We shall summarize the Orthodox position in theology, as regards the “Filioque”, by making the following, basic observations: Firstly, with regard to Providence. “Providence” implies the actions and the acts of God, within History and Creation. We too accept that the Holy Spirit is given, is sent forth by the Son. So far, at this level, the Filioque is acceptable. However, we cannot accept it from the aspect of the eternal, the never-ending status of the Holy Trinity, where the relations between the Personae are not relations that pertain to any energies. As far as the eternal and never-ending Trinity is concerned, we cannot accept that the Spirit also proceeds from the Son, because inside the Trinity, we have ontological relations only, and inevitably, the Cause can only be one: the Father. Because, by introducing two Causes, we will inevitably have two Gods. In Providence, one could say it is acceptable to admit that the Spirit is also dependent on the Son; that it is a gift, given to us by the Son. In this context, one can speak in the same way that the Apostle Paul spoke, with regard to the Spirit of Christ, i.e., that the Spirit does indeed proceed from the Father, but, It is sent forth, into Providence, via the Son. The term “proceeding from” (εκπορεύεται) strictly pertains to the Spirit’s ontological dependence on the Father, within the eternal Trinity, therefore, the term “proceeding from” pertains only to the eternal status of the Trinity. The association here is strictly ontological, and the Causer is only one: the Father. When dealing with Providence however, we do not touch on ontological associations, but only those associations that pertain to energies/actions, hence the Son’s action of sending forth the Spirit. In this way, we have a sort of Filioque, but only in regard to Providence. In light of the above, significant confusion arose in the West, with regard to these two terms. The (Greek) words “εκπορεύεται” ( proceeding from/out of ) and “πέμπεται” ( sent forth by ) were translated in Latin, as both meaning “procedure”, right from the very start, in the 4th century. This is what gave rise to the confusion. They could not discern between these two notions, whereas in the (Greek-speaking) East they were discernable, hence the term “proceeding from” (εκπορεύεται) was duly confined to the eternal, ontological aspect of the Trinity, and was not used in reference to Providence. From the very beginning, the Filioque was applied by the West, to both aspects (ontological and Providential). This is how the confusion began, and the Filioque appeared as the offspring of precisely this confusion. For the East, this distinction is imperative; if one does make this distinction, then he can accept the Filioque, but only in regard to Providence. But the Filioque, in its true dimensions as defined by the West, is not only linked to Providence, but also to the eternal Trinity. And that is where we have a problem. Can one apply the Filioque to the eternal Trinity? Let’s observe the problems that Patristic Theology encountered here. In the 7th century, Saint Maximus was asked (because word was getting around that the Filioque was being used in the West), what his opinion was on this matter. He replied that he had examined the matter, and that the situation was as follows: The Latin-speaking Romans did not have respective words for expressing these two notions (“εκπορεύεται” and “πέμπεται”). They used only one word. This consequently gave rise to a confusion. We Greeks, who speak the language, must therefore show some understanding in this regard and not automatically declare the Filioque a heresy of the Westerners, because, as analytically explained in the “epistle to Marinus”, the Filioque was the product of this confusion. In the same epistle, Saint Maximus says that during his talks with the Romans themselves about this issue, he had noticed that they also referred to Saint Cyril of Alexandria in order to support the Filioque. Saint Cyril had indeed written certain things that could have provided a basis for the Filioque. We also have one testimony that something which was written by Saint Cyril on the subject had generated an intense reaction. It was the reaction of Theodoretus of Cyrus who was quite strident in his manner, and who commented that if Cyril was referring to the Filioque in regard to Providence, then all is well; but if he was relating it to the eternal Trinity, then he was mistaken, and this could not be accepted. It was obvious that Cyril did not mean it, simply and strictly within the confines of Providence, as he had also allowed inferences to the eternal Trinity. He did not say “proceeds from” (εκπορεύεται); he did not use this word. He used the expression that the Spirit is manifested; that it essentially originates (i.e., with regard to the Essence) from the Son also. Given that the Essence is common to all three Personae, then the Son must necessarily precede the Spirit, from the aspect of the Essence. But, as for the Persona of the Spirit in connection to the other two Personae, we cannot have the Filioque, because only the Father –as a Persona- can be the Cause. At first glance, this appears somewhat vague. A passage by Saint Gregory of Nyssa clarifies this vague point somewhat satisfactorily. In his work “That there are not three Gods” (ότι ουκ εισί τρεις Θεοί), he says: «We do not disregard the difference between that which exists as the Cause, and that which is OF the Cause». We therefore have the Cause as one thing, and secondarily, that which is OF the Cause. In other words, the existence of God is not a simple thing; one cannot say that God simply “exists”. God’s existence includes activity, movement. Even within God’s Being – within His ontological associations –activity exists. God is not devoid of cause; He does not exist without cause. The cause is naturally inside His very Self, but, there is a distinction inside God: it is the distinction between the Cause and whatever originates from the cause. «We support the difference between the One Who exists as the Cause and the One who is OF the Cause». It is in this way -- and only in this way -- that we can perceive how the one Persona is discerned from the other; i.e., in the belief that the Cause is one, and the other is OF the Cause. He further says that «the distinction between the Personae inside the Holy Trinity cannot be made in any other way, except only in regard to this causality.» With regard to the nature, with regard to the energy, we cannot make such a distinction; however we can make it, on the basis of this principle of causality. This is a principle that was introduced by the Cappadocians. Before them, we do not find it clearly specified. We therefore have the ability to discern the Personae, precisely because we make the distinction between the Causer and that which is OF the Causer. And he continues: «With regard to that which is OF the Cause, we have in there another distinction, whereas with regard to the Cause, it is clear that it is only the Father. When referring to “OF the cause”, we can acknowledge a further difference: That only the one of the two originates immediately from the First». He uses the word “immediately”, which implies “directly”, or, “without any intermediation”. «The one originates immediately from the Cause, while the other originates through (=with the intermediation of) the one who originates directly from the First». The difference between the Son and the Spirit –in regard to the appearance, the existence and the origin of the two- is that the Son comes forth directly from the Father (the Cause), while the Spirit comes forth through the intermediation of the one who originates directly from the Cause, i.e., via the Son. But why does Gregory make this distinction and observation? He goes on to explain, that «Thus, it is in this way, with this intermediation, this intercession of the Son in the life of divinity, in divine existence, that His characteristic of ‘Only-born’ is preserved» So, in order for the Son to remain “the Only-Born Son”, we must attribute this “immediacy” to Him, otherwise we will somehow end up with two Sons, albeit the natural, the essential association of the Spirit with the Father is not abolished, because all of divine nature also exists within the Son, and consequently, in everything essential (as regards the nature), the Spirit likewise communes with the Father, even though it comes into existence through the intermediation of the Son. This could be interpreted as a kind of Filioque from the aspect of God’s eternal existence; however, neither the Son nor the Spirit can be regarded as Causes. In other words, while the Son may in some way intercede for the Holy Spirit to come into existence, this does not make the Son the Causer of the Spirit. The Causer is always the Father. In summarizing what we have said, we need to reach a conclusion, because we have before us some very delicate nuances. We need to maintain the principle -the faith- that only the Father can be the Cause, and that the Son –on account of the Filioque- can by no means be perceived as a co-Causer of the Spirit’s existence. Therefore, from the aspect of Providence, there is no problem. From the aspect of the eternality of the Trinity however, we have the problem whether the intercession of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit somehow makes the Son the Cause of the Spirit, or not. In his epistle “To Marinus”, Saint Maximus stressed that he had discussed the issue with the Romans of his time, and had concluded that they did not imply that the Son is the Causer. Thus, Maximus acquitted the Westerners of the accusation of heresy. Of course, all of this had taken place during the 7th century. Later on, when the Filioque was used by the West as a banner against the Orthodox, things changed, and they took a different turn. In the discussions that took place, the Westerners were no longer predisposed to revoking that the Son is co-Causer along with the Father in the “procession” of the Holy Spirit, thus reducing the Filioque theory to a heresy, because it was not possible to orthodoxically embrace it. In the Council of Florence, an attempt was made to unify the division. It was through the use of the term “through the Son”. If this had been accepted by both sides, then instead of saying “from the Son”, we would have said “through the Son” – in other words, it would have connoted the intercession of the Son that Gregory of Nyssa had mentioned. But even this attempt failed, because neither side was willing to take a clear stance on the issue, and the West had already stabilized its own position with the expression “from the Father AND the Son”, and was not willing in any way to retract it, and replace it with the expression “THROUGH the Son” Nowadays, fresh attempts are being made, and it will prove very interesting for one to observe where they will lead. As Orthodox theologians, we must bear in mind that every attempt –whatever it may involve, wherever it may lead- should not lead us into the obscuring of the basic premise that, within the Holy Trinity, ONLY THE FATHER is the Cause. An idea has been proposed (mainly by a Russian theologian, Bolotov, who has studied this subject especially) that the Filioque should be regarded as something that can be theologized. There is the distinction, which he basically introduced, that there are many ideas which do not constitute dogmas that affect man’s salvation. Some of them that are regarded as topics for discussion, have been considered items for theologizing, as opposed to dogmas that are not items for theologizing, that should not be subject to discussion. So, there is a proposal for the Filioque to be regarded as an item to be theologized, but this is a proposal which was not accepted, both by the Westerners and the East. Because even the Westerners continue to maintain (although nowadays they are tending to distance themselves from this stance, whereas in the Middle Ages they clearly supported it) that it is heresy for someone to NOT believe in the Filioque, and that belief in the Filioque comprises a dogma. Consequently, the idea of the Filioque becoming an item to be theologized was not accepted, and from time to time, it is brought up in discussions of our time, along with Bolotov’s positions, but there seems to be no progress in this direction. Our position should be that: provided the conditions we mentioned above are applied, the Filioque can be considered an item for theologizing. We in the East have no need to introduce this, but, in the West they can use it, provided that they mean it in the appropriate sense, as they did in the 7th century. If they regard it in a manner that makes the Son a co-Causer together with the Father, then we cannot see this as an item for theologizing, but as a heresy, because it jeopardizes monarchy. That the Father alone is the Causer, is linked to the fact that in God, we have only one principality, and that this principality is understood ontologically here. We do NOT have two causes; we do NOT have two principalities. Since we have a monarchy (= one principal), we have only one cause, and that cause coincides with the Father. Thus, literally, God is the Father. If we introduce a second Causer (the Son), then we are at risk of acknowledging two Gods. The West does not feel that it has this problem, because “monarchy” to them is not the one Father, but the one Essence. The “one God” for the Westerners is the one Essence, and not the Persona of the Father. Consequently, they believe they are not risking the loss of monotheism when they say “AND by the Son”. For the West, monotheism is dependent on the one essence of God, and not the Persona of the Father. And since this is the case, the Filioque does not threaten their monotheism, because their monotheism is not dependent on the notion of the “one Cause”. We have covered the topic of the Filioque, having seen how it was generated historically, under what premise it could have become accepted, at what point it became a heresy, and at which points it could constitute an item for theologizing. OODE observation: Obviously, the fact that the official Papist view does not comprehend the issue of polytheism that springs from the Filioque theory, does not mean that the problem does not exist. On the contrary, because of this differentiation, another, more serious problem is apparent: That the Papists have in fact been worshipping A DIFFERENT GOD than the one the Orthodox Christians believe in. While the Orthodox view is that “God is the Father”, the Papist view is clearly that “God is an IMPERSONAL ESSENCE”. Because, when the Persona of the Father is not regarded as the primary Cause, the impersonal element of an alleged Triadic Essence is acknowledged in His place. This not only undeniably ushers Papism into idolatry, but also, as we have outlined in previous chapters, it has other, serious implications in the matter of inter-Triadic relations between the Personae, and even in what each Persona is! The entire content of Theology is distorted, and becomes totally unrecognizable. Furthermore, by regarding the Essence as “God”, we no longer have a subservience of the Essence to the Persona, instead, the Persona is subservient to the Essence. In other words, the Father is no longer what He is because He thus wills it, but because He is compelled, by the Essence! The magnitude of blasphemy that the Papist theory introduces with regard to God, is clearly obvious here. We are shown a “God” who is dependent on His essence; a SUBJUGATED GOD, who functions on the basis of necessity and not on freedom and free volition, exactly like the idolaters’ “gods” who are restricted within the confines of the material universe, who are governed by “fate” and not by the free will that they supposedly possess. Secondary consequences of the above (so that we have a better idea of the depth and the gravity of the issue) are : Freedom –as a necessary ingredient for one’s becoming “in the likeness of God”- is abrogated, and the entire Christian dogma on salvation thereafter collapses altogether, dragging down with it the element of Love (since the personae of Divinity are defined by the Essence and not by voluntary love). We thus end up with the god-judge-punisher of the West, whom one can only fear and hate! For all the aforementioned reasons (and many more, which we do not need to expound here, because much has already been outlined), which are all derived from the heretical view on the “Essence God” of Augustine, it becomes evident that not only should one not agree to any union with the Papism that insists on embracing the Filioque, but we should also demand from them to relinquish altogether the Augustinian perception of an “Essence God”, if they truly wish to be re-embodied in the Church of Christ.

我們將總結出正教的神學在有關於及聖子的方面上所持有的立場，以以下的基本的觀察： 首先， 在有關於神命 (providence) 的方面上。"神命" 暗示著上帝在歷史和創世中所作出的行爲。我們也接受聖靈是由兒子所給與和派送出的。到這個階層爲止，及聖子是可以接受的。 但是, 我們無法從永恆的、無休止的三位一體的方面上接受它 （在那裏人格們之間的關係並不是那些屬於任何能量的關係等等）。 就永恆的以及無休止的三位一體來説，我們不能接受聖靈也是從兒子之中所出現的想法， 因為在三位一體裡面， 我們只有存在性的關係, 並且， 不可避免地, 起因只能是有一個： 父親。 因為， 若是介紹出兩個起因， 我們則不可避免地有兩個神。 在神命中， 你能夠說，我們可以承認聖靈也是依靠著兒子的； 説道，聖靈是由兒子所給與我們的禮物。在這種情況下， 你可以用使徒保羅的説法來講； 他在有關於基督的靈的方面上有説道， 聖靈的確是從父親之中出現的， 但它是由兒子所被派送於神命中的。"從某某之中進行出" (εκπορεύεται) 這字是有關於聖靈在永恆的三位一體之內對父親所有的依賴性； 因此 "從某某之中進行出" 是只屬於三位一體之性的永恆的地位中的。在此的關係純粹是存在性的，並且起因者只有一個： 父親。 然而，當我們在講神命之時， 我們不再是講存在性的關係， 反而只是在講那些屬於能量以及行爲的關係等等， 因而有兒子派送出聖靈的行為。這樣, 我們就有一種及聖子之事， 但那只是有關於神命的。 根據上述之事， 在有關於這兩個詞的方面上，在西方於是就有了嚴重的混亂。"εκπορεύεται" (從某某進行出) 以及 "πέμπεται" (被派送出) 這兩個希臘文詞， 從一開始起，在第四世紀時，就皆由拉丁語詞 procedure 所翻譯出。這就是製造出混亂之事。他們不能夠辯別出在這兩個概念之間所有的不同之事， 但是在說希臘語的東方，它們則是可以被辨別出的， 因此，"從某某進行出" (εκπορεύεται) 很適當地被限制於三位一體的永恆的、 存在性的方面而以， 而不被用於有關於神命的方面上。 從一開始起， 及聖子即被西方人同時用於這兩個方面上 (存在性的以及神命性的方面) 。混亂即是如此開始的， 而及聖子就是這個混亂的結果。對東方人來説， 這個分別是絕對必要的； 如果你接受了這個區別， 那麼你就只能在有關於神命的方面上接受及聖子。但是及聖子呢，在它由西方人所定義出的真實的維度裏，不是只與神命連接上的，但也是與永恆的三位一體之性有關。而這就是我們有問題的地方。你是不是可以把及聖子用於永恆的三位一體身上? 讓我們觀察一下教父神學在此所會遇到的問題。 在第七世紀時， Saint Maximus 曾被人問 (因為大家已經聽説，及聖子在西方被用上了)， 他對這個問題的看法是什麼。他回答道， 他審查了這個問題， 而情形則是如下： 講拉丁語的羅馬人沒有不同的詞來分別表達出這兩個概念 ("εκπορεύεται" 以及 "πέμπεται")。 他們只使用了一個詞。這因而造成了混亂。至於我們希臘人呢，我們會講這個語言, 我們因此必須顯示出我們對此事的理解， 而不自動地宣稱及聖子是西方人的異端邪說， 因為， 就如在給 Marius 的書信中有被分析解釋過的一般， 及聖子是這個混亂的結果。 在同一封的書信中， Saint Maximus 說道，當他與羅馬人談到這個問題之時， 他注意到，他們也提及到亞歷山大的聖西利爾 (Saint Cyril of Alexander) 以便能支持及聖子。聖西利爾的確寫了些能夠為及聖子提供依據的東西。我們並且也有證言，說道聖西利爾 在這個主題的方面上所寫的東西曾引起了強烈的反應。這是 Theodoretus of Cyrus 的反應； 他對此有相當激烈的反應， 並聲稱，如果西利爾是在有關於神命的方面上提及到及聖子的話，那麼一切皆好； 但如果他將其與永恆的三位一體連接上， 那麼他就是錯了， 並且這就不能被接受。 很明顯的，西利爾並沒有如此意味著， 也就是只在神命的區域内， 因為他也允許提及到永恆的三位一體之性。他沒有說 "從某某進行出" (εκπορεύεται）， 他沒有用這個詞。他所用的説法是，聖靈顯現出，聖靈是在根本上(即, 在有關於本質的方面上) 起源於兒子的。既然本質是共同於所有三個人格的， 那麼兒子就必須是在聖靈之前, 在本質的方面上。但， 就聖靈的人格與其它兩個人格的關係而言，我們無法有及聖子，因為只有父親 -- 一個人格 -- 才能是起因。乍看之下， 這看來有些含湖。 Saint Gregory of Nyssa 所寫的一篇章文則稍為澄清了這含湖的一點。在他所寫的 " 沒有三個神" （ότι ουκ εισί τρεις Θεοί）一書中， 他說道： "我們並未忽略在那存在為起因之者， 以及那是起源於起因之者之間的不同之處" 。我們因此有起因者，那是一回事， 而次要地，我們有那是起源於起因的之者。換句話說, 上帝的存有不是一件簡單的事情； 你無法說， 上帝是"存在的" 而已。上帝的存有包括著行爲、活動。即使在上帝的存有中 -- 在他的存在性的關係協會之內 -- 行爲是存在的。上帝不是毫無起因在内的； 他不是沒有起因而存在的。起因自然地是在他自已裡面， 但， 在上帝裡面有一個分別， 那就是在起因者以及起源於起因之者之間的分別。 "我們支持在那存在為起因之者， 以及那是起源於起因之者之間的不同之處" 。就是這樣 -- 也只有這樣 -- 我們才能察覺到，一個人格是如何可以從其他人格中辨別開； 即， 以起因是一者、 而另一者是起源於起因的這個信仰。他進一步說， "在神聖的三位一體裡面的人格之間的區別是無法以其他的方式來作出的；除了用這個因果的關係的方法之外。" 在有關於本性的方面上，在有關於能量的方面上， 我們無法作出這個區別； 但是在這個因果關係的原則的基礎上，我們則是可以將其作出的。這是由卡柏多西亞教父們所介紹出的原則。在他們之前， 我們不見它有很清楚地被表明出。 所以我們有能力來辯別人格，就是因為我們在起因者以及起源於起因者之者之間做出了區別。並且他繼續説道： "至於那是起源於起因的之者呢， 我們在那裡有另一個分別， 但是在有關於起因的方面上， 很清楚的， 這只是父親。當提及到"起源於起因之者"時， 我們能夠認出另一個區別： 那就是，在那兩者當中只有一者是立刻起源於第一者的"。他運用"立刻" 這個詞， 意味著 "直接地" ，或者， "沒有任何調停地" 。"其中一者立刻起源於起因， 而另一者則是經由(= 以調停之法) 那個直接起源於第一者之者而起源的" 。在兒子和聖靈之間的區別 -- 在有關於他們的出現， 存有，和起源的方面 -- 則是，兒子是直接來自於父親(起因)的， 而聖靈則是經由那個直接來自於起因之者的調停而發源的， 即， 經由兒子。 但是 Gregory 爲何要做出這個區別和觀察呢? 他解釋， "因為即是如此， 即是以這調停、以這兒子在神性生命中的調解， 他的唯一生子的特徵才能被保存住。" 所以， 為了能使兒子仍是"唯一出生的兒子"， 我們必須將這調停性歸因於他， 否則呢，我們將最後有兩個兒子， 雖然聖靈與父親的本性的、根本性的協會並不被廢除掉， 因為所有的神性也存在於兒子之中，以至， 在一切根本性的(有關於本性的)方面上， 聖靈同樣地是與父親共融的， 即使它是只通過兒子的調停而能存在的。 這能夠被解釋為是一種在上帝的永恆存有的方面上而做出的及聖子； 但是， 兒子和聖靈皆不能被認為是起因。換句話說, 雖然兒子能在某個方面上為聖靈做調停以便它能開始存在， 這並不表示兒子是聖靈的起因。起因者向來是父親。 在總結我們已說過的事情之中， 我們需要得出一個結論， 因為在我們之前有一些非常精妙細微的差異。我們需要維護這個原則或信仰，那就是，只有父親能是起因， 而兒子 -- 由於及聖子之故 -- 絕不能被認為與父親一起是聖靈的存有的起因 。 所以， 從神命的方面上來看，則並沒有問題。然而，從三位一體的永恒性的方面上來看， 我們則有問題，那就是，兒子在聖靈的出現之事中所作出的調解是否在某種方面上使得兒子成爲了聖靈的起因 。 在他給 Marius 的書信裡， Saint Maximus 強調，他與他那個時代的羅馬人已談論過了這個問題， 並且認為， 他們並沒有想說，兒子是起因的 。因此， Maximus 赦免了西方人；他們不再是持有著異端邪說的了。當然， 所有這些皆是發生在第七世紀期間。之後, 當及聖子被西方人用來反對正教之時， 事情則不再是如此了，反而轉變了。在後來進行的討論中， 西方人不再想取消兒子與父親一起是 聖靈之出現的起因的這個想法， 因而使得及聖子的這個理論降級為一種異端邪說, 因為我們是不可能由正教性的方式來接受它的。 佛羅倫斯的大公會議曾企圖統一這個分歧。這是以"經由兒子" 這個詞的。如果雙方皆接受這個説法的話， 那麼， 我們將不再說 "從兒子之中"， 反而說 "經由兒子" -- 換句話說, 這會暗示著 Gregory of Nissa 所 提及過的兒子的調停。但是連這個嘗試也失敗了， 因為兩邊皆不願意在有關於這個問題的方面上採取上清楚的立場， 而西方人在用"從父親以及兒子之中"的説法之時已經固定了他們自己的立場， 並且不願意在任何情況下將其收回， 以"經由兒子"之説來替換它。 現今， 又有新的如此的企圖， 而觀察著這將帶領我們至何處，那將是非常有趣的一件事。身為正教的神學家們， 我們必須記住， 任何企圖 -- 無論它介入些什麽， 無論它帶領至哪兒 -- 皆不應該使得我們忘卻那最基本的前提， 即，在神聖的三位一體之內, 只有父親是起因。 最近有一個想法 (這主要是由一位俄國神學家, Bolotov, 所提議出的；他特別地研究過這個主題)， 認爲及聖子應該是可以被搞在神學中的東西。他在基本上介紹出一個分別，説道有很多的想法並不構成能影響到人的救贖的教條。有些被認為是可以討論的話題， 被當作是神學討論中的項目之一， 而這是與那些不是神學議論中的項目、也不應該被討論的教條等等相對的。 所以呢， 有人提議將及聖子視為是神學議論中的項目之一， 但這是既不由西方人、也不由東方人所接受的。因為甚至連西方人也繼續認爲， 要是不相信及聖子，那可是異端邪說的， 並且那對於及聖子的信仰已是包括在教義中的 (雖然他們今日漸漸地開始疏遠於這個立場， 但是在中世紀之時他們卻很清楚地是支持著及聖子的)。 結果呢，在神學上講及聖子的這個想法就未被接受， 並且呢，有時候，在我們的時代的討論中它有被提及到， 尤其是以 Bolotov 的立場， 但是，這看起來似乎沒有甚麼特別的進展。 我們的立場則應該是: 要是我們在上述中所提及到的條件被應用上的話， 那，及聖子則是可以被認為是搞神學中的一個項目。我們在東方並沒有介紹出這點的需要， 但是， 在西方他們則能使用上這點，只要他們是在其適當的意義中如此作的話，就如在第七世紀時代。如果他們因此而把兒子也看成是與父親一起的起因者， 那麼我們則不能把這作為是可以搞在神學中的東西， 因為那將會是異端邪說， 因為它會危害到君主制。父親單獨地是起因的這個事實，這是與另一個事實相連接上的，那就是，在上帝中， 我們只有一個公國， 而這個公國是在存在性的方面上被瞭解的。我們並沒有兩個起因； 我們並沒有兩個公國。既然我們有一個君主制(= 一位君長)， 我們就只有一個起因， 並且那個起因是與父親相符的。因此， 上帝真的在字面上是父親。如果我們介出紹第二個起因(兒子)， 那麼我們就有了承認兩個神的危險。 西方人並不認為他們有這個問題， 因為"君主制" 對他們來説不是一個父親， 而只是一個本質。對西方人來説，"是為一者的上帝" 是一個本質， 而不是父親的人格。結果呢， 他們相信，當他們說 "以及兒子" 的時候，他們並沒有失去一神論的危險。對西方人來説， 一神論是依靠於上帝的唯一本質的， 而不是依靠於父親的人格。既然如此，及聖子並未威脅到他們的一神論， 因為他們的一神論並不是依靠於 "一個起因的" 概念的。 我們已報道了及聖子的這個題目， 看見了它是怎麼樣地在歷史中出現的， 在什麼情況下它是能夠被接受的， 在什麼時候它成為了異端邪說， 並且在甚麼條件下它可能構成一個在搞神學中的項目。 OODE 的觀察： 很明顯地， 羅馬天主教會並未看出及聖子之事造成了多神論的問題這件事，並不意味著這個問題就因此而不存在。反之， 由於這個分別之故， 另外一個更嚴重的問題則出現了： 羅馬天主教徙實際上是在崇拜著另一個、不是正教基督徒所相信的神。 正教的看法是， "上帝是父親"， 然而羅馬天主教徙的看法很清楚地則是， "上帝是無個人性的本質" 。 因為， 當父親的人格不是被認為是主要的起因之時， 他即被一個無個人性的三位一體的本質的要素所代替了。這不僅使得天主教成爲偶像崇拜， 而且， 就如我們在先前的章節裡解釋過了的一般， 它還會有其他的、在有關於三位一體的人格之間的聯係的方面上的、更嚴重的問題，甚至包括著人格到底是甚麼東西的問題。 神學之整個內容皆因此而變形了，並且完全無法再被認出。 此外， 由於本質被看待為"上帝"， 本質不再是屈從於人格的了， 反之， 人格是屈從於本質的。換句話說， 父親不再是因他的意願之故而是他所是的之者， 而是因為他被他的本質所強迫之故！ 羅馬天主教徙所介紹出的對於上帝的褻瀆之程度， 很清楚地在此顯露出來。這個"上帝" 是依靠於他的本質的； 一個被征服的神，他是根據必要而有作用的，而不是以自由和自由的意志， 就像偶像崇拜者的"神"一樣， 那些被限制於物質性的宇宙的區域之內、由"命運" 而不是由他們所擁有的自由意志所被治理的神。 上述之次要的後果則是(以便我們能對這個問題的重力和深度有更好的了解)： 自由 -- 那個人爲了能成爲 "上帝的形像" 所必需的東西 -- 被廢止了， 而整個之後的有關於救贖的基督教教義也崩潰了，連愛的要素也被扯拽下來 (因為神性的人格現在是由本質而定義出的，而不是由自意的愛) 。我們因此而有西方的審判處罰的神，那個你只能怕和恨的神！ 由於所有的上述的原因之故 (以及許多其它的原因， 但我們在此不需要闡明這些， 因為之前我們已經概述了許多) -- 而那些全都是從奧古斯丁的“本質上帝”的異端看法中所獲得出的 -- 以下則變得很明顯的：你不但不能讚成與任何堅持著及聖子的天主教同盟， 並且我們應該要求他們放棄奧古斯丁的 "本質上帝"， 如果他們確實希望再回到於基督的教會中的話。