C. ON God

C. 上帝

II. Basic principles of Patristic teaching

II. 教父之授業的基本原則

2. The contribution of the Cappadocian Fathers

2. 卡帕多西亞教父們所作出的貢獻

The vent, the timely solution to this problem, was given by the Cappadocian Fathers during the 4th century, through a radical innovation, the “innovating of names” as they called it. Names had to be innovated, be given a new meaning. What the Cappadocian Fathers did, was the following: Whereas up to that day the term ‘hypostasis’ related to the term ‘essence’ (Athanasios the Great clearly states that the two are the same thing), the Cappadocians took a further step (you see how they dared during those times) and said that here, we shall discern between these two meanings. The meaning of the word essence and the meaning of the word hypostasis do not signify the same thing, hence a very serious problem arose. The first Ecumenical Synod placed an anathema on those who accepted, who confessed that God is one essence or Hypostasis. Amendments followed………… The Cappadocians now said the following: that the term ‘essence’ is identical to the term ‘nature’ and is used to denote the unity, the Oneness of God. God is therefore one essence, one nature. The Latin term ‘substantia’ is henceforth translated into Greek, no longer as ‘hypostasis’, but as essence, or nature. On the other hand however, the term ‘hypostasis’ is transposed (note this revolution in terminology), to now become equal to, to relate to the term ‘persona’. Thus, the term ‘persona’ in this light, now ceases to bear the meaning that Savellius had given it. Because now, ‘three personae’ no longer implies three facades, since the persona, which is now related to the hypostasis, signifies three entities. So, from the historical aspect of philosophy, it is both a timely and a revolutionary move, even though it has not been given any special mention in the history of philosophy, significant as it may be. A term such as hypostasis which is an ontological term, is now related to a term such as the persona, which was never an ontological term but had always existed, and had always denoted an association that appended to an entity. We are thus relating the being: I am, let’s say, who I am; my being is not dependent on the role that I play, or on my persona. My persona and I, are not the same thing. Just like an actor, who plays a role: he has a persona, but that is not his actual being. In the same way, the Savellian view was that God is One Being, but He plays these roles. Therefore, Savellius was quite happy with this use of the persona, but as we said, it did not appeal to orthodox Christians. And it was for this reason that Vasileios the Great insisted on saying that this expression “God has three faces” is unacceptable to us, unless the term hypostasis is included, to denote that the persona is a hypostasis. What happens in this case : By saying that I am a persona, it now means that I have an entity of my own, different to another’s entity. In this way, the persona acquires an ontological meaning. But we shall look into these matters in detail, when we interpret the dogma of the Trinity existentially. Now you can understand how, historically, this revolution in terminology was not entirely arbitrary; It was because the term ‘hypostasis’ bore several nuances which allowed this development. But here, we are mainly interested in the outcome, and the outcome of the Cappadocian Fathers’ theology was that: God is One – as regards His essence, His nature – and He is also Three – as regards His Personae, His Hypostases. And this, as far as terminology is concerned; this is how we arrived at the formulation of the dogma of the Holy Trinity which we have to this day. And now for the meaning. What they meant by it. When we say that God is one Essence and three Personae, with the term Essence we always refer to something general, something that implies the existence of more than one being. For instance, when we say ‘human essence’ or ‘human nature’, this denotes that while all of us are of one essence, one nature – human nature – we are each individually a complete human being; that is, this one nature has many in number. These ‘many in number’ we call hypostases, or persons. This analogy, this picture, was used by the Fathers. The Cappadocian Fathers say: Look here, what we theologians are saying about God is not so unreasonable, because if in fact we observe humanity, we can see that mention is made of one essence, one nature and simultaneously of two, three, four etc. hypostases of this same nature; they are the numerous ways, in which this nature appears. But, this now immediately brings on the danger of three gods, because we many humans are many people, therefore don’t we similarly have many gods? If we espouse this example, how do we avoid multi-deities? This is where the Cappadocians’ extremely difficult task begins. They pose the question: Why are we humans many and are consequently able to speak of a number of people, whereas in the case of God, we cannot speak of a number of gods? The answer is that because we humans have been created, and our given nature – human nature – is divisible; for example, me and my father are two separate human beings. Between him and me, time has intervened (or distance, in other cases, while he is still alive), and this factor of time or space allows each one of us to be perceived as a self-existent person ( i.e. my father does not exist now, but I do). In other words, time has permitted individuality. It has permitted me to be perceived independently of my father, and it is in this manner that nature is segmented, just as when man is born entirely individually, nature is segmented; because each person can be perceived individually, on his own, as a separate person. This is why we have many people and the unity of the human race cannot be ensured, or, rather, why it conflicts with the multiplicity of those individual persons. In order to simplify this difficult issue, I will promptly apply the example to the case of God, as the Cappadocians did. Supposing that, in order to comprehend this example, there is no intervening time or space between us, and nature is not segmented during our birth, what would happen existentially? What would happen, is that me and my father would never be apart; it would be inconceivable to have any void whatsoever between him and me….. But what does that mean? It means that in essence, we would be two persons, two persons that are different to each other, and, because we could never be apart, we would always be one. Subsequently, how can unity be ensured? By an incessant communion – relationship between us. Thus, that which breaks up the communion – the association – between my father and me, is time and distance. Time and space are attributes of the created world. They appear precisely during Creation; it is impossible to refer to time and space with regard to God, and not inevitably face the matter of God’s origin, i.e., that ‘once upon a time, God did not exist’. In order to preserve God’s eternity, which is a contiguous and inherent factor of the concept of God that sets Him apart from the created world, we must necessarily exclude any admission of space and time within God’s existence. Therefore, in the instance of God, we have this as a certain reality. And what does that mean? That here, multiplicity does not conflict with unity. That is the mystery of the Holy Trinity; a mystery with regard to our experience, because for us, multiplicity always conflicts with unity. It is a mystery as regards our experience, however, from the moment that you accept God as an uncreated God Who is not subject to time and space, it ceases to be a mystery. What happens? One assumes an inevitable stance towards God. It is a stance, which, if not taken, one loses the meaning of God; one looks upon God as a creation. I repeat, all these things presuppose that you have decided from the start to accept the mystery of the Holy Trinity. You will not prove why God is Threefold. You will try to prove how this can be so; how you can perceive this mystery. But with what kind of speculation, what kind of thought? We shall see how it is not simply a matter of speculation or thinking that is directed at satisfying a certain curiosity of the mind, but something that has immediate consequences. Our entire life changes, if God is not Triadic. If God is not triadic, man’s life is a totally different thing. If God is Triadic, if this mystery is indeed real, and this comparison that I made, between our own experience (where singularity and multiplicity conflict with one another) and the experience (or rather the existence) of God, where this conflict does not occur; and if there is no unity wherein multiplicity is not a conflicting factor, then, a number of things in our existence are jeopardized. The Dogma on the Holy Trinity is the most bountiful existential message that any religion or a philosophy could possess. Now, let us focus on the historic outcome. The Cappadocian Fathers had said that the aforementioned example of one human nature with a multitude of people could be applied to God, provided that we do not include time and space in the equation - this being a self-evident condition anyway, with regard to the existence of God, thus, we automatically cease to have the problem of three Gods within the Holy Trinity. When they express this unity, the one essence, i.e. the association of God with the term essence, they immediately give rise to the following problem: whether this essence pre-exists, and somehow becomes a Trinity at a later stage – which is something that occurs in us humans; something that the Greek philosophers had already pinpointed when they said that all us people come into existence as separate beings and diverse, from one, pre-existing essence, a pre-existing nature. I would say that nature pre-exists in us, and it is followed by the persona. When I came into this world, it wasn’t me that brought the essence of humanity – human nature – into existence. Human nature existed before me, and it is this point that the ancient Greek philosophers had expanded in a general manner, to say that this essence, this general thing in which many participate, is pre-existent and is followed by the more specific thing – the persona. Hence, the Platonic philosophers spoke of a “predominating kind” and the Aristotelians of a “subjective kind” – implying that, no matter what each one of us is individually, as an individual human being, we are but sequels of an existence. For the Platonians, we are sequels of the ideal human being in which we all participate, while for the Aristotelians, we are sequels of human nature, of the human species which we all spring from. The human species precedes the human being, and that is why - according to Aristotle – in death the particular beings may disappear, but the species itself survives. Consequently, for us, the essence precedes the persona. You will see the existential importance of this, later on. The Cappadocian Fathers here are carving new paths in philosophy, on account of the Dogma of the Holy Trinity. Vasileios makes the following statement as a basis, as an axiom of his entire subsequent argument: There is no “bare” essence as he called it. With this, he meant that there could not be any essence without a hypostasis; an essence that does not have actual and specific hypostases. Therefore, it is impossible to presuppose a human nature, out of which specific beings can spring from. One must consider that all specific beings are equally primeval in ontology, along with the essence of humanity. Therefore, given that bare essence cannot exist, one cannot accept essence without any specific hypostases. Now, if this is applied to the human species, what does it mean? That the origin and the unity – that which ensures the continuum of the human species – does not lie in the essence of humanity, because bare essence never existed on its own. For example, Aristotle discerns between a human being in general (this is the essence) and Kallias or Socrates who are persons, hypostases. According to the Cappadocian line of thought, it is impossible to mention the term human essence without automatically implying Kallias or Socrates or George or Costa or someone. It is impossible to refer to the essence alone, without implying the specific persons; in other words, this primary, general humanity does not exist. Even today, frequent mention is made, especially of ‘humanity’; ‘Humanity’ means specific persons. And no matter how strange it may seem to you, all these things have sprung from the Dogma of the Holy Trinity, with a profound impact on anthropology. Since there is no bare essence, and we cannot subsequently presume that the origin of the human species is a human essence or Plato’s ideal human, or nature, as Aristotle’s definition, then what is the origin and the cause that makes man singular, if it isn’t his essence? This issue is discussed in one of Vasileios’ Epistles, in his dialogue with Amphilochios. These Epistles had been considered questionable, but they are very probably genuine and there is no serious reason for anyone to doubt them. At any rate, the topic is found in Vasileios’ epistles. In one of these epistles, the problem is thoroughly analyzed, and Vasileios totally agrees with the viewpoint that since a ‘bare’ human essence cannot be the origin of humankind, the chief ontological predicate of a human being cannot be his essence; it must definitely be a specific being, and that being is Adam. Thus, while the ancient Greeks said that we draw our descent, our existence as particular beings, from a common, human nature, we must – as Christians – say that we each draw our existence from one persona, Adam. The cause of our being is not our nature; it is a persona. By applying this to God, observe the consequences: The Cappadocians for the first time in theology introduce the meaning of ‘agent’ – that the one God is not just one Essence, but that He is the Father, and that He as a Persona makes manifest the unity of the Trinity, and not He as an essence. Naturally the term ‘one essence’ continues to exist, but not in the sense of a causative essence. It is not essence that causes God to have hypostases. Essence functions differently now. The ultimate and the foremost point of reference for the existence of God is not the Essence, it is the Father. This means that you cannot proceed from the essence of God in order to subsequently reach the Father. You start from the Father, and, because He claims to be a Persona and not an essence, He bears the characteristic of not being ‘only’; whereas essence can be understood as something on its own, and essence is of course one. In this way, we bypass the principial status of the unit, by introducing multiplicity as something primeval in ontology, in God’s being; obviously, the meaning of the term ‘Father’ has no ground on its own, without the existence at least of a Son. Whose Father would He be, if a Son didn’t exist? We would then have to concede that He wasn’t always ‘Father’. However, if He was always the ‘Father’, then the Son must also have existed always. Thus, this multiplicity, this interdependence of the personae, becomes a chief ontological predicate; in other words, you cannot go past it, or behind it, in order to discover something that precedes it and leads us to it. The one Essence is not a precedent, and it is not the ‘cause’ of God’s being. Precedent is the Father, as the agent, but because by definition He is automatically in a communion, He cannot be acknowledged as a single unit. This is how we must comprehend the expression “God is Love”. Because it is directly related to the triadic dogma, this point underwent many clarifications by the Cappadocian Fathers. That God is love, is a statement that was not first made by Christianity; Plato had already said the same thing. On the other hand, Gregory Nazianzene rejects the idea that God is love, in the sense that divine nature overflows with goodness, like an overflowing vessel; i.e., love is no longer an emotion. That is not the meaning of love. ‘God is love’ means that God is constituted as an existence; He exists, within personal associations. Communion is a prime component of God’s existence; it is not something that God acquires in retrospect. Just as we can say ‘I exist and additionally I love someone’, we must try to imagine an instance where we cannot say ‘I exist, only if I am in communion with someone else’ otherwise I lose my identity, I disappear. This is the reason that God is primarily the Father, inasmuch as He loses His identity altogether if He does not have the Son. And subsequently, love – that communion which causes us to exist – is not an emotion. Love is not an emotion; it is a relationship that causes us to exist. Love actually proves to be love, when the existential thread is cut, and you begin to float in a void. For example, death will cut this thread, and you realize that you no longer exist, if this thread is not reconnected. Because it is the other person, it is the communion with the other person that comprises the basis of your entire being. Well, “God is love” essentially means that God is a Holy Trinity. It is nothing else. His essence is communion. And what do we mean by ‘is’ communion? It means that we cannot imagine Him, not even as a fabrication, as an ‘Only’; Just as you cannot ever imagine yourself alone, in love. Not unless you love yourself, in which case, it is not true love. So, therefore, if you take away the Trinity and make God a unit, then you automatically create the problem of whom God loves. There is none other besides God, because that is the notion of God : He is without a beginning, and He comes before the world. Many people have this naïve thought, that God is love because He loves the world; but then, the world didn’t always exist. By definition, we cannot imply that the world is something eternal, and God likewise eternal, or co-eternal. If therefore God loves the world and thus exists as love, then He wasn’t always love: He becomes love. He is not love; he becomes love, when the world comes into existence ( unless you follow the same steps as Origen and several others, who transferred the cosmos into eternity; in other words, to accept the world as being eternal and that the world somehow always existed in God’s mind. ) But then, God would be deprived of His freedom, because He would be obliged to possess this world and He could not exist without this world. If God – this is a biblical demand – is absolutely transcendental, if God is imaginable (and He should be imaginable without the existence of the world), then, necessarily, (a) He either is not love or (b) He loves Himself – who is not love – or (c) He must be a Trinity. The expression “I love myself” Implies the prerequisites of a subject and a verb: the Father loves the Son, the Son loves the Father, the Father loves the Spirit, the Spirit loves the Father, the Son… they each love more than one. In this way, God does not love Himself, i.e. selfishly; He loves a certain persona; He loves as a persona, because God is a Father, a persona. The essence does not love; the persona loves. With Augustine, all of what I told you up to now is cancelled. Because from there onwards, an entirely new position is taken, on which many things will depend, such as the Filioque and many other things. But, compared to the essence of the problem, the Filioque issue is minute in size. The problem is summarized in the following: Does the essence of God precede the persona? Augustine couldn’t grasp the Cappadocians’ thoughts on this issue, and thus made the mistake of considering the Essence of God – the one Essence – as being the One God; hence the beginning of tremendous problems. In our next lesson, before closing our historical overview, we shall examine Augustine’s theory. Then we shall go on to an existential interpretation, i.e., to see if all these things are of any significance, or if they are simply things that we theologians say, in order to preserve traditions. Anyway, can anyone say things without explaining them? The Fathers exhausted themselves in their attempt to explain these issues, because they could see the huge existential consequences that the Dogma on the Holy Trinity would have.

在第四世紀期間， Cappadocian 教父們對於這個問題給予了一個適時的答案；他們是以一種完全基本的革新而能如此作的：「名字性的改革」-- 他們如此稱呼。名字是必須被改革的，給予一個新的意思。Cappadocian 教父們所作的是：直到那時為止， hypostasis 是有關於 essence 的（Athanasios the Great 很清楚地聲明，二者是同樣的東西）；然而，Cappadocians 教父們則再進一步（你得明白，他們在此時期是有多麼足夠的膽量的）說，在這裡，我們將在這兩個意思之間作出辨別。 Essence 這字的意思以及 hypostasis 這字的意思是不一樣的，因此一個很嚴重的問題即出現了。第一次大公會議曾詛咒過那些接受或招認上帝是一個 essence 或是一個 Hypostasis 的人。許多的修改然後接踵而來 ..... 。Cappadocian 教父們現在則作出以下的要點：essence 這字是與 nature 相同的，並且是用來指上帝的統一性以及他的個一性。所以上帝是一個 essence，一個 nature。那個拉丁字 substantia 從此以後不再由 hypostasis 來被翻譯於希臘文中，而是由 essence，或 nature。而在另一方面， hypostasis 這字則變換（注意這個術語學中的革命性之事）成為與 persona 相同和有關之事。因此，persona 這字現在不再有 Savellius 所給予的意思了。因為現在 tres personae 不再意味著三個面相。現在，persona 是與 hypostasis 相聯繫的，並表示著三個實體。所以，從哲學之歷史性的方面來看，這是適時的，也是革命性的行為的，雖然這事並沒有在哲學的歷史中被特別地提及到，不論它是多麼有意義的。擁有存在性的意義的 hypostasis 這個字，現在是與 persona 這個字相聯繫上，而 persona 這個字本來是没有存在性的意義的，並且已經是存在了很久的，而它向來是表示著加上於一個實體的一種協會。我們於是是與一個實體相聯繫上的：比如我們說，我是我是的人；我的實體之存有不是依賴於我所扮演的角色，也就是我的 persona。我的 persona 和我，不是同樣的事情。就好像一個扮演著某些角色的演員一樣：他有一個 persona，但是那不是他的實際的實體。同樣的， Savellian 的見解是，上帝是一個實體，但是他扮演著這些許多的角色。所以， Savellius 對於這種使用 persona 的方式是感到相當滿意的，但是我們說過，這對於東正教的基督徒們來說並不是合意的。而 Vasileios the Great 就是因此而堅持地說，「上帝有三面」的這種說法是我們所無法接受的，除非 hypostasis 這字也被包括在内，以表示著那 persona 是一個 hypostasis。 在這種情況下所發生的則是：當我說我是一個 persona 的時候，這則意味著我是有我自己的一個實體的，而這個實體是有別於另外其他的實體的。以此，persona 這字就獲得了一個存在性的意義。但是，當我們想以存在性的方式來理解有關三位一體的教義之時，我們將更仔细地看看這件事情。 現在你能夠明白，這個在術語學中的革命在歷史上完全不是任意的；這是因為  hypostasis 這字是有若干細微差別的意義的，因而允許這種發展。但是在這裡，我們主要是對事後的結果感到興趣，而 Cappadocian 教父們的神學的結果則是：上帝是一  -- 在有關於他的 essence，他的 nature 的方面上 -- 但是他也是三 -- 在有關於他的 Personae，他的 Hypostases 的方面上。而這 -- 至少就術語學的方面而言 -- 這就是我們如何達至於我們今天所有的三位一體的教義。 現在再講它的意思。他們是意味著什麼呢。當我們說上帝是一個本質 (essence) 和三個人格 (Personae) 的時候，本質總是指著那些一般性的東西，一個意味著不止一個存 有的東西。例如，當我們說 ' 人的本質 (human essence) ' 或是 ' 人性 (human nature) ' 之時，這表示著，雖然我們大家都是只有一個本質，一種自性 -- 人性 -- 但是我們其中每一個人皆是一個完整的人；也就是，這個本質有很多人數。 這些 ' 在數字上是很多的 ' 我們稱之為 hypostases，或人格 (personae)。這種類比，這種描述，就是教父們所使用的。Cappadocian 教父們說：你瞧，我們神學者所說過的關於上帝之事不是很不通的，因為，如果我們好好觀察一下人類，我們能看到，雖然我們只提及到一個人類的本質，一種人性，但是，我們却又同時說到兩個， 三個， 四個等等這種同樣的本質的 hypostases ；他們是這種本質能够現 身的多種方式。但是，這又立即導致於一共有三個神的危險，因為，我們許多的人到底是許多的人，因此，我們同樣地不是也有許多的神嗎？如果我們支持這種說法，我們又如何去避免多神之事？ Cappadocian 教父們所面臨的困難的任務就是在這裡開始的。他們提出這個問題：為甚麼我們人類是多 數的，並且我們能够談起一大堆人，然而，在說到上帝的時候，我們不能够說許多的神？答案則是 ，因為我們人類是受造物，並且我們的本質 -- 我們的人性 -- 是可分割的；例如，我和我的父親是二個分別的人。在我和 他之間，有時間的隔離（或空間，在他還是活著的情形下） ；這個由時間以及空間所造成的隔離的因素允許我們之中的每一個人皆可被視為是一個自我存 有的人（即，我的父親現在已不存在了， 只有我仍是存在的）。換句話說，時間制造出了個性。它允許我和我的父親分開地被察覺到， 而是因這個原因之故，本質是被割開成許多部份的，正如，當人 是一個一個分別出生的時候，人的本質就是被分割成許多部份的；因為每個人皆能夠分別地、獨自地、被察覺到，如一個一個 分別的人。這就是為甚麼我們有很多的人，以至於人類的統一不能够完全被確保，或者說，以至於人類的統一與個人的多樣性相衝突。為了能簡化一下這個困難的問題，我將立即把這個例子應用於上帝身上，就如 Cappadocian 教父們所作過的一樣。想一想，以便能理解這個例子，若是在我們之間沒有空間和時間的隔離，並且，大自然在我們誕生之時不是被分割成許多部份的，在有關存在性的方面上，那又會是如何？會發生的事情則是，我和我的父親是絕不可能被分開的；任何在他和我之間的距離皆會是不可想像的..... 但是，那又意味著甚麼呢？那意味著，在本質上，我們會是兩個人，有別於彼此的兩個人，但是，因為我們不能够被分開，我們總是又會是一者。之後，統一性又如何能夠被確保住呢？經由不斷的共融 -- 在我們之間的關係。所以，毀壞了在我和我的父親之間的共融或協會 ，是時間和距離。而時間和空間是受造的世界之特質。 它們正好是在創世期間出現的；而時間和空間是不可能與上帝有關的，因為若非如此，那就會有上帝的起源之事，也就是， ' 很久以前，還没有上帝的時侯 '。 為了能保持上帝的永恒性 （而這個永恒性即是有關上帝的概念之中的一個必定得有的因數，以將他與受造的世界分别出） 我們必須將空間和時間從上帝的存有中排除掉。所以，在有關上帝的方面上，我們對這事是可以無疑的。而那又意味著甚麼？那意味著，在這裡，多樣性並不與統一性相衝突。那是神聖的三位一體的謎；但是那只是在我們的體驗中像是一個謎，因為對我們來說，多樣性總是與統一性相衝突的。一個在我們的體驗中的謎，然而，一旦當你承認上帝為一個未受造的、不受空間和時間所限制的、神的時侯，它即不再是一個謎了。如何如此？一個人對上帝持有一個不可避免的態度。 一個人若是不持這個態度的話，他將會失去上帝的意思；他將把上帝作為是一個受造物。我再重複一次，所有這些事情皆假設你從一開始就已決定接受神聖的三位一體的謎。 你將不會去證明上帝為甚麼是三位一體的。你將只嘗試著證明，這如何能夠是如此的；以及你如何能夠察覺到這個謎。但是，這是以甚麼樣的推測，甚麼樣的思考法？我們將明白這如何不只是一件理智推測的事情，或是一種為了滿足某種好奇心的思考，但是是一件有立即的結果的東西。如果上帝不是三位一體的話，我們的整個生命即將改變。 如果上帝不是三位一體的話，人的生命將會是完全不同的。如果上帝是三位一體的話，如果這個謎確實是真的話 -- 而我在我們自己的體驗（在此，個一性和多樣性彼此互相衝突）和有關於上帝的體驗（或者說，上帝的存有：在這裡，總之，這種衝突是不會發生的）之間所做出的這個比較 -- 如果沒有那種在其中多樣性將不 會是一個矛盾因數的統一性的話， 那麼，在我們的存有中的許多事情就會有危 了。神聖的三位一體的教條是任何宗教或哲學所能夠具有的最肥沃的存在性的消息。現在，讓我們先注意著歷史性的結果。Cappadocian 教父們說道，先前的一個人性之具有許多個人的例子是能夠被應用於上帝身上的，只要我們不把時間和空間等等包括在這個公式之內 -- 反正，無論如何，在有關於上帝的存有的 這個問題的方面上，這是一個不証自明的條件，因此，我們自然地就没有了在神聖的三位一體之中有三個神的這個問題。 當他們講到這個統一性的時候，這一個 essence，也就是，將上帝與 essence 相聯繫上之舉，他們立即引起了以下的問題：這個 essence 是否在之前就已存在，而是在以後才成為三位一體的 -- 至少，在我們人類中是如此的；希臘哲學家們已經講到過這點，當他們說 ，所有的人皆是從同一個先存在的 essence，先存在的本質，之後出生為許多個別的和多種多樣的人。我將說 ，本質在我們的自我中是先存在的，隨 後才有人格。當我來到這個世界的時候，並不是我將人類的本質 -- 人性 -- 帶到世界中的。人性是存在於我之前的，而古代希臘的哲學家們即是在此以一種總要的方式來擴展了這點，說道，這個本質，這個很多皆在其中參與的總要的東西，是最先存在的，而之後才緊隨跟來了那些許多個别的東西 -- 人格。因此，柏拉圖派的哲學家們談起到一個「最為優勢的類形」，而阿裡斯多德則提到過「主觀的類形」等等 -- 那皆意味著，無論我們個別地是什麼樣的人，我們都只是一種存有的後果。對柏拉圖派的哲學家們來說，我們是我們在其中皆參與的人類之理想形式的後果，而對阿裡斯多德學派來說，我們是人性的後果，也就是，我們大家皆從其冒出的人類的後果。人類是在個人之前的，那就是為甚麼 -- 根據阿裡斯多德的說法 -- 在死亡中，一個個别的生命也許已消失了，但是他所屬的種類之本身則仍是存活的。因此，對我們來說，本質是在人格之前的。你之後將看到這點的存在性的重要性。 Cappadocian 教父們在這裡是在以神聖的三位一體的教條在哲學中創造出新路徑。Vasileios 以以下的說法來作為他後續之論點的基礎：世上沒有他所稱之為「虛空的」本質。以此，他意味著，若是没有 hypostasis，則没有essence；世上沒有未有實際和個别的 hypostases 的本質。因此，我們不可能事前先假定出一種人性，之後從其冒出許多個别的人。我們必須考慮到，所有個别的人在存在論裡皆與人類的本質是同等原性的。因此，既然虛空的本質不能存在，若是我們不接受 hypostases， 我們則不能接受 essence。 現在，如果這被應用於人類本身身上，這將意味著什麼？這意味著，起源和統一性 -- 那些確保著人類的統一體性的東西 -- 不是屬於人類的本質之中的，因為完全虛空的本質不能够獨自存在。例如，阿裡斯多德在一般人 （這是本質）以及卡里阿斯或蘇格拉底 （這是人格，hypostases） 之間做出辨別。根據 Cappadocian 教父們的想法，提及到人性，這是不可能不自動地也意味到卡里阿斯或是蘇格拉底或是喬治或是柯斯達或是任何其他某人的。我們是不可能只提及到本質，而不意味著個别的人；換句話說，這個最先的，最總要的人類並不存在。甚至在今天，人們仍常提及到 ' 人類 ' ；' 人類 ' 表示著個别的人。無論這對你來說會是多麼奇怪，所有這些事情皆是從神聖的三位一體的教條中冒出的，以至對人類學做出深刻的影響。既然世上沒有虛空的本質，並且我們不能假定人類的起源是一個人類的本性或是柏拉圖的人類的理想形式或是本質 （阿裡斯多德的定義），那麼，人類之是為單數的原因則又是什麼呢，如果不是他的本質的話？ 這個問題在 Vasileios 的書信中 （在他與 Amphilochios 的對話中）被討論過。這些書信的真實性曾被懷疑，但是他們很可能是真的，而且沒有人有足够的理由去懷疑他們。無論如何， 這個主題在 Vasileios 的書信中有出現過。在這些的書信的其中一件之中， 這個問題有徹底地被分析過， 並且Vasileios 完全同意，既然一個「虛空的」 的人性决不能是人類的起源，人 類的主要的存在性的前提不能是他的本質； 那肯定是一個個别的人，那個人就是亞當。所以， 雖然古代的希臘人說，我們的個别性的存有是來自一個總要的人性，我們基督徒們必須說 ，我們的存有完全是只來自一個人的，也就是亞當。我們的存有的 起因不是我們的本質；而是一個人格。 當你把這應用於上帝身上之時，你將看到：Cappadocian 教父們首次在神學中介紹出 ' 動者 ' 的意思 -- 那就是，一個上帝不是只是一個本質，但是他也是一個父親，並且，身為一個人格，他顯現出三位一體的統一性，而不是一個本質。自然地，本質這個字將繼續存在，但是不是以能够產生某種結果的東西的意思。上帝之有 hypostases 不是因為他的本質之故。本質現在有不同的功能了。上帝的存有之最終的以及最首要的要點不是本質，而是他的父親性。這意味著，你不能够從上帝的本質開始，而隨後找到他的父性。你得從父親開始，並且，因為他是一個人格而不是一個本質，他有著不是唯一的之特點；而本質則能夠被理解為是一個獨自的東西，並且，本質當然是只有一個的 。 以此，我們迴避了單位的主導性，並且在上帝的存有中，以及在存在論中，介紹出是同樣原始的多樣性；很明顯的， ' 父親 ' 若是没有兒子， 是没有存在的意義的。他會是誰的父親，如果兒子不存在的話？我們然後則必須勉強承認，他並未向來是 ' 父親 '。然而，如果他向來是 ' 父 親 '，那兒子也必須向來是存在的了。因此，這個多樣性，這些人格之間所有的相互依賴性， 則成為一個主要的存在性的先提；換句話說，你不能够回避過它，或是越到它 之後，以便發現一些在它之前的、或者是引導我們至於它的東西。 這個唯一的本質不是一個先例，也不是上帝之存有的' 原因' 。於此的先例是父親，但是，因為他在本質上即是自動地存在於一個共融裡，他不能够被認為是 一個單個的單位。 這就是我們應該如何去理解「上帝是愛」這句話的方式。因為這是直接與 三位一體的教條相聯繫上的，所以這點曾由 Cappadocian 教父 們特别地澄清過。上帝是愛，這句話並不是首先由基督教徒們所說的；柏拉圖已經說過了同樣的話。 而在另一方面上，Gregory Nazianzene 則拒絕這個上帝是愛的想法，也就是神 性是充滿著善意、像一支過剩的容器的想法；這表示著，愛已不再是一種情感。那不是愛的意思。' 上帝是愛 ' 這意味著上帝是一種存有的構成；他是在私人性的 關系之內存在的。共融是上帝存有中的最重要的組件；這不是上帝在回顧中所吸收 到的一件東西。就如我們能夠說 ' 我先存在，而之後我 再去愛某人 '，我們在此必須去嘗試著想像一下，我們是不 是能够不說 ' 我只有當我跟其他人一起在共融裡時才是存在的 ' ，不然，我即會失去我的身分，我即會消失。這就是上帝主要是父 親的原因：如果他沒有兒子的話，他即會完全失去他的身分。 所以，愛 -- 那個使得我們存在的共融 -- 不是一種情感。愛不是一種情感；它是使得我們存在的一種關係。愛自我證明是愛，當你的存在性的 命線被切掉、而你開始在一個空間中漂蕩之時。例如，死亡將切斷這截線，你並且知道你已不再存在，如果這截線不被重新連接上。因為你的全部生命的基礎是包含於其他人之中，是包含於其他人的共融之中的。 「上帝是愛」主要是意味著上帝是神聖的三位一體。這再也不是表示著任何其他的甚麼東西了。他的本質是共融。 然而，‘是共融' 這又是意味著甚麼？那意味著，我們不能够去想像他是 ' 僅僅一者 ' ，即使我們想亂編一通；正如你不能够想像自己是獨自地在愛 之中。除非你是在愛自己，而在這種情況下，這不是真正 的愛。因此，如果你把三位一體拿走 ，然後再把上帝作為一個單位，那，你即自動地造成了上帝是在愛 誰的問題。除了上帝以外没有他人，因為那即是上帝的概念：他没有起點，他存在 於世界之前。 很多人有這種天真的想法，以為上帝是愛，因為他愛世界；但是，世界不是向來是存在的。不言而喻，我們不能够說，世界是永恒的， 跟上帝一起是永恒的，它們永遠是共存的。如果上帝愛世界並且是如愛而存在的， 那，他就不是向來是愛：他是在之後成為愛 的。他不是愛；他成為愛，當世界出生之時 。（除非你沿著 Origen 、以及若干其他的人、曾有過的想法，他們把宇宙轉移至永恒中；換句話說，他們接受世界是永恒的，世界總是在某種方面上在上帝的理智裡存在著的。）那，上帝即會 失去他的自由，因為他將被迫地擁有這個世界，並且不能夠没有這個世界而存在。如果上帝 -- 這是聖經所作出的需求 -- 絕對是超越性的，如果上帝是可以想像的（而世 界若是不存在，他也應該是可以想像的），那， 他一定 (a) 或者不是愛 (b) 或者是愛自己的 -- 而他自己不是愛 -- 或者， (c) 他是三位一體的。 「我愛自己」這意味著一個主題和一個動詞的先決條件：父親愛兒子，兒子愛父親，父親愛聖靈，聖靈愛父親，兒子 ... 他們每個皆愛不止一人。以此，上帝不只愛自己，即自私性的愛；他愛某個人格；他如一個人格而愛，因為上帝是一個父親，一個人格。本質不愛；人格才愛。 Augustine 把全部我到目前為止所告訴你的事情皆取消了。因為從那時起，有一個完全新的看法，而很多事情將依賴於那個新的看法上，如及聖子 （ Filioque） 和很多其他的事情。但是，與本質的這個問題相比， 及聖子這個問題是很小的。這個問題可以如此總結：上帝的本質是在人格之前嗎？Augustine 在這個問題的方面上不能夠瞭解 Cappadocians 教父們的想法，因而犯錯地想，上帝的本質 -- 唯一一者的本質 -- 即是上帝的一者性；這是之後極大的問題的起點。在我們的下一個課堂中，在結束我們的歷史性的觀點之前，我們將檢討一下 Augustine 的理論。然後我們將繼續來到那個存在性的詮釋，即，來看一看所有這些事情是否有任何意義，或者他們只是我們神學者說說而以的事情，以便能保護傳統。無論如何，可有任何人能夠說說事情，而又不去解釋他們？教父們在解釋這些事情時耗盡了自己的精力，因為他們可以看到，神聖的三位一體的教條將會有很大的存在性的結果。