C. ON God

C. 上帝

II. Basic principles of Patristic teaching

II. 教父之授業的基本原則

3. Augustine' s views

3. 奥古斯汀的見解

In the previous lesson, we expanded on the Cappadocian Fathers’ theology, and mainly that of the Holy Trinity; we saw exactly how they promoted the dogma as compared to their predecessors. May I remind you of the main points: a) they clarified terminology, by making the significant step of relating the term ‘hypostasis’ to the term ’persona’. b) they disengaged the term ‘hypostasis’ from the term ‘essence’; Even at the time of Athanasios the Great and his contemporaries and up to the time of the Synod of 362, these two terms were linked. They therefore made this distinction between essence and hypostasis, by transferring the term hypostasis from the realm of the essence to the realm of the persona. The terms ‘persona’ and ‘essence’ are now related, and the reason they did this, was to give the persona an ontological content, in order to say that the three personae are not three facades (which was what the term formerly implied), but three personae. The term persona normally signified a façade and a mask, thus always giving rise to suspicions of Savellianism. So, after the Cappadocians, we were able to say that God is one essence, three personae, without the risk of Savellianism, because personae now signify hypostases, and hypostases are complete beings. c) they introduced the notion of ‘cause’ within God’s being. That is, they posed the question of who is the cause of God’s existence, of God existing, and the fact that He is God and exists as a Trinity. The reply that they gave to this question, was that the ‘cause’ is only the Father; and when we say ‘only the Father’, we are chiefly pointing out that the essence is not the cause (keep this in mind, because we shall see that it is of great importance) and secondly, we are denoting that neither of the other two personae are the ‘cause’. So, the ‘cause’ is the Father; and from this ‘cause’, the Son is primarily evident, while the Holy Spirit proceeds from the ‘cause’ (who is the Father), through Him that is ‘from the cause’ (the Son). This may not be entirely clear, but we shall talk about it later on. What interests us at this point, is to clarify the meaning of the term ‘cause’; to see how the existence of God is not simply a given reality. It is a reality that is owed to something, and that ‘something’ is the Father; it is a persona. It is not the essence of God that broadens, expands or divides; and that is why only the Father can primarily be called God. The Father is God, in the sense that He does not owe His existence to anyone else; He is the very cause of existence, whereas in the case of the Son and the Holy Spirit, the fact is that their coming into being is owed to someone else – the Father – and subsequently, in God we have a narrowing down to one persona, one hypostasis and therefore an unshackled cause, not a compulsory projection or expansion of God’s single essence. We shall see what significant existential consequences this has. Having set down these guidelines, the Cappadocians created a kind of theology (at least for the East, who followed them) where the persona – the hypostasis – played a primary ontological role. Whereas in ancient philosophy the leading ontological role always belonged to the essence (each human was in essence a person, since human nature preceded him; man does not bring human nature into being, hence the priority of essence or nature, with the persona in a secondary role), with the Cappadocians this logic was overturned. In God, essence does not come first; first comes the persona of the Father, Who causes essence to exist. The Greek verb ‘exist’ is the root from which the word ‘hypostasis’ is derived; thus we say ‘he exists’. Therefore, to exist means that you are you, and not someone else; that you are an individual. Well, God exists, as hypostases. And God’s essence exists, only as hypostases. And that which makes it exist as hypostases is again a hypostasis and not any attribute that the essence itself may have. This means God exists independently, and not due to a given essence, or a given reality. And the essence, which – as the Cappadocians and Vasileios said – cannot be bare, cannot be devoid of a hypostasis, acquires hypostasis, it exists, it comes into existence thanks to a persona, and in the form of these three Personae. Therefore in this context, the Holy Trinity is a primary ontological meaning; it is not something that we add to God’s being, instead, it is that which makes God be. In other words, if the Trinity were removed, God would not exist. Because the only way that God can exist, is as a Trinity; and this is attributed to the Father – a persona – and not an essence. Therefore the essence – albeit important and necessary – does not have that primary significance of causing God to exist. That which causes God to exist, is the persona of the Father. I have insisted on these details, because I wanted you to see what happens in the West with Augustinee, who moves in an entirely different way in theology, by not bearing in mind the Cappadocians’ theology. It is important to stress that the West never assimilated the Cappadocian Fathers’ theology, to this day. The FILIOQUE has also something to do with this problem, as we shall see. And not only the FILIOQUE, but a number of other problems related to East-West differences are attributed to the fact that the Cappadocian theology was not assimilated historically by the West. Augustinee’s theology had interposed, and especially during the Franks era, it became the West’s theological flag, in contradiction to eastern theology, from whence, tremendous problems ensued. But the roots of these problems are found in the fact that the Cappadocian theology was not assimilated by the West; instead, Augustinee’s theology was sanctioned. What, therefore, is Augustinee’s theology? Augustinee mainly concerns himself with the dogma on God, in his writings “On the Holy Trinity” ( DE TRINITATAE ). In it, he is not as concerned with documenting the dogma on the Holy Trinity, as he is in finding ways to make this dogma comprehensible, to find analogies in human existence, and to somehow assist the thinking person not to reject the theory on the Holy Trinity, which at first glance is so difficult for the human mind to accept. So, while searching for these analogies in human existence, he makes a serious mistake from the very beginning, which will henceforth leave its mark on the theology of the Holy Trinity. The mistake is that he searches for an analogy or a model in one single person, whereas the Cappadocian Fathers could never see the analogy of the Trinity through the observation of a single person. They always needed three persons to draw the analogy. In other words, for the Cappadocians each divine persona was a complete entity, a complete being: thus, in terms of our human experience, an exact correspondence to a trinity would be a Peter, a Kostas and a John, whereas with Augustine this is exactly the mistake he made, in that he believed the Trinity to be found only in Kostas, i.e., by observing only the one person. Notice his train of thought: By observing only one person, he perceived – under the neo-Platonic influence that he carried – that the essential thing in a person is the mind. This was the Platonic viewpoint: what is that which makes me be me? my mind. And this is what later led to Augustinee’s theory, to be subsequently developed by Cartesian and western thought in general, which has all those introvert thoughts on seeking one’s conscience, of discovering myself on my own, without the need to observe anyone else nearby. The ability to think, to be conscious of one’s self, is, for the West, the key to understanding one’s existence. “COGITO ERGO SUM” – I comprehend, therefore I exist. Therefore it is enough for you to say that you exist; it is enough to be on our own, in order to study your existence; that is why it is not necessary to look around you. So, by looking at one person, we strive to find therein the analogies that will lead us to the existence of a trinity. We find the following elements that Augustinee has isolated, and on which he builds his theology: a) The basic element is the mind. b) The basic element of this mind is memory, from which its entire existence springs. Observe, why memory is of such importance. It is the Platonic idea of remembrance. Everything we understand, think about and know of is stored inside us. Each one of us has a soul, in which eternally exists a storeroom of – let’s say - the truth. To Platonic thought, knowledge is nothing more than a recollection of this truth. The derivative of the Greek word “truth” is “un-forgettable”. When you cease to forget, that is when you find the truth; in other words, knowledge and reality emerge from oblivion. This meant that memory is the source of existence. Man’s mind has a source – memory – from which our existence springs. If we now take from Athanasios and the Cappadocian Fathers the traditional expression “source of divinity”, we will observe that the Cappadocian Fathers did not dwell on the meaning of “source”, because “source” implies something that gushes perforce. This traditional image of a source is what Augustinee embraced; he translated it from the Greek text and thenceforth related the source to the Father. There is also the term “beginning” – the Source and the Beginning. This is also used by Athanasios and the Cappadocians, but not overly stressed by the latter. They state that the Father is the source, or that He is the beginning, but they use it in the context of a cause. The differences between these terms are very subtle. Anyway, the source and the beginning, all these are the Father, and all these are memory. To human psychology, memory is the source from which primarily knowledge springs forth. Knowledge is a basic characteristic of the mind and of the human being. God is the Mind; the mind has a source of knowledge, and the knowledge that is produced is the Logos, the second persona of the Holy Trinity. In order to prove that God as an intellectual being - and especially as a supreme Mind - is not without knowledge, he believed that precisely the Logos of God was the means by which God knows. But, knowledge is always drawn from memory, and this he analyzes in great detail: I would never know this table, if the notion of a table were not already stored in my memory bank. It is the basic Platonic concept, that the ideas of all things are stored within us. Therefore, when I recognize this table, it is from within the source that is my memory, that the knowledge of the table springs from. If I know nothing, then it would mean that I am not an active mind. In order to be an active mind, I must express it, and God is an active mind; He has a Logos. And Logos signifies knowledge. So, from the source that is the Father comes knowledge that is the Logos – God’s knowledge. But then, knowledge of what? (given that there is nothing else except God). Naturally, He has knowledge of Himself – this is self-awareness. The Logos knows the Father – the object of His knowledge is the Father – consequently we have a circular reference, a self-knowledge of God. But again in accordance with another basic Platonic theory, God is not only the Mind, He is also the absolute Good. The absolute good cannot be just the Mind; it must be the Mind of absolute Goodness. According to Plato, good always attracts love and Eros, and also beauty. Just as beauty arouses Eros, likewise goodness arouses Eros, love. Now, if God is goodness and if there is no other goodness except for Him, whose love would He arouse? The Logos has a separateness towards the Father and He recognizes Him, so, by recognizing Him, He recognizes Him as the Good, and that is when Eros is born, which is the love towards the Good, who is the Father. This love between the Son and the Father is the Spirit. The Spirit is a third form of existence, by which the Father loves the Son and the Son loves the Father; it is – as Augustine called it – the “NEXUS AMORIS”, the bond, the bond of love between the Father and the Son. The Spirit has this – let us say – hypostatic attribute. However, this generates the following problem. As you can see, by accepting the Father as memory, the Son as knowledge and the Spirit as love, you will have three separate definitions and descriptions of the contents of each persona. Each persona has its own positive function; it has hypostatic attributes. The Son has the attribute and the content of knowledge; the spirit has the content of love. Therefore, there is a way here to positively describe the hypostatic attributes of the three Personae. If you compare this with the Cappadocian Fathers and the eastern Fathers in general, you will see that for them, something like this is impossible; they avoid giving any positive content whatsoever to hypostatic attributes. When they are called upon to give their reply on what the hypostatic attribute is of the Son, or of the Spirit, and – more important – the difference between “being born of” and “proceeding from”, they avoid defining the difference between being born and proceeding from. Why? Because they do not want to give any positive content to the Hypostases. The Son differs from the Father, simply because He is not the Father; and the Spirit – likewise – is not the Son, etc. etc. Thus, we say that the hypostatic attributes are non-communing ones, as opposed to Augustine, who gives a positive content to each Divine Attribute. Straight away, the danger of anthropomorphism arises which is exactly what the eastern Fathers strove to avoid. However, with Augustine, anthropomorphism became a part of western theology. They subsequently used other methods to circumvent it, by means of various innovations that they inserted in their theology; however, when we say that the Son is Knowledge or the Spirit is Love, what we are actually doing is projecting through God the psychological attributes and experiences that belong to humans. In this way, the Trinity becomes a psychological conglomeration, a complex of psychological relations; obviously, this is not the Trinity that the Cappadocians wanted to speak of. However, the problem is not only there; in giving an anthropomorphic content, a psychological content, one must find a way of referring to God, above and beyond the anthropomorphic, psychological experience. This is why Augustine doesn’t see the Holy Trinity as the primary classification of God’s existence. Whereas for the Cappadocians it was imperative for one to begin from the Trinity, because it begins with the Father and it is not possible to escape the Trinity, exactly because it begins with the Father’s persona. Augustine does not place the persona in a primary place because he does not begin with the Father. With regard to the triadic existence, he considers the Father a source, a beginning etc., but with regard to what we call “God”, he does not relate this to the Father, as did the Cappadocians and the eastern Fathers in general. In Augustine’s theology, God is related to the essence of God; i.e., there is that which the easterners call “godhood”. There is a difference between the word god and the word godhood. Godhood has the same meaning as the essence: God is the Father (God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ).. Well, this godhood is translated in the sense of DIVINITAS, which bears the meaning of essence. With Augustine, it is clear that godhood is the impersonal, single, divine essence; thus, the one God – the essence - comes first, and logically the Trinity follows, as the means by which that one God, that one essence, exists. In other words, even the notion of the Father becomes secondary, with respect to God. This is a very large mistake: Who is the one God? Are the Fathers monotheists? If so, then who is the One God in Whom they believe, when they say “ I believe in one God….”? If we say that the one God is the essence (which is what Augustine did), then the three Hypostases – the Father, the Son and the Spirit – are all the same, from the point of view of ontological existence. The Father is no longer the cause, in the strict ontological sense. He is a “source”, but only a “source” in the sense of godhood, meaning that godhood pre-exists before Him. He is not the One who causes essence to exist. Therefore, the one God is an essence. This is also heard from many orthodox – that God is a single essence. He is not an essence. To us, God is the Father. Now, where is the significance in placing the one God in the essence, and prioritizing the essence? The significance is this: We lose the meaning of cause and we lose the meaning of independence in the existence of God. When the essence is isolated and impersonal, it generates the existence of God out of necessity, because essence contains the element of necessity. Essence is that which exists; we do not ask why and how it exists. When we do ask why or how, then we are turning away from the essence and are moving towards the hypostases. When you say essence, you do not ask how. The “how” is a question placed by a persona or a hypostasis. With the essence, you simply make an ontological observation: that God exists. And with this, you are also implying that He is not another essence; that He is not a man, but God. As for how this essence exists, it is a problem of the hypostasis. For the Cappadocians, the “how” cannot be a sequel to the fact that it exists. Without the “how”, nothing existing exists. This is what they mean by “bare” essence. We cannot consequently give priority to the essence. In Augustine however, priority is given to the essence. First we say that God exists, then we ask how He exists. Hence what occurred in the West. Two things happened in the West: the one unfortunately also applies to us . Mediaeval theology in the West divided Dogmatics - under the influence of Augustine’s teachings - into a separate chapter on the one God and another chapter on the Holy Trinity. How can you speak of one God, if you don’t mention the Holy Trinity, given that you have accepted the equation: one God = the Father? For Augustine, this is not a problem, since he does not accept the equation. To him, the equation is : one God = one essence. Well, according to him, we shall first talk about the one God as an essence – about His attributes; and this is where he lists all of God’s attributes. (Unfortunately, the same thing is done in our contemporary Dogmatics). This is the first mistake, and it touches on the methodology of Dogmatics. However, there is another serious mistake with regard to monotheism, which continues to plague us orthodox. We say that there are monotheist religions that accept the one God, while there are polytheist religions that acknowledge a number of gods. Even today, attempts are being made on a common basis by all monotheist religions, to relate to one another. This is happening, on account of the distinction that Augustine made, which allowed for the mention of “godhood” or “religiosity”. This perception is so deeply rooted, that it is extremely difficult to remove from our mind; the fact is, the “how” God exists is equally primeval as the “if” He exists, and the “if” He is one. Consequently, to us orthodox, the Trinity is a prerequisite for every discussion on monotheism, when discussing it with other religions. There are other ways for one to approach the subject of monotheism, but we haven’t elaborated on them as yet. What is important, is that between Augustine and the East, lies the chasm of the priority of the essence, which essence relates to the one God, whereas for us, the one God is the Father. From these ideas have sprung the immense differences that we have, also with regard to a special point – the FILIOQUE – which we shall examine later on.

在之前的課堂中，我們擴展出 Cappadocian 教父們的神學，主要是關於神聖的三位一體的神學；我們看到，他們是如何助長了這個教條的 （與他們的先輩相比）。我想提醒你一下他們所作出的主要的要點： a) 他們把必要的術語澈清了：主要的，他們把 hypostasis 這字與人格相聯繫上。  b) 他們把' hypostasis ' 這字從 ' essence ' 這字解脱出；一直到 Athanasios the Great 以及他的同時代的人的時候，甚至到 362 年的大公會議的時間，這兩個字仍然是連接上的。 他們於是在 essence 和 hypostasis 之間作出分别，將 hypostasis 由 essence 的領域中轉移至人 格的領域中。人格現在是與本質有關係的， 並且，他們如此作的原因，是想給予人格一個存在性的內容，以便能說 ，三個人格不是三個面相（這是之前 大家所以為的)， 而就是三個人格。人格這字 (persona) 通常表示著面相和面具， 所以總是使人們懷疑到 Savellianism。所以， 在Cappadocian 教父們之後， 我們能說，上帝是一個本質，三個人格， 而沒有犯上 Savellianism 的風險， 因為人格現在表示著 hypostasis，而hypostasis 是一個完整的存有者。 c) 他們在上帝的存有之內介紹出 ' 起因' 。也就是，他們提出誰是上帝的存有的起因的這個問題，以及他是上帝並且是以三位一體的形式而存有的之事實。他們給予這個問題的答案則是，那個 ' 起因' 就僅僅是父親； 當我們說 '就僅僅是父親' 的時候，我們主要是在指出，本質不是起因 （注意這點，因為我們將看到它的重要性），其次，我們也在表示，那二個人格中的任何一個皆不是 ' 起因'。 這樣， ' 起因' 是父親； 並且，由這 ' 起因'，兒子就是最明顯的，而聖靈則從 ' 起因' （父親） 開始，經由那個 ' 是由起因的'（兒子）。這個現在可能還不大清楚，但是我們之後將再談論它。此刻使我們感興趣的，乃是搞清楚 ' 起因' 這字的意思；也就是，明白到上帝的存有如何不只是一個已有的現實。上帝是一個欠因于另一件東西的現實，而那 ' 另一件東西 ' 就是父親；他是一個人格。 並不是上帝的本質在變寬，擴展，或自分； 那就是為甚麼只有父親才能夠被叫做上帝。父親是上帝，因為他的存有並不是起因於任何其他的人；他是所有存有的起因，然而，至於兒子和聖靈呢，事實則是，他們之存在完全是因另一人之故 -- 父親 -- 以此，在上帝中，我們就減至於一個人格，一個 hypostasis， 一個没有起因的起因，而不是上帝的單個的本質之強制性的成形或擴張。我們將看到這會有甚麼種的有意義的存在性的結果。 制下了這些指導方針， Cappadocian 教父們建立了一種神學 （至少對跟隨著他們的東方人來說）， 在其中，人格 -- hypostasis -- 扮演著最主要的存在性的角色。 在古代的哲學中，最主要的存在性的角色總是屬於本質的（每個人在本質上皆是人，因為人性在人之前；並不是人把人性帶進世界中的，所以本質或本性是有優先權的，而人格只持有一個次要的角色）； 然而，Cappadocian 教父們把這種邏輯推翻掉了。在上帝中，本質不排第一位； 身為第一位的是父親之人格 , 是他使本質存在的。hypostasis 是來自於希臘動詞 ' exist （存在） ' ；因此我們說 ' 他存在 '。所以，'存在' 意味著你是你，而不是其他人；他意味著，你是一個個人。上帝是存在的，以 hypostases。 並且，上帝的本質是僅僅以 hypostases 存在的。 而那個使其以 hypostases 存在的則又是一個 hypostasis， 而不是一個本質本身可以有的特質。 這意味著上帝是獨立存在的，而不是由於一個本質，或是某種現實。並且本質 -- 如 Cappadocian 教父們和 Vasileios 所說過的 -- 不能是虛空的，不能是先沒有 hypostasis，而得到 hypostasis，而存在，而因人格而能存在，並且以三個人格的形式存在著。所以，在此，神聖的三位一體是一個最先要的存在性的意義；他不是我們加在上帝身上的一件東西，反之，他是使上帝存有的東西。換句話說，如果三位一體被取消，上帝就不會存在。因為上帝能夠存在的唯一方式，就是以三位一體的方式；而這方式是屬於父親的 -- 一個人格 -- 而不是屬於一個本質。因此本質 -- 雖然他仍是重要和必要的 -- 並沒有那種可以使得上帝存在的最先要的意義。那個使得上帝存在的，是父親的人格。 我堅持你注意著這些細節，因為我想要你看到， Augustine 在西方作成了些甚麼； 他因不曾牢記住 Cappadocian 教父們的神學， 而在神學中走上了一個完全不同的路。我們得強調， 西方世界迄今從未吸收上 Cappadocian 教父們的神學。我們將看到，FILIOQUE 與這個問題也有一些關系。並且不僅僅是 FILIOQUE，但是一些其他的、與東西世界之差別有關係的問題也得歸因於 Cappadocian 教父們的神學在歷史中從没有被西方世界所吸收的這個事實。 Augustine 的神學於此加進來，尤其是在法蘭克人的時代期間，它成為西方世界的主要神學，與東方的神學相矛盾，自此，極大的問題接踵而來。但是這些問題的根本則在於 Cappadocian 教父們的神學沒有被西方世界所吸收到的這個事實；反之， Augustine 的神學被認可。那麼， Augustine 的神學究竟是甚麼？ Augustine 在他的 「關於神聖的三位一體」( de TRINITATAE ) 的著作中主要是關心於關於上帝的教條。在其中，他不是想記載出這個關於三位一體的教條，而只是想使這個教條變得更可理解，在人的生活中找出類比，以某種方式幫助會思考的人不去拒絕這個乍看之下是件很難接受的神聖的三位一體的理論。 所以，當他在人的生活中搜尋這些類比之時，他在一開始就犯了一個嚴重的錯誤，而從此以後在神聖的三位一體的神學上將永遠留著這個記號。他的錯誤是在於他只在一個單身人中搜尋那個類比或模型，而 Cappadocian 教父們則不能夠在單個的人中意識到任何神聖的三位一體的類比。他們總是需要三個人才能够做出類比。換句話說，對 Cappadocian 教父們來說，每一個神聖的人格皆是一個完整的實體，一個完整的存有者：因此，在我們人生的體驗中，一個更精確的三位一體的類比則會是一個彼得，一個克斯大斯， 和一個約翰同在一起，然而 Augustine 却偏偏犯了這個錯誤，因為他相信三位一體是只能發現於克斯大斯一人身中，即是，它可以被發現於對一人的觀察之中。 注意著他的想法： 只觀察著一個人，他察覺到 -- 在他已吸收了的新柏拉圖學派的影響下 -- 在一個人中最必要的東西是理智 (mind) 。這是柏拉圖的觀點： 是甚麼東西使我是我？是我的理智。 而這就是後來導致於 Augustine 的理論的想法，隨後又由笛卡兒和西方的思想所再開發。這些皆是內向形的想法，尋求自己的良心，不去觀察附近的其他任何人，反而只獨自地去發現自己。思考力，自覺性，這些對西方人來說，是對於理解自己之存在的最主要的東西。「COGITO ERGO SUM」 -- 我思，故我在。因此，你說你存在，這即是足够的；你只需靠自己，那足以研究你的存有；那就是為甚麼你没有必要去查看你的周圍。因此，只觀察著一個人，我們即努力地去發現能够引導我們至三位一體的類比。我們發現 Augustine 所隔離出的以下要素，在其上他創造出他的神學： a) 最基本的要素是理智 b) 這理智的最基本的要素是記憶， 從其中存有之全部皆出現。 注意一下，為甚麼記憶會有這樣的重要性。這是柏拉圖的記憶之想法。我們所瞭解到的、所思考到的、和知道的一切，皆儲存在我們裡面。我們每一個人中皆有一個靈魂，在其中永遠有一個 -- 讓我們說 -- 事實的儲藏所。 以柏拉圖的想法，知識不過是對於這個真理的回憶。希臘文中的 「真理」 這字的本來意義是「非 （不是） 容易忘記的」。 當你不再忘記的時候，那就是你發現事實的時候；換句話說，知識和現實是從忘卻中浮現出的。這意味著，記憶是存有的來源。人的理智有個來源 -- 那就是記憶 -- 從其中我們的存有現出來。如果我們現在從 Athanasios 和 Cappadocian 教父們那裡取出 「神性的來源」 的這個傳統的表達方式，我們將看到， Cappadocian 教父們並沒有詳細地講述到 「來源」 的意思，因為 「來源」 意味著某些東西必須湧出。 來源的傳統的圖像是 Augustine 所接受的； 他由希臘語翻譯出這字，並以後把來源與父親相聯繫上。 同時也有 「起點」 這個字 -- 來源和起點。這也被 Athanasios 和 Cappadocian 教父們使用過，但是後者並不過度地強調它。 他們聲明，父親是來源，以及他是起點，但是他們是在一段關於起因的上下文中使用這個字的。在這些字之間的差別是很微妙的。無論如何，來源和起點，這所有皆是父親，而這所有又是記憶。以人的心理來說，記憶是知識所出現的主要來源。知識是理智和人的一個基本的特點。上帝是理智；理智有一個知識的來源，而所產生的知識是 Logos，神聖的三位一體中的第二個人格。 為了要證明上帝身為一個智能 -- 甚至是最高等的理智 -- 是並非沒有知識的，他相信，上帝的 Logos 就是他所知道事物的功能。但是，知識總是從記憶中所提取出的，並且他將此分析的很詳細： 我絕不可能知道這張桌子，如果這張桌子的概念沒有事先在我的記憶中儲存著的話。這是柏拉圖的基本的想法，所有事物的概念皆已在我們之中儲存著。所以，在我認識這張桌子之時，這張桌子的概念是從我的記憶資源中被提出的。 如果我甚麼東西也不知道，那就意味著我不是一個活躍的理智。為了是一個活躍的理智，我就必須向外表達； 上帝是一個活躍的理智；他有一個 Logos。而 Logos 表示著知識。這樣，從是為父親的來源中，出現了是為知識的 Logos -- 那即是上帝的知識。不過，那是關於甚麼的知識？（既然，上帝之外，甚麼也没有的話）。自然地，他有關於自己的知識 -- 這就是自覺性。 Logos 認識父親 -- 他所知道的物體是父親 -- 所以，我們就有一個循環性的引用方式，也就是上帝的自知。 但是再按照柏拉圖的另一個基本理論來說，上帝不僅僅是理智，他也是絕對地“好”的。絕對的“好”不能只是理智； 它也一定得是絕對的好的理智。根據柏拉圖的想法，“好的" 總是會吸引上愛和愛欲，以及美麗。就好像美麗能喚醒起愛欲，同樣地，“好”也能喚醒起愛欲，或愛。現在，如果上帝是好性，並且除了他以外沒有任何其他的好的事物的話，那他將會喚醒起誰的愛？Logos 是個別於父親的，它並且是認識他的，這樣，在認識他之時，Logos 也認識他為“好的”，而愛欲即是在那時候出生的，也就是對於好的愛，而好的就是父親。 在兒子和父親之間的愛就是聖靈。聖靈是第三種類的存有方式，以他，父親愛兒子， 以及，兒子愛父親； Augustine 稱之為 「NEXUS AMORIS (愛的關係)」，在父親和兒子之間的愛的連接。聖靈有這種 - 讓我們說 - 本質性 (hypostatic) 的特質。 然而，這又造成了以下的問題。你看，當你接受父親為記憶、兒子為知識、聖靈為愛的時候，你將會有三個不同的人格的内容之描寫和定義。 每個人格皆會有其自己的正當的功能以及本質性的特質。兒子有知識的特質和内容；聖靈有愛的内容。因此，在這裡有一種肯定的方式，以描寫出三個個別的人格的本質性的特質。如果你將此與 Cappadocian 教父們或東方的一般教父們相比較的話，你將看到，對於他們來說，類似這樣的事是不可能的；他們避免給予人格的本質性的特質任何明確的內容。 當人們叫他們回答，兒子或聖靈的本質性的特質是甚麼的時候，以及，更重要的， 在「出生」和「出現」之間所有的差異是甚麼之時，他們即避免定義出「出生」和「出現」之間的差異。為甚麼？因為他們不想給予人格的本質性的特質任何明確的內容。 兒子不同於父親，只因為他不是父親； 並且聖靈 -- 同樣地 -- 不是兒子，等等等等。因此，我們說，本質性的特質不是相融的 （communing），與 Augustine 相對：他給予每種神聖的特質一個明確的內容。擬人論的危險以此立即地出現了，而那正是東方的教父們想迴避的事情。然而，因 Augustine 之故，擬人論就成為了西方的神學中的一部份。他們隨後使用其他的方法去回避這個問題，以一些他們插入在他們的神學中的各種新發現的方法；然而，當我們說兒子是知識或聖靈是愛的時候，我們其實只是在以上帝來投影出屬於人類的心理的特質和經驗而已。以此， 三位一體則成為一個心理性的聚集，一個心理關係的合成； 很明顯地，這不是 Cappadocian 教父們想談起的三位一體。 然而，問題不僅僅在那裡； 在給予一個擬人法的、一個心理性的內容之時，我們仍然必須發現一種在擬人法之上、在心理性的體驗之外的方式，以能提到上帝。這就是為甚麼 Augustine 並不把神聖的三位一體視為是關於上帝之存有的最主要的分類法。 但是對 Cappadocian 教父們來說，我們得從三位一體性開始，因為它是從父親開始的，並且不可能逃避開三位一體性，因為它正好是以父親的人格開始的。Augustine 並不把人格放在最主要的位置裡，因為他不以父親開始。在關於三位一體性的存有方式的方面上，他認為父親是起源或起點等等，但是在關於我們稱之為「上帝」之者的方面上，他不把此與父親相聯繫上，好比 Cappadocian 教父們和東方一般的教父們如此作的。在 Augustine 的神學中，上帝是與上帝的本質相聯繫上的； 也就是，東方人所稱之為「神性」的東西。 在神和神性之間有一個差別。神性與本質有同樣的意思：上帝是父親 （上帝以及我們的主耶穌基督的父親）。 這種神性是以 DIVINITAS 的意義來被翻譯的，而 DIVINITAS 則是有本質的意思。對 Augustine 來說，神性很清楚地是非個人性的、單一的、神聖的本質； 因此，是為一者的上帝 -- 本質 (essence) -- 首先出現，在邏輯上來說三位一體性才接著來到，來成為是為一者的上帝 -- 一個本質 -- 之存有方式。 換句話說，在關於上帝之事的方面上，甚至連父親的這個概念也成為第二等的。這是一個很大的錯誤： 是為一者的上帝是誰？教父們可仍是一神論者嗎？如果是這樣，那他們所相信的是為一者的上帝又是誰呢，當他們說 「我只相信一個上帝」 之時？如果我們說，那個是為一者的上帝是本質 （那就是 Augustine 所說的），那，那三個 Hypostases -- 父親，兒子，和聖靈 -- 以存在論中的關於存有之事的觀點來看，就會是同樣的東西。 父親將不再是起因，以嚴格的存在論的意義來說。他是「起源」，但他僅僅是以神性的意義才是那個「起源」，意味著神性在他之前已存在著。他不再是使得本質存在的那一者。所以，是為一者的上帝是一個本質。很多東正教人士也如此說過 -- 上帝是單一的本質。但上帝不是本質。對我們來說，上帝是父親。 現在，將是為一者的上帝放置於本質中，並且把這本質作為是最主要的，這種作法之重要的意義在哪裡？其意義在於：我們因此失去了起因的意義，也失去了上帝存有之中的獨立性。當本質被如此隔離開並作為是非個人私有性的時候，它是出於必要而產生出上帝之存有的，因為本質包含著某種必要性。本質是那個存有之者；我們不去問，它是為甚麼以及如何存有著。當我們真正地去問為甚麼或如何的時候，我們則是在遠離於本質而邁向於 hypostases。當你說本質的時候，你不是在問如何。「如何」是一個由人格或 hypostasis 所問的問題。以本質，你只不過是在做出某某有關於存有的觀察：上帝是存在的。 並且以這點，你也是在意味著，他不是另一個本質；他不是人，而是神。至於這個本質是如何存在的呢，那是有關於 hypostasis 的一個問題。對 Cappadocian 教父們來說，「如何」不能是有關於存有之事之後的一個問題。没有「如何」，存有的東西就不能存在。這就是他們所謂的 「虛空的本質」 的意思。 我們於是不能給予本質優先權。而 Augustine 却給予本質優先權。我們先說，上帝是存在的，然後我們再問，他是如何存在的。 因此就是在西方所發生之事。有兩件事情在西方發生：其中一件也不幸地與我們有關。 西方的中古時代的神學 （在 Augustine 的教義的影響下） 將教義學劃分成兩部分： 一部份是有關於上帝的，另一部份是有關於神聖的三位一體的。 你如何能夠談起一個上帝，如果你不提及到神聖的三位一體之性，當你已接受了：是為一者的上帝 = 父親 的公式？對 Augustine 來說，這不是一個問題，因為他並不接受這個公式。對他來說，公式則是： 是為一者的上帝 = 一個本質。他說，我們首先得將是為一者的上帝當成是一個本質 -- 我們首先得講他的特性等等； 所以，他在此列出上帝的特性。（很不幸地，同樣的事情也發生在我們當代的教義學中）。這是第一個錯誤，而它是有關於教義學的方法學的。 然而，在此有另外一個關於一神論的嚴重錯誤，繼續地折磨著我們東正教。 我們說，一神論的宗教只接受一個神，而多神論的宗教則接受一大批神。甚至在今天，一神論的宗教們試圖在一個共同的基礎上找出彼此互相的關係。這是因 Augustine 所做出的區別而能發生的： 這些區別允許我們提及到「神性」或「虔誠」。 這種理解已很深刻地植根於我們的頭腦中，以至很難從我們的意識中挖除掉； 事實則是，上帝是「如何」存有的這個問題與他「是不是」存有的問題，以及他「是不是」只是一者的問題等等，皆是同等先级的。所以，對我們東正教來說， 在與其他宗教討論之時，三位一體之性是每一個關於一神論的討論皆必需持有的先決條件，。 思考一神論的這個主題，還可以有其他的方式，但是我們到目前為止還未詳細地描述它們。 最重要的要點則是，在 Augustine 和東方的神學之間，有關於本質之優先權的深坑； 他認為，本質是與是為一者的上帝有關係的，而我們則認為，是為一者的上帝是父親。 由於這些想法，我們在關於 FILIOQUE 的這個特別題目的方面上，也有了非常不同的意見。 我們將在以後調查這點。