C. ON God

C. 上帝

II. Basic principles of Patristic teaching

II. 教父之授業的基本原則

4. Discerning between «Theology» and «Provision»

4. 「神學」和「上帝之命 」之間的辨別

The question of the “Provident” Trinity’s affiliation to the eternal Trinity was also related to the Filioque issue. The following observations on this point are basic ones. First of all, the Fathers had stressed that the essence of God is altogether inconceivable, unthinkable and incomprehensible, and, for the Fathers of the East, it is also without participation, that is, one cannot participate in the essence of God. According to the West, the Scholastics and Aquinatus, it is possible to participate in the essence of God. Therefore, from this aspect, we can discern the difference between “theology” and “provision”. If “theology” were to concern itself only with the essence of God, then there would have been no problem, because, the essence of God is something incomprehensible and as such, we would have no theology on the essence of God. But theology, as a field of reference to God as He is throughout eternity, is juxtaposed to provision, which preoccupied itself with the Trinity - the Triadic form of God’s existence. Therefore, we cannot say that here we have an absolute opposition, and that we have nothing to say; We can speak of the personae of the Holy Trinity, and not only can we speak of them, but – more importantly – we can participate in the life of the three Personae. It is the life that God has precisely invited us to participate in, through our theosis: our participation in the life of the Trinity, by partaking of the filial, loving association between the Father and the Son. And that is what Christ did: he brought to this world, to us, this relationship between the Father and the Son. And He said to us “now you are also a part of this relationship, and my Father shall acknowledge you as His sons”. This is the ultimate gift of adoption. It is thus, that we enter the Triadic life of God. Here, there is no room for negation. One must be careful here, because lately, we have begun to flirt somewhat excessively with Negation, as Lossky for example did. There are very many dangers in this theory of Negation. With regard to the essence of God, there is no doubt whatsoever that we have Negation. Nobody can talk about the essence of God. But to confess our faith in the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, that is not Negation; we know that God is Father, Son and Holy Spirit. With regard to the personae, we have affirmation; and it is not only a logical and intellectual affirmation because we have confessed it as such; it is a participation, an existential participation, in which we partake of these personal associations of God. With the Holy Trinity, there is no room for negation, except perhaps during the use of analogies, none of which are befitting the Holy Trinity. When we wish to describe the Trinity with human analogies, the analogies will inevitably stop somewhere, as in the analogy of the three (separate) persons etc. Since we can, therefore, make mention of God per se with regard to His Triadic existence and not His essence, then the question is posed as to whether our reference to the Trinity in God’s eternal existence is supported by, or rather reveals, the same relations and the same attributes that are revealed in ‘provision’. Let us take Augustine for example. When he gives a definite hypostatic attribute to the Logos by naming Him “God’s Knowledge”, then whenever the Logos reveals Himself within the ‘providing’ Trinity, within ‘provision’, He must, above all, reveal Himself with this hypostatic attribute of His, namely Knowledge. In other words, this will be the revelation or the cognitive means by which we may reach God. And in fact, during the 2nd and moreso in the 3rd century, the meaning of Logos was conveyed in this sense. The Son’s relating to the Logos in the Gospel of John, gave rise to Justin and a number of other contemporary writers to see in the Persona of Christ the cognitive means by which we could reach God. That is why he placed all philosophers within this “seminal” logos as he named it: They are all participants of expression, therefore the attribute of the Son is a revelatory means for the cognizance of God. At the same time, the Holy Spirit manifests itself with other attributes, such as the attribute of communion, hence the Holy Spirit presents God as a communion. Now, whether the Holy Spirit and the Logos have these attributes in Their hypostases eternally, or they take them on for our sake during ‘provision’, is a delicate and very significant issue. The Greek Fathers avoided giving definite hypostatic attributes to the Personae of the Holy Trinity, because if they did what Augustine did by giving hypostatic attributes, we would then have to say that whatever God is in His eternal existence (for example that He is the Logos), this would also apply during ‘provision’. In this way, we would arrive at a compulsory ‘provision’, because if the Son were the Logos of God, or the cognizance of God, then this cognizance must also permeate ‘provision’, in order for God to be recognized. He would perforce have to be carried over to ‘provision’, through the Son. In Mediaeval times, the question had been posed as to whether any other of the Personae of the Holy Trinity could become incarnate. The answer given by some was that this was possible; there was no logical necessity for the Son alone to become incarnate. Other contemporaries (and more recently Rahner and other western theologians) claimed that only the Son could have become incarnate, because He alone is the Logos Who makes God known. Within God Himself eternally, God recognizes Himself through the Son – the Logos. Therefore if God wants to make Himself known to us as well, in providence, He must again use this instrument of knowledge that He has, i.e., the Logos. This choice is subsequently a compulsory one that incarnates the Logos. It is not free. On the other hand, if we avoid giving a definite content to the attributes of the Personae, and of course do not relate the Logos as God’s cognitive instrument, then why should only the Son become incarnate? We have no logical answer, no compulsory logical argument that could convince anyone that only the Son could become incarnate, simply because He alone has that attribute. Instead, we attribute it to freedom, inasmuch as the Son said, “yes” to the Father freely, and that He took on this mission ( provision ) upon Himself. We are thus moving within a realm of freedom and not in an atmosphere of logical necessity. Otherwise, if we were to give a positive content to the hypostatic attributes, we would necessarily be moving along the lines of logical need with regard to ‘provision’. When the issue of the Filioque is expanded on, you shall see how both Augustine and Aquinatus indeed supported the argument that if the Son and Logos are the cognizance of God, and the Spirit is the Love of God (note Augustine’s argument which Thomas repeats), then the Spirit’s origin must be eternally dependent on the Son also, because (as stressed by Augustine) cognizance precedes Love; you cannot love something that you do not recognize. This is a gross mistake, as analyzed in the relative chapter; at any rate it gives rise to a logical argument, a logical requisite. If you cannot love something that you do not know, then God cannot love Himself, without prior cognizance of Himself through the Son, and this can be so, only if based on the association between memory and cognizance, which enables, specifies and realizes the Mind’s cognitive ability, which is God. It is only on this basis that Love – the Spirit - can be constructed. You can understand how, in this way, we are dealing only with logical necessities when we give a positive content or positive attributes to the hypostases. And, by avoiding to give this definitive content, the Greek Fathers are simultaneously introducing an air of freedom to all the important questions such as “why does the Son become incarnate, and not the Spirit?” However, this means we cannot fully relate the Trinity of ‘provision’ with the eternal Trinity of Theology. There is a certain difficulty here. If we do not associate it, we risk claiming that in ‘provision’, God did not give nor did He show His true Self, but that He was somehow hiding something from us; that He did not tell us who He actually is. Hence, we cannot say that the Theological Trinity is one thing and the Providing Trinity is another. We must state that the Trinity is one and the same. Then where is the difference? The difference is that for the Theological Trinity we cannot say anything definitive as regards the content of the personaes’ attributes. We have an element of negation here. For the “Providing” Trinity we have positive things to say about the attributes of the Personae, but this is only because these Personae have freely undertaken these kinds of attributes within providence. That is, if the Son appears as the revelation of the Father (he that has seen me has seen the Father), this does not mean that in the eternal Trinity the Son necessarily has this function and attribute. If the Spirit appears as love and communion to us, and as that which creates the bond of love within the Church, which builds the church etc., it doesn’t mean that within the Theological Trinity the Holy Spirit has the same function. Because by the same reasoning, we could say that the Crucifixion of the Logos is similarly a part of the eternal, Theological Trinity. Just as the Son undertakes a ministration, an attribute, a relationship that He did not previously have eternally, thus the Spirit and all the other attributes of Christ that we see in Providence are not extensions of the Theological, eternal Trinity. These are attributes taken on by the Personae freely, for our sake. At this point we must make another important observation, i.e., it is precisely because these attributes have to do with ‘provision’ and not theology, the differentiation of these attributes must be limited to ‘provision’ only, and that when we refer to theology, we cannot make such differentiations, i.e., to say that the One is Love and the Other is Knowledge. None of these can be said with regard to theology. So, what does this mean? It means that at the level of theology, all actions - because they are in fact actions – are uniform, and simultaneous. They diversify, at the level of providence. Let us take the Love of God. We cannot say that Love is a characteristic of only One Persona. We must say that Love is the common characteristic of all Personae. Like every other action, it springs from the Father. “The Love of God and our Father”. It participates in this action, just as the Son and the Spirit participate in the one essence and the one action. And the action is common. Every action coming from God is common to all three Personae. It is only when we reach the level of ‘Provision’ that the differentiation begins, and the distribution of attributes and responsibilities. In Theology, we cannot do this at the level of the eternal God. This is equally important with regard the to the unison of God; not from the aspect of essence for which we can say nothing, but from the aspect of action. Because as you know, it is by the action of God that He communicates with us and we with Him. Saint Gregory Palamas made this distinction between essence and action. It is of course an older one, it dates back to the Cappadocians, but it was systematized and exploited further, and the purpose of this distinction was to keep the essence of God unaffected by ‘Provision’. That is, God was to maintain His transcendence, during His actions within Providence. Of course the action of God is not something that He acquires in order to enact ‘provision’; it is something that already exists. But in Theology, whih comes before ‘provision’, this action is uniform. During ‘provision’, it is expressed in different ways, without creating any division or distance or separation of the three Personae. The three Personae in Providence always act in unison, but not all three do the same thing. The action of God becomes differentiated in the sphere of ‘Provision’, without inducing a separation of the Personae. Where the Father is, there the Son and the Spirit are; where the Son is, there the Father and the Spirit are. They cannot part. But, whatever the Father does, is not what the Son does, etc. All these differentiated actions of God in ‘Provision’ do not comprise extensions of differentiation within he “eternal” Trinity. Western theology reached the point of relating ‘provisional’ differentiations to differentiations within the “eternal” Trinity, that is, with ontological differentiations. And this is one of the reasons that it has become theologically trapped in the FILIOQUE as well. The position of the Hellenic Fathers automatically creates a radical distinction between theology and ‘provision’, which was assuredly pointed out by Vasileios the Great (who by the way was the one who introduced this, as we have no similar formulation before him), and we shall briefly outline the history of this case. In his work “On the Holy Spirit”, Vasileios the Great introduces a glorification text – or rather, defends a glorification text – which he had introduced in the Liturgy in his province, which differed from the glorification that was common at the time, and was of Alexandrian origin. The Alexandrian form was “Glory to the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit”. Saint Gregory’s glorification – for which he was obviously criticized and had to account, by claiming that it was a very ancient form – was the following: “Glory to the Father, also to the Son, and the Holy Spirit”. He replaced the “through” (through the Son) and the “in” (in the Holy Spirit) with “also” and “and”. There is a theological expedience in this replacement, which he expands on, in his work “on the Holy Spirit”. The expedience is that with the former glorification – the Alexandrian one – with its use of “through” and “in”, there is an underlying innuendo of God on the basis of ‘provision’. Because it is precisely in ‘Provision’ that God appears to us, or, that we recognize Him in this way: through the Son, in the Holy Spirit. This way also contains the element of hierarchy, of classification; i.e. the Son precedes and the Spirit follows. Vasileios the Great wrote, for the reason that the “Spirit-militants” whom he wished to thwart used this “in” (in the Holy Spirit) as a denoting of space, so that when they said “in Spirit” in the glorification, and given that “in” presupposes space, the Spirit is therefore understood as being within creation, inside space, and therefore not within Divinity. This was a pretext, but essentially, Vasileios wanted to say something more. He made this distinction that I mentioned, between the way in which we refer to God on the basis of ‘Provision’, and the way in which we refer to God, not on the basis of ‘Provision’, but more on the basis of the Eucharist experience, during Worship. Thus, this form of “though the Son, in the Holy Spirit” is not necessary when we wish to express the relations between the Father, the Son and the Spirit. Take special note of this detail, as it is very delicate. In this way, Vasileios the Great creates a kind of negation, as the prepositions “through” and “in” have something definite to say about the three Personae, while the “also” and “and” do not say anything positive. They simply tell us that the one is alongside the other. In this way, Theology (in the true sense of the term) is stripped by Vasileios the Great, of the associations between the three Personae that is observed in ‘Provision’. And this is important, because as we shall see when we discuss the FILIOQUE later on, the Alexandrian Fathers and especially Saint Cyril of Alexandria, because they were based on this glorification, had already reached the point of somehow transferring the FILIOQUE to the eternal existence of God; i.e. the dependence of the Spirit from the Son, as if the Spirit proceeded eternally through the Son. We shall see, when we discuss the FILIOQUE, how this had a certain basis and had been partially accepted, that the Spirit proceeded through the Son, but it will require extremely lengthy explanations. Our topic here is to stress that, according to Vasileios the Great, the subject of God on the basis of ‘provision’ includes associations of the Personae that are not necessarily associations that exist at the level of Theology. That was why he made these changes to the prepositions in the glorification. He replaced them with “also” and “and”, as a means of declaring that while we can say “through” and “in” with regard to Providence, in Theology there is another way, without the use of “through” and “in”. Thus, he introduced a deep incision between the “Providing” Trinity and the “Theological” Trinity, without implying any other Trinity. The conclusion therefore from the all the above is that the Holy Trinity that we see in ‘Provision’ allows us to give a definitive content to the hypostatic attributes. However, it is a definitive content that we cannot extend into the “eternal” Trinity.

「神命性的」 三位一體 (Provident Trinity) 與永恒的三位一體是有甚麼形式的從屬關係的這個問題也與關於Filioque 的那個問題有所聯繫。 關於這點所作出的以下的觀察等等是屬於基本性的。首先，教父們強調著上帝的本質是完全不能想像的、難以思考的、以及不能理解的，並且，對東方的教父們來說，它也是不能被參與的，也就是，没有人事是可以參與到上帝的本質的。而根據西方的思想家 （例如，經院哲學家和 Aquinatus）的說法，人事則是可以參與到上帝的本質的。 因此，從這個方面看來，我們能夠辨別出在「神學」和「神命」 (provision) 之間所有的差異。如果「神學」只是關心於上帝的本質的話，那就不會有問題，因為，上帝的本質是一件不能理解的東西，所以，我們就不會有關於上帝的本質的神學。 但是神學是引用到永恒的上帝的總領域的，而它是與「神命之性」相並列的； 「神命之性」是關心於三位一體之性的 -- 上帝的三位一體之存有方式。因此，我們不能說，在這裡我們有一個絕對的相對性，並且我們甚麼也不能說； 我們能夠談起神聖的三位一體的人格，並且，我們不僅僅能夠談起他們，但是 -- 更重要地 -- 我們能夠參與於這三個人格的生命。 上帝邀請我們以我們的神化 （theosis） 來參與這些生命： 當我們參與於在父親和兒子之間的溫馨的協會的時候，我們即是參與到三位一體的生命了。而這就是基督所作的：他帶給這個世界，他帶給我們，這種父親和兒子之間的關係。並且他向我們說， 「現在，你也是這個關係中的一部分了； 我的父親將承認你為他的兒子」。 這是最極端的禮物：收養。 我們即是如此而進入上帝的三位一體的生命中的。 在這裡，沒有否定的餘地。但是你一定得小心著，因為最近，我們開始有點極度地玩著否定性，比如 Lossky。在關於否定的理論中有很多的危險。 在關於上帝的本質方面，無疑的，我們有否定性。沒有人能夠談論上帝的本質。 但是， 去承認我們對父親，兒子和聖靈的信仰，那不是否定； 我們知道上帝是父親，兒子，和聖靈。關於人格這方面呢，我們是有肯定性的；並且這不僅僅是一種邏輯性的和智力性的確認， 只因為我們承認了他們； 這是一種參與，一種存在性的參與，在其中我們參與到這些上帝的私人性的協會等等。 在神聖的三位一體之中，沒有否定的余地，除了在使用類比之時，而那些類比也不完全適用於神聖的三位一體。當我們希望以在人生中所能找到的類比來描述三位一體的時候，這些類比將不可避免地在某處失效，比如，在以三個個別之人來作類比之時等等。 既然我們只能夠在關於上帝的三位一體性的存有方面提及到上帝，而不是在關於他的本質方面，我們就有這個問題，我們對在於上帝的永恒存有中的三位一體性的引用是否是支持於，或說得更確切些， 是否有揭露出，在「神命之性」中所透露出的同樣的關係和同樣的特質。讓我們以 Augustine 為例。 當他給予 Logos 一個本質性的 (hypostatic) 特質的時候，稱之為「上帝的知識」，那麼， 每當 Logos 在“神命性” (providing) 的三位一體之內，在 「神命」之中，顯露自己之時，他必須與他的本質性的的特質一起顯露自己，也就是知識。換句話說，這將是能使我們找到上帝的啟示或智知的工具。事實上，在第二以及第三世紀期間，Logos 的意思就是以這種意義來傳達的。在約翰福音中所出現的兒子與 Logos 之連合，引得 Justin 以及其他當代的思想家們將基督的人格看成是能使我們找到上帝的智知的工具。 那就是為甚麼他把所有的哲學家皆分置於那個他所謂的 「原種性的」 (seminal) Logos 以內： 他們皆是參與表達之者，因此，兒子的特質是可用為對上帝的意識的一種啟示途徑。同時，聖靈自顯出其他特質，如共融的特質，因此，聖靈將上帝介紹為共融。 現在，聖靈和 Logos 是否在他們的本質 （hypostases） 裡永遠有著這些性質，或者呢，他們只是因那為了我們的神命之故而暫時具有他們的，這是一個非常微妙和顯著的問題。希臘教父們避免給予神聖的三位一體的人格們任何明確的本質性的特質，因為他們若是如 Augustine 的一般，而去給予那些本質性的特質的話，我們然後則必須說，上帝在他的永恒的存有中所是的一切（例如，他是 Logos ），在神命的期間這也得是如此的。 如此，我們就會抵達於一種強制性的“神命”，因為，如果兒子是上帝的 Logos，或是對上帝的意識，這個意識也必須渗入於那個“神命”之內，以便能使上帝被認識到。 它則必須經由兒子而被帶到 “神命”中。在中古的時期時，曾出現過這個問題，神聖的三位一體中的其他的人格是否也可道成肉身。某些人回答說，這是可能的； 邏輯並没有限制只有兒子才可道成肉身的。那時代的其他人 （以及在最近 Rahner 和其他西方世界的神學者） 則聲稱，只有兒子才能夠道成肉身的，因為只有他才是能使上帝被認識的 Logos。 在上帝自己之中，他永遠地透過兒子 -- 也就是 Logos -- 而認識自己。因此，如果上帝想使我們也 （在神命之中： providence) 認識他的話，他則必須再次使用這個他所有的知識用的工具，也就是 Logos。這種使得 Logos 道成肉身的選擇則是強制性的。這不容許其他的方式。 而在另一方面上， 如果我們避免給予人格的特質一個明確的內容，並且自然地不把 Logos 當成上帝的認知所用的工具，那，為甚麼只有兒子才應該能够道成肉身呢？我們對此沒有邏輯性的答覆，沒有強制性的邏輯性的論點，以便能夠使人相信， 只有兒子才是能夠道成肉身的，因為只有他才有那種特質。 反之，我們將此歸因於自由： 由於兒子對父親自由地說，「是的」， 因而自己接受這個任務 （神命）。我們因此是在自由性的境界內活動的，而不是在邏輯的必要性的範圍中。不然，若是我們給予本質性的特質一個明確的內容的話，我們在關於 “神命”這方面上，就一定得按照邏輯的必要性而行動。 當我們再去講 Filioque 的那個問題的時候，你將看到 Augustine 和 Aquinatus 兩者皆支持著那種論點： 如果兒子和 Logos 皆是對上帝的意識、而聖靈是上帝的愛的話 （注意這個 Augustine 的論點； 托馬斯後來會再重複它），那，聖靈的起源一定也得是永遠地依賴於兒子的，因為 （如 Augustine 所強調過的） 意識是在愛之前的； 你不能够愛一件你不認識的東西。 這是一個很大的錯誤，就如我們在相對的分章中已分析過的；無論如何，這引至於一個邏輯性的論點，一個邏輯性的先决條件。如果你不能愛一件你不知道的東西，那，上帝就不能愛自己，要是他没有事先以兒子而得到的對自己的認識的話； 而這能夠是這樣，只因在記憶和意識之間的關系之故，指明著和實現到理智的認知的能力，也就是上帝他自己。 我們是只有在這個基礎上才能够建造出愛 -- 也就是聖靈。你可以瞭解到，我們以此如何僅僅是在應付著邏輯性的需要， 當我們給予本質 （hypostases） 一種肯定性的内容或者是明確的特質的時候。然而，因他們避免給予這種肯定性的内容之故，希臘教父們也是在對於「為甚麼只有兒子才可道成肉身，而不是聖靈？」之類的重要問題給予出了活動自由。 然而，這意味著，我們不能完全地將神命性的三位一體與神學中的永恒性的三位一體相聯繫上。在這裡有某種難題。 如果我們不把它們互相聯繫上，我們就冒著誤說以下的危險： 在“神命”中，上帝並沒有給出也沒有顯示出他的真實的自己，反之，他是在對我們隱藏著某些東西； 他並沒有告訴我們他真正地是誰。因此，我們不能够說， 神學性的三位一體是一回事，而供應性的三位一體又是另一回事。我們必須說明，三位一體向來是同一回事。那，這兩者之間的差異又是在哪裡？ 差異則在於， 在關於神學性的三位一體的方面，我們不能够說出任何明確的關於人格之特質的內容。我們在這裡面對的是否定性。 然而，在關於「神命性」的三位一體的方面，我們則能夠明確地說出人格的特質等等，而這只是因為這些人格在「神命性」中自由地採納了這些各種的特質。也就是說，如果兒子顯現出父親的話 （看見了我的人也就是看見了父親），這並不意味著，在永恒的三位一體裡，兒子也是一定有著這種功能和特質的。 如果聖靈對我們來說是愛和共融，並且是他在教會中建立出人人之間互相親愛的關係 （而是這愛建造出教會的），這也不意味著，聖靈在神學性的三位一體之內會有著同樣的功能。 因為以同樣的推論法，我們也能夠說，Logos 之被釘死於十字架上之事也是永恒的神學性的三位一體中的一部份。正如兒子接受採納了一個功能，一種特質， 或是一個他以前所未永恒地有的人際關係，所以，聖靈以及我們在上帝之命 （Providence） 中所看到的基督之全部的其他的特質等等皆不是神學性的、永恒性的三位一體中的一部份。這些全都是人格們為了我們的緣故而决定自由採納的特質。 在此，我們必須做出另一個重要的觀察，那就是，正因為這些特質是與“神命性” 而不是與神學有關的，這些特質等等的區別性一定是只限於“神命”的，並且，當我們提及到神學的時候，我們不能做出同樣的區別，例如，說道這一個是愛，那一個是知識。 在講神學之時，我們不能說任何這些。那，這是甚麼意思呢？ 這個的意思是， 在神學的程度上，所有行動 -- 因為他們在事實上都是行動 -- 皆是同樣的，同時的。他們是在天命 (Providence) 的程度上才分出個性的。 讓我們用上帝的愛來做例子。 我們不能够說，愛只是一個人格中的特點。我們必須說，愛是所有人格皆有的共同特點。就像每一個其他的行為一樣，愛是出現於父親身中的。「上帝和我們父親的愛」。 它參與於這個行為，正如兒子和聖靈參與於那一個本質和那一個行為。而這個行為是他們共同所有的。每一個來自上帝的行為皆是共同於所有三個人格的。只有當我們到達供應的境界之時，他們之間的區別才開始出現 （特質和責任才開始分配於各者）。在神學中，我們在永恒的上帝的境界中則不能如此做。 這在關於上帝的一體性的方面上來說也是同等重要的； 這不是從本質的方面來說 （在此我們甚麼也不能說），而是從行為的方面來說。因為，你已知道，上帝是以他的行為而與我們聯絡的，而我們也是如此與他聯絡的。St. Gregory Palamas 曾在本質和行為之間作出區別。這種區别當然已是很老的一個了，它的起源追溯到 Cappadocian 教父們的時代，但是它在此進一步地被系統化和利用，而這種區别的目的乃是使上帝的本質不受於供應之影響。也就是，上帝將在他的天命中 (Providence)，在他的行為期間，保持他的超越性。 當然， 上帝的行為並不是他為了要實行他的天命而得取的一些東西； 這些在之前就已經存在了。但是在位於天命之實行之前的神學中， 這些行為是一體的。 在實行天命的期間，這些行為是以不同的方式被表達出的，而它們又不在三個人格之間制造出任何分别、區分、或距離。 這三個人格在天命中的行為總是和諧的，但是他們不是都作同樣的事情。上帝的行為在天命中被區分出，而又不造成人格之間的分離。 父親在哪裡，兒子和聖靈就在那裡； 兒子在哪裡， 父親和聖靈就在那裡。他們不能够彼此分離。但是，父親所做的事，不是兒子所作的事，等等。這些上帝在天命中所做出的分别行為，並不代表著在「永恒的」三位一體之中所有的區別之延伸。 西方的神學已經到了這種地步，將天命所用的區別與在「永恒的」三位一體之中所有的區別 （也就是與存在性的區別） 相聯繫上。而這也就是西方的神學之所以被困於 FILIOQUE 之事的理由之一。 希臘教父們的意見自動地在神學和天命之行之間作出一個基本的區別，這已由Vasileios the Great 所指出過。 （而他就是介紹出這個區別之者； 我們在他之前沒有類似的說法。） 我們將簡要地略述一下這事的歷史。 在他的「關於聖靈」的一書中， Vasileios the Great 介紹出一篇讚美書 -- 或者說，他辯護著一篇讚美書。 他在他的省區的禮儀中介紹出這篇讚美書。一般的頌揚書是起源於亞歷山大的，而它與這一般的頌揚書不同。亞歷山大的形式是： 「在聖靈中， 經由兒子， 而讚美父親的榮耀」。St. Gregory 因他的頌揚不同之故而被批評； 他因而必須為此說明，聲稱這是一種很古老的形式。 它的形式是： 「榮譽是歸於父親的，同時也是歸於兒子以及聖靈的」。他將「 經由」和「在... 中」改成「也」和「以及」。 在這個代替之中有一種神學性的便利性 ，他在他的「關於聖靈」的一書中將之說明。所謂的便利性則是，之前的亞歷山大的頌揚，以其「在」和「 經由」，有一種在「供應」的基礎上所建立的間接性的對上帝之引用。 因為上帝即是在 「神命」中顯現於我們的，而我們即是以這方式認識他的： 在聖靈中， 經由兒子。 這種方式也包含著階級性的或分類性的功能； 即，兒子在先， 而聖靈在後。Vasileios the Great 寫道，他所希望阻礙的 「神靈戰士們」 用這個 （在聖靈中的）「在」以表示空間，以至當他們在頌揚中說「在聖靈中」的時候 -- 而「在」如今表示著空間 -- 聖靈則因此被理解為是在空間裡面的受造物之一，而不再是在神性之內的了。這是藉口，但是Vasileios 主要地是想說更多的一些東西。 他做出這個我已提及過的區別，也就是在我們以「天命」為基礎來提及上帝的方式，以及我們不是以天命為基礎，而是在崇拜期間、在聖餐體驗的基礎上來提及上帝的方式之間所有的區別。因此，當我們希望表達出在父親，兒子，和聖靈之間的關係之時，這種「在聖靈中， 經由兒子」的方式不是必要的。特别注意一下這個細節，因為它在實際上是很細致的。 以這方式， Vasileios the Great 建立了一種否定式，因為 「在」 和 「經由」 在有關於三個人格的方面說出了一些明確的東西，然而 「也」 以及 「和」 却未說出任何明確的東西。它們只是告訴我們，一個是在另一個的旁邊。 以這方式，（真正的）神學被 Vasileios the Great 奪去了在 “天命” (provision) 中所觀察到的三個人格之間的協會。 而這是很重要的，因為，我們在之後討論 FILIOQUE 的時候你將會明白， 亞歷山大的教父們，尤其是聖西里爾 (St. Cyril)，因為他們以這種頌揚為基礎，已經到了如此的地步，把 FILIOQUE 轉移到了上帝的永恒的存有的身上； 也就是，聖靈是依賴於兒子的，好像他永遠地是自兒子而來的。我們將明白，當我們討論 FILIOQUE 之時，這如何是有某些基礎的，並且在部分上已被人們接受了 （也就是，聖靈是自兒子而來的），但是它將需要非常冗長的解釋。我們在這裡的目的乃是強調，根據 Vasileios the Great，建立於天命(provision) 的基礎上的有關於上帝的主題未必是包括著在神學中所有的人格之間的協會。那就是為甚麼他對那些在頌揚中的前置詞做出這些改革。他將它們取代為「也」以及「和」，以便聲明，我們雖然能夠在關於天命 （Providence） 之時說 「在」 和 「經由」，在神學中則有另一種方式，不用「在」 和 「經由」。 因此，他在「神命性」 的三位一體以及「 神學性」 的三位一體之間介紹出一個極深的分別，而又不意味著任何其他的三位一體之性。 從以上全部所能做出的結論則是， 我們在天命中所看到的神聖的三位一體允許我們給予本質性的特質一個最終的內容。但是，我們不能將此最終的內容伸展至「永恒性的」三位一體身上。