On examining Augustine’s triadic theology, we noted the following: Just like the Cappadocian Fathers and the other Fathers, Augustine also sought ways of expressing that supreme mystery of the Holy Trinity. In his search for those images that would at least somehow express the mystery of the Holy Trinity, Augustine resorted to the notion of the metaphysical, perfect Being who is God; which perfect, metaphysical Being Augustine had depicted on the basis of Platonic belief regarding the perfect metaphysical Being. According to Platonism, the perfect metaphysical Being (which relates to God Himself) is the “Nous” (mind, intellect). Consequently, the Nous relates to God. God equals that perfect Being, which in essence is the Nous. However, according to Platonism, that perfect metaphysical Being who is God, as the Nous, also possesses three other characteristic elements. One of them is Memory. The perfect Nous, the perfect Being who is the Nous, possesses the characteristic of Memory. To Platonism, Memory is of special significance, because Platonism commences from the notion that the entire truth is accumulated, stored, in the past. In other words, man’s soul is eternal – its origin is eternal – therefore, given its eternal origin, the soul is endowed with the full truth, as though it is somehow “stored” within it. Memory therefore is a very important thing for Platonism. It is the source, from which truth unfolds and manifests itself. God therefore, as a perfect metaphysical Being, possesses this source, this storage tank that contains the entire truth. God therefore possesses Memory; and that which is “Memory” in the case of God (and as we have already said, it is the source of life, thought, and energy of this supreme Being, this Nous, this God) is - in Augustine’s dogmatic language on the Holy Trinity - referred to as the “Father”, because the “Father” – according to standard Christian belief - is the source of all life in the Holy Trinity. Thus, in using this correlation (the element of Memory), Augustine proposed a very clever means of expressing the Father. But in this perfect metaphysical Being, Memory is not inactive. It does not remain inert. It is Memory, because it is the storage tank –the source- from which Knowledge proceeds, and from which the Truth proceeds. The (Greek) word for “Truth” is «Α-λήθεια» (pronounced A-lethea), which is a composite word, made up of the privative «α» and the ending «λήθη» (lethe, oblivion). In other words, Αλήθεια (Alethea) means “that which is remembered”, or “that which does not fall into oblivion”, but rises up to the surface of Memory. Thus, the Truth comes forth from within Memory. But Truth becomes characterized when it sees the light, through the realization of things. And that is what is called Knowledge, i.e. when Truth comes into the light. When a tutor implements the Socratic idea - the “obstetrics” method of acquiring knowledge - he too is drawing from within the pupil’s soul those things that the pupil supposedly always knew, because according to Platonic perception, nothing is new. The tutor gives nothing new to the pupil that the pupil didn’t already know beforehand. The pupil knows everything; every kind of knowledge is apparently already stored away, inside his soul. Because knowledge is supposedly borne by the soul, and because each person’s soul is eternal, it therefore carries knowledge inside it. Consequently, what the tutor does, is to “deliver” knowledge by means of the dialectic practice (dialogue). He “delivers” (like an obstetrician) and extracts. He extracts, until he succeeds in bringing the pupil to the stage of acknowledging: “Yes, it is just as you say”. The moment in their dialogue that the pupil says “It is just as you say, master”, that is supposedly the moment that “the child is born”, so to speak. (This is the obstetrics method, in other words). That is the moment when the perennial Memory of a Truth is extracted from its storage tank, and becomes Knowledge. So, it is from this source of Memory that Knowledge comes from, and it is in this “depiction” that Augustine finds a useful correlation, given that the Son is also characterized in classical and Christian terminology as the “Logos”. The term “Logos” is a concept that contains the element of Knowledge, of reason. It is a Knowledge that is born of Memory. But this perfect metaphysical Being – again according to Platonic perception - not only has Memory and Knowledge; it also has Love, because it is attracted by the Benevolent, the Good and the Beautiful, and therefore God –Who is the perfect Being, the perfect Nous - cannot lack this element of Love. Augustine finds a correlation to the Spirit here. So, the Spirit is the Will – or the Love - that this supreme Nous has. Thus, in his work on the Holy Trinity, Augustine succeeded with the help of Platonism to somehow formulate an Apologetics of his own; i.e., to translate the dogma on the Holy Trinity into a language form that was familiar and acceptable to the intellectuals in his environment. But in attempting this, Augustine was digressing from the basic principles that the Cappadocian Fathers had outlined in the East – principles which he may not have been aware of. Here we have a classical example of differentiation. What does that differentiation consist of? Well, one basic differentiation is that we can relate all the above analogically, to only one person; which means, we can theoretically refer to the dogma of the Holy Trinity by looking at only one person, who has all those elements (depending on the degree of perfection that he has attained). According to the Cappadocian Fathers however, we cannot find a depiction of the Holy Trinity within one person. We need to use three persons. Because the characteristic of the Cappadocian Fathers’ theology is that: The three Personae of the Holy Trinity are not the energies of the one God, but are three complete hypostases. Subsequently, in order to present the fullness of those hypostases, the analogies must be likewise in full. If we are to use correlations based on people, it must be of three people and not one person (or three suns, or three lit torches). We must have three, fulfilled, complete beings; thus, we have here a basic differentiation. Augustine’s perception can lead to individualism, i.e., that God is like an individual with various energies and abilities and qualities, all of which can supposedly be understood as “personae”. But, in this way, the personae are again at risk of becoming (as they did in Savellianism, and in ancient Hellenism) merely guises; of becoming the characteristics of a one, selfsame being, and not individual, complete and fulfilled beings. We have, therefore, in this instance, a huge differentiation. The Greek Fathers did not confuse, or separate, the Personae of the Holy Trinity as “characteristics” – and in fact psychological characteristics such as Memory, Knowledge and Love - which the Greek Fathers had associated with the Nature - the one Nature - of God, and not with the three Personae. In other words, God has one Knowledge, one Will, one Love, and not three. Nor is the one Persona equivalent to Knowledge and the other Personae are nothing, or, Love is one of the three Personae who expresses Love, while the other two Personae don’t. All three Personae express it, because it is common to all three of them. But, this is not what we refer to as “hypostatic characteristics”. These are not the characteristics of the hypostases. The characteristics of the hypostases are something else, and we have already clarified what they are. We therefore have a differentiation here. With Augustine, we can see the risk of projecting onto God the psychological attributes of man; in other words, we are faced with the risk of anthropomorphism. Other facets of Augustinian Theology Augustine associated God with the Nous. Thus, when asked “Who is the one God?”, he was unable to reply with reference to the Personae of the Holy Trinity – to any of the Personae of the Holy Trinity – because to him, those Personae are only attributes of the Nous – the one Nous – and are not “personae” per se. This is the way he interpreted and applied the formula –the phrasing- which had prevailed, i.e., that God is one essence, three personae, i.e., by taking the term “essence” and linking it to “God”. Thus, God – the one God - is the essence, and the Personae are merely the attributes that we mentioned previously: they are the attributes of that one Nous. In doing this, Augustine gave priority to the essence; priority to the God-Nous, from whence the Personae supposedly sprang as secondary elements. So, in answer to the question “Who is the one God?” Augustine’s reply was : “The one essence”. With the Greek Fathers, we have a different situation. To the question “Who is the one God?”, or, when we simply say “God”, the answer is “The Father”. The element of Monarchy (=sovereignty) does not reside within the essence and the nature of God; it resides within the Persona of the Father. When therefore associating “God” with “the Father”, we are looking at the Biblical way of referring to God also, i.e., “the God, and the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ…”. When the -par excellence- God is acknowledged as “the Father”, then we are led to realize why the Holy Trinity is embodied in the concept of “one God”: On the premise that the one God is the Father, and that the term “father” is a term that presupposes a relationship, a “father” can therefore not exist, if there is no “son”. And – naturally - the Father is not only Father to the Son, but is also “Father” to the Spirit, only in a different way. Thus, both the Son and the Spirit are - from the very first moment - automatically included in the concept of the “one God”. This is extremely important, because the dogma of the Holy Trinity becomes a primary issue. You cannot speak of “one God” first, and then go on to speak of the Holy Trinity, as a secondary issue. I wish to stress this, because, on account of Augustine, Western Theology was led to this division in Dogmatics, which appeared during the scholastics age, and which, unfortunately, was also emulated by Orthodox Theologians, i.e., to first examine a chapter on the one God, to examine that one God Himself, His attributes, and whatever else you can imagine. And then, to examine another chapter, which refers to the Holy Trinity, as if it were ever possible for one to refer to the one God without simultaneously referring to the Holy Trinity. But, as Augustine asserted, in order for someone to refer to the one God primarily and exclusively, one must relate God to the essence and give priority to the essence; one must say that the essence comes first, then come the Personae. The subject is very serious, whether priority should be given to the essence or the Persona. Western Theology gave priority to the essence (and there are many Orthodox who do the same). To us Orthodox, the “one God” is the Father and not the one essence, and that is why the Holy Trinity is the first thing that we say about God. The first thing that we say about God is that “God is the Father”. Since this is the first thing that we say, we cannot avoid acknowledging the Trinity, because the term “Father” is a meaning that necessarily involves the Holy Trinity. We have here a very serious difference between East and West. Can one speak of the one God, independently of the Holy Trinity? According to Augustine in the West, this was possible. And it is indeed being done, in all the dialogues that take place nowadays, with monotheistic religions. You can see, that this is actually being done, in the West. “Let’s first come to an agreement” – they say - “with those who believe in one God, those who are the same as us, and exclude the atheists. The next step is to isolate the monotheists from the polytheists. Nowadays, we don’t have many polytheists of course; almost none. Polytheism has eclipsed. The other religions are all monotheistic….” But what happens in such dialogues, is that we must presuppose that it is possible for us Christians to speak of God –the one God- without any reference to the Holy Trinity to begin with. This is precisely where we are led -in a natural way- by Augustine and by the priority of the essence as opposed to the Persona. And because Dogmatics is not an Academic subject, (i.e., something to be comprehended with the mind); Dogmatics is not only for those who study Theology in order to acquire a diploma, but it is something that concerns everyone, it must, therefore, have direct consequences – existential consequences – for the entire world. And there is in fact a serious consequence here, which is: All those who pray, what/who are they praying to? It may be possible to pray to “God” per se, but: is it possible for one to pray to the essence of God? This is the perception of Augustine and of many Orthodox, who have not thought things out very well, and have related God to that which the Greek Fathers had named “Divinity” (or “God”, in this, abstract sense). When I say: “I am praying to God”, to which God am I praying? Can I pray to the one God, as the one Divinity, or, could it be, that when we say: “I am praying to God” we are clearly praying to one of the three Personae or to all three Personae simultaneously? You cannot pray, you cannot personally address the essence of God, but you can pray to the one God. So, if the one God is not the essence, then to whom are you praying? You are of course praying to the Persona of the Father. We actually have prayers in Orthodox worship that are addressed only to the Father, as the – par excellence - God. Naturally, the Holy Trinity cannot be divided; where the Father is, there the Son is and there the Spirit is. But as for us who are addressing God (where the Personae are united and inter-embraced yet are hypostatically different), we are each what we are: individuals. That is what allows us to pray to a specific Persona: we can even pray to the Holy Spirit separately, as in the prayer “Thou heavenly King, the Paraclete…” which is addressed to the Holy Spirit. We of course have very many prayers that are addressed to Christ, and we also have prayers addressed to the Father, which are basically all the prayers of the Divine Eucharist – they are the eucharist prayers, the prayers of thanks. The Divine Eucharist is addressed to the Father. And if one studies the prayers of the Divine Liturgy of the first centuries and sees how they developed and arrived at the form they have in the Liturgies of the Chrysostom and Basil that we have nowadays, it will become obvious that the supplication prayer in the Divine Liturgy is a supplication that was originally addressed to the Father. This has been preserved, in the Liturgy of Basil the Great. That prayer is addressed to the Father. It is evident that we are addressing only the Father, however without this precluding the presence of the Son and the Spirit. Nonetheless, we are addressing a Persona, just as the Son (while in the flesh) addressed – and prayed to – the persona of the Father, even though He Himself continued to be “within the Father”, through their inter-embracing. Therefore, the fact of His “being within the Father” clearly did not deter the Son from addressing the Father. This is what characterizes the hypostases. But in this case that we are studying, things appear extremely vague; we have “Knowledge” praying to “Love”, and “Love” praying to “Memory”…. This cannot be applied to any existential experience, and even more so, to the Church’s experience of worship. That is why in the West, in the matter of prayer, the Holy Trinity was put aside. One can see that in the West, one prays to God generally and vaguely; it is either to the essence of God, or –usually- to Christ. That is where Westerners’ piety and spirituality resides. Bearing in mind that Christ is a man, it is possible for one to sense Him better; it is possible to sense Him more hypostatically, as a person. Augustine’s theology not only made it possible to speak of one God prior to the Holy Trinity; he also made it possible to pray to the one God without necessarily praying to one specific Persona. To us, the “one God” is undoubtedly the Father, at least from the aspect of worship (which is what determines Theology), because it is a Persona to whom we are praying. The “one God” is therefore the Father, in the sense that He is the One “from Whom” the Personae of the Holy Trinity originate. The Father is the par excellence God; He is not the essence, He is the Persona of Father. This is how Orthodoxy is contradistinguished, opposite Augustine. With these Augustinian principles of the Holy Trinity in mind, we shall attempt to examine a thorny issue that had arisen between the East and the West, with regard to Triadic Theology. It is an issue that continues to preoccupy us, i.e., the famous “Filioque”. The Filioque has two aspects. The one aspect is the canonical one, which is linked to the historical problem behind the appearance of the Filioque, and the other aspect is the theological one, which is linked to the justification of the Filioque by the Westerners or its rejection by the Orthodox. In order to comprehend the theological aspect, we must definitely be well acquainted with the following two things: Augustine’s theology, and the Cappadocians’ theology. This is because the Westerners theologized the Filioque on the basis of Augustine’s theology, while the Eastern Orthodox rejected it, on the basis of the Cappadocians’ theology. Before arriving at the theological justification or rejection of the Filioque, we should mention a few things regarding the canonical aspect, the historical aspect that the Filioque problem presents. “Filioque” is the Latin expression inserted in the Creed, which means “and from the Son”. In other words, that the Holy Spirit not only proceeds from the Father, but “also from the Son”. This concept, this Filioque procession, existed in the West, even during the 4th century. We find it in Ambrose mostly, but in a form that didn’t create any theological problems, and also during the age of Saint Maximus, when a minor disturbance had begun to appear. Maximus, who kept in touch with Rome, was asked about it. There is an epistle by Maximus addressed to Marinus, in which it appears that Maximus had been asked: “What’s going on in Rome? They say that the Filioque exists there”; to which Maximus had replied: “Yes. It is a fact that this exists in the West, but the way in which they present it, is absolutely Orthodox and correct.” Therefore, it was not a theological issue during Maximus’ time. We are now in the 7th century. Up until that time, we have a theologically neutral situation. In a certain strange way, the Filioque entered the everyday scene, and became the epicenter of scandal, for purely political reasons. It was first of all inserted by the West in the Creed (the Symbol of Faith), in Spain, in the 6th century, during the 3rd Synod of Toledo. King Requarerdos, who had converted from Arianism, was –like every new convert- likewise fanatically supportive of the new faith. He was positively adamant about reinforcing the anti-Arian position that the Son is God, and he found the means of doing this in the Filioque idea which, albeit existent in the West, had not yet been officially inserted in the Creed. He thenceforth proceeded to persuade that Synod to insert the Filioque in the Creed, so that it could be triumphantly confessed that the Son is equal to the Father. So far, things were more or less innocuous. But that which ensued, was the cause that opened up an entirely new age. It was the appearance of the Franks, and the appearance of Charlemagne as the Byzantium’s opposition (in the sense that he wanted to establish the genuine Roman state, as the successor of the former Roman state, whereas the Byzantine Emperor regarded himself as the successor, and the Byzantine Empire the natural continuation of the Roman Empire). In his designs to wage war against Byzantium, Charlemagne “activated” the Filioque, because in those times (unlike today, where nobody pays attention to a religious definition), you could start a war with a single dogmatic word. Charlemagne therefore rallied all of his troops around the Filioque theory, claiming that the Byzantines were the heretics, who didn’t acknowledge it. This entire quarrel with Byzantium was consequently an issue of faith. But at the time, the pope had expressed his disagreement with Charlemagne. He regarded Charlemagne as a risk to his own authority as well; thus, the pope found himself supporting the side of Byzantium, and opposed to the introduction of the Filioque in the Creed. In order to triumphantly prove this, pope Leo III instructed the inscribing of the Creed, without the Filioque, onto two plaques, which he placed visibly inside the basilica of Saint Peter. In fact, in one of the recent conventions that took place in Rome regarding the 2nd Ecumenical Council, a Roman Catholic theologian had proposed that it would be a good move on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, to put those plaques (which had been hidden out of sight) back in their place; those plaques of pope Leo III, which have the original Symbol of Faith inscribed on them, without the Filioque. Up until that time, the defending of the Filioque had remained a Frankish matter. Rome did not agree with it. Rome introduced the Filioque for the first time officially, only in the 11th century. In the year 1014, and on the insistence of Frederick IV -a Frankish emperor of German descent- his coronation ceremony in Rome by the Pope was agreed upon, on the condition that the Creed would be introduced, with the inclusion of the Filioque. For reasons of expediency, Rome agreed to this (expediency was usually Rome’s priority). The time was ripe; there had also been a dispute with Photios because Rome had insisted on imposing its policy in Bulgaria, and the matter of the Filioque had soon entered the dispute. An atmosphere of opposition between Rome and Constantinople had been created, in which dispute the Filioque had also played a certain role. So, the time was ripe in the 11th century; the Filioque was officially inserted in Rome’s Creed, and ever since that moment, Rome itself, together with the Franks, undertook the defence of the Filioque, to the point that in 1054 (the year of the schism between Rome and Constantinople), the Pope’s anathema -which Umberto had deposited on the Holy Altar of the Church of Hagia Sophia- contained the accusation that the Easterners had eliminated the Filioque from the Creed!! Now this is very interesting, because, for centuries, the West has believed that the Easterners had eliminated the Filioque, and not that Westerners had inserted it!! Ever since then, an entire industry of theological arguments has sprung up, on both sides. The fight for the justification or the rejection of the Filioque was now under way, with the West drawing its arguments from Augustine’s theory, and cultivating and further developing them with the aid of scholastic theology by Thomas Aquinatus. We even discovered the slogan that whoever doesn’t believe in the Filioque is a heretic. On the other side, an anti-Filioque theology had developed, with the argument that whoever accepts the Filioque is a heretic. These polemics lasted for centuries. And now that we are in the present time, the theological problem has resurfaced even more acutely, mainly because of its implementation by the Slavophiles of Russia during the previous century. They were the ones who eventually headed the theology of the Émigrés (the Russian emigrants who arrived after the communist revolution in Europe), amongst whom was the protagonist who re-introduced the Filioque into the dispute between East and West, and in fact in the form of a heresy (and even worse); he was Lossky. So, Lossky did not simply bring the Filioque back into the limelight; it was re-introduced even more exacerbated than it was during the Middle Ages. Of course today’s psychological climate does not allow for exacerbations, but if you were to ask a Westerner or an Orthodox what is that which basically differentiates us, they will say it is the Filioque. And this gave a new look to the theological problematics of the Filioque. However, the canonical aspect remains as is. It remains as a problem, which has the following form: Does a “church” such as the Western one have the right to unilaterally insert a new expression in the Symbol of Faith? That is where the issue is canonical: Can there be a one-sided alteration of the Creed, when this Symbol of Faith was the product of an Ecumenical Synod? How can one party change it, without the consent of the others? Observation by OODE: We need to point out here, that there have been some very important Synods related to the above matter –- such as the 8th, with Photios the Great (879-880); also the Hesychast Synods of 1341, 1347, 1451 (9th Ecumenical); the more recent Synods of Constantinople (1722, 1727, 1838 and others) -- but also the divinely inspired saints such as Mark of Ephesus, Athanasios of Paros, Nicodemus of the Holy Mountain, Nektarios of Pentapolis, who, with their evangelical, patristic and holy-synodical theological argument, outrightly condemned the Latins or pro-Latins as heretics. Actually, as a general rule, all Synods and Patriarchal Circulars in their poemantic obligation to safeguard the people from the Franco-Latin propagandas, use intensely trenchant –albeit not untrue or malevolent- characterizations. This is also observed in the “Synodical of Orthodoxy”, which was included in the Triodion and is read in Monasteries. On the basis of such Orthodox Synodic and Patristic criteria, the Rev. father Hierotheos of Nafpaktos in one of his articles stresses that there is no apostolic succession (in the bestowing of Grace and the Truth); that there are no Sacraments, nor is there any literal notion of a “Church” in Papism. Otherwise, if simple “historical succession” constituted a guarantee of genuine Apostolicity (Orthodox Apostolic tradition), then we would have to acknowledge it in all the other heretics and heresy leaders, which is out of the question. For example, Saint Mark of Ephesus observes: «Την μεν αιτίαν του σχίσματος εκείνοι δεδώκασι, την προσθήκην εξενεγκόντες αναφανδόν, ήν υπ’ οδόντα πρότερον έλεγον· ημείς δε αυτοίς εσχίσθημεν πρότεροι, μάλλον δε εσχίσαμεν αυτούς και απεκόψαμεν του κοινού της Εκκλησίας σώματος. Διότι ειπέ μοι: Πότερον, ως ορθήν έχοντας δόξαν ή ορθώς την προσθήκην εξενεγκόντας; Και τις αν τούτο είποι, μη σφόδρα τον εγκέφαλον διασεσεισμένος; αλλά ως άτοπα και δυσσεβή φρονούντας και παραλόγως την προσθήκην ποθήσαντας. Ουκούν ως αιρετικούς αυτούς απεστράφημεν και δια τούτο αυτοίς εχωρίσθημεν... αιρετικοί εισιν άρα και ως αιρετικούς αυτούς απεκόψαμεν». “For it was they who provided the cause of the schism, by outrightly expressing the addition (of the Filioque), which (schism) they had previously propagated through their teeth (verbally), by saying that we (Orthodox) had deviated first, when it was we who had cut them off and had removed them from the common body of the Church. Because, tell me, which of the two applies: that the existing belief is correct, or that the addition was correctly proposed? And who, if saying they desire the addition –unless they are seriously mentally deranged- would not admit the addition to be something unfitting and irreverent and preposterous? It was therefore not because we repulsed them as heretics and for this reason departed from them; but it was because they are in fact heretics, and as such, we excised them.”

在審查奧古斯丁的三位一體的神學之時， 我們注意到了以下之事： 就跟卡帕多西亞教父們和其它的教父們一樣，奧古斯丁在尋找著能够表達出那至尊的神聖的三位一體的奧秘的方式。在他尋找某種能够表達出三位一體的奧秘的圖像之時， 奧古斯丁採用了是為形而上學形的、完善的存有者的上帝的概念；而他是依據著帕拉圖式的關於完善的、形而上學形的存有者的想法來描述這個是為形而上學形的、完善的存有者的上帝。根據帕拉圖學派的想法， 一個完善的形而上學形的存有者 (而這是與上帝有關的) 即是"Nous" (理性，理智) 。 如此， Nous 與上帝有關。上帝是一個完善的存有者，而在實質上他就是 Nous。 但是， 根據帕拉圖學派的想法， 那是為上帝的完善的、形而上學形的存有者，因他是 Nous， 也還擁有著三個其它的典型的要素。其中一個就是記憶。完善的 Nous， 是為 Nous 的完善的存有者， 擁有著記憶的這個特徵。 對帕拉圖學派來說， 記憶是有特別意義的， 因為帕拉圖學派是從整個真理是積累和存放於過去的這種想法而開始的。換句話說， 人的靈魂是永恆的 -- 它是起源於永恆的境界的 -- 因此，由於這個永恆的起源之故， 靈魂因此擁有著整個真理， 就好像它是被存放於靈魂内部似的。記憶因此對帕拉圖學派來說是一件非常重要之事。這是真理開始表示和體現自己的地方。 因此， 身為一個完善的形而上學形的存有者，上帝就擁有著這個包含著整個真理的儲存庫。上帝因此擁有記憶； 並且那在上帝身中是 "記憶" 的東西(而我們已經說過， 它是這個至尊存有者、這個 Nous、 的生命、思想、 和能量的源泉) 就是 -- 用奧古斯丁的關於三位一體的教義語言來說 -- "父親"， 因為"父親" -- 根據標準的基督徒的信仰的說法 -- 是在三位一體之性中的所有生命的源泉。因而， 在使用這種關聯(記憶的要素)之時， 奧古斯丁提出了一個非常巧妙的表達父親的方法。 但是在這個完善的形而上學形的存有者裡， 記憶不是不活動的。它並不停留在靜性中。這是記憶， 因為這是知識和真理從其中所出現的儲存庫和泉源。 表明 "真理" 的希臘語詞是Α-λήθεια (A-lethea)， 這是一個綜合詞， 包括著否定字 "α" 以及結尾字 "λήθη" (lethe， 忘卻) 。換句話說， Αλήθεια (Alethea) 意味著 "那被記得之事"， 或者，"那不曾被忘卻之事"， 但上升到記憶表面之事。因此， 真理來自於記憶之內。但是真理是在見光之時而被描繪出的， 也就是經由對事物的認識。而那就是所謂的知識，即， 當真理進入天光之時。 當一位家庭教師使用蘇格拉底的方法的時候 -- 以"產科學" 的方法來獲取知識 -- 他也是從學生的靈魂中取出那些學生在想像上已經知道的事情， 因為根據帕拉圖式的想法， 没有甚麼新的東西。家庭教師没有給予學生任何不是他事先已經知道的新的東西。學生已知道一切； 每件知識皆很明顯地是已經被存放於他的靈魂裡面的東西。由於知識是由靈魂所持有的， 並且因為每個人的靈魂皆是永恆的， 所以它在它的身中運載著知識。結果， 家庭教師所得作的， 就是通過辨證法 (對話： dialectics) 的方式而 "接生出" 知識。他"助產" (就像產科醫生一般) 並且取出。他取出，直到他成功地使學生承認： "是的， 正是如您所說的" 。當學生在他們的對話中說 "是的，老師， 正是如您所說的" 的時候， 那就是"孩子出生"的時刻。(這是產科學的方法，換句話說 。） 那就是當一直存在的真理的記憶從它的儲存庫中被提取出來、並且成為知識的時刻。 如此， 知識是來自於這記憶的泉源的， 而奧古斯丁就是在這種 "描述" 中發現一種很有用的關聯，因為兒子在古典的和基督徒的術語中也是被描繪為"Logos" 。Logos 是一個包含著知識或理智的要素的概念。它是由記憶出生的知識。 但是這個完善的形而上學形的存有者 -- 根據帕拉圖式的想法 -- 不僅是有記憶和知識的； 它並且也有愛， 因為它是由仁慈、好、和美麗之者而吸引住的， 所以呢，身為完善的存有者以及完善的 Nous 的上帝不能缺乏這個愛的要素。奧古斯丁在此發現一種相對於聖靈的東西。如此， 聖靈是這至尊的 Nous 所有的意志 (Will: βούληση) -- 或者愛。 因此， 在他的有關於神聖的三位一體的書寫中， 奧古斯丁成功地用著帕拉圖學派的想法來做出他自己的護教學； 即，將有關於神聖的三位一體的教義翻譯為對在他的環境裡的知識分子們是熟悉的以及可被接受的的語言形式。但是在如此試圖之時，奧古斯丁則偏離開由卡帕多西亞教父們在東方所概述出的原則等等 （他可能根本未聽說過這些基本原則）。 在這裡我們有一個典型的分别的例子。那個分别包括著什麼? 這個基本的分别的其中之一是， 我們能把上述的以類推式的方式只與一個人相聯系上。 那表示著，在理論上來說， 我們能够在只看一個人之時就能提及到三位一體的教義， 而這個人就有著所有的那些要素 (這得根據他已獲得了的完美程度而說）。 但是，根據卡帕多西亞教父們的想法， 我們不能够在僅僅一個人之中發現到對於 三位一體之性的描述。我們需要用上三個人。那是由於卡帕多西亞教父們的神學的特徵是： 神聖的三位一體中的三個人格不是一個上帝的能量， 而是三個完全自立的位格。因此， 為了能表示出那些位格的豐滿性， 我們所作出的比喻必須也是同樣充足的。如果我們想用人來作為根據， 那則必須是三個人， 而不是一個人(或者呢，三個太陽， 或是三個點燃了的火炬等等) 。我們必須有三個完全自立的存有者， 因此，我們在這裡有一個基本的分别。 奧古斯丁的想法可能導致於個人主義， 即， 上帝就像是一個人，有著各種各樣的能量、能力、和性質，而所有這些皆可被瞭解為是"人格" 。但是， 要是這樣， 人格就再有成為假面相的危險 (就如同在Savellianism 之中， 並且在古代的希臘文化之中)；也就是成為一個自我相同的存有者的特徵等等，而不是各自的、 完整的、和充分的存有者。我們 因此在此有一個巨大的分别。 希臘的教父們並未把神聖的三位一體中的人格們搞混為是"上帝的特徵" -- 事實上， 這些心理性的特徵 （如同記憶、知識、和愛）希臘的教父們將其與上帝的唯一本性相聯繫上，而不是與那三個人格。換句話說， 上帝有一個知識， 一個意志， 一個愛， 而不是三個。亦不是一個人格等於是知識， 但其它的人格什麼都不是， 或者呢， 愛是三個人格當中的一個所表現出的愛， 而其它的兩個人格則不愛。所有三個人格皆表達出愛， 因為愛是所有他們三者所皆共有的。但是， 這不是我們所提到的"位格性的特徵" 。這些不是位格們的特徵。位格們的特徵是其他的一些東西，並且我們已經澄清了這些東西是什麼。 我們因此在此有一個分别。在奧古斯丁的例子中， 我們能看到將人的心理性的屬性等等投射於上帝身上的做法所會有的風險； 換句話說， 我們是面對著擬人論的風險的。 奧古斯丁的神學中的其它平面 奧古斯丁把上帝與 Nous 相聯繫上。因此， 當被問： "誰是那是一者的上帝?"， 他就無法以指出神聖的三位一體中的某個人格 （指出神聖的三位一體中的任何的人格） 的方式來做出答復， 因為對他來說， 那些人格只是 Nous -- 唯一的Nous -- 所持有的屬性等等， 而不是"人格" 們本身。這是他解釋和使用最後成為普及性的公式或說法的方式， 即， 上帝是一個本質， 三個人格； 即， 把"本質" 與"上帝"連接上。 因而， 上帝 -- 是為 一者的上帝 -- 就是本質， 並且人格僅僅是我們先前所提及到的屬性而已： 他們是那一個 Nous 的屬性。如此地作， 奧古斯丁就給與了本質一種優先權； 也就是給與了 Nous-上帝優先權， 而從其中人格則以次要的要素的身份顯現出。如此， 奧古斯丁給與 "誰是是為 一者的上帝?" 的這個問題的答復是： "是為 一者的本質" 。 但是在希臘教父們的例子中，我們則有另外一種形式。 對於 "誰是是為 一者的上帝?"的這個問題， 或者， 當我們簡單地說"上帝"之時， 答復則是"父親" 。君主(= 主權) 的這個要素並不是在於上帝的本質或本性之中； 它是在於父親的人格之內的。當我們把"上帝" 與 "父親" 聯繫在一起的時候， 我們是在看著聖經中所有的提及到上帝的方式， 即， "我們的主耶穌基督的神和父親..." 。 當最真確的上帝是被認作為"父親"之時， 我們就會了解到為什麼神聖的三位一體之性是屬於"是為 一者的上帝" 的概念之中的： 既然是為 一者的上帝是父親， 並且"父親" 這字表示著某種關係，所以， "父親" 若是沒有"兒子"的話則是不能存在的。並且-- 很自然地 -- 父親不僅是對兒子來說是父親， 而對聖靈來說也是父親， 只是用著不同的方式而已。因此， 兒子和聖靈自一開始就是自動地被包括在"是為 一者的上帝" 的概念中的。 這是極端重要的， 因為如此有關於神聖的三位一體的教義就成為了一個主要問題。你無法先講"是為 一者的上帝"， 然後再去講神聖的三位一體之性， 好像那只是一個次要問題而已。 我想强這點， 因為， 由於奧古斯丁之故， 西方神學被帶進了這個教義學中的分區； 這最初是出現於經院學派 (Scholastic) 期間的， 並且，很不幸的，這也由一些東正教神學家們所模仿上。即： 首先去審查關於上帝的書章， 審查那是為一者的上帝， 他的屬性， 或者是任何其他你能想像到的東西。然後呢，再去審查另外的、有關於神聖的三位一體的書章， 好像一個人可以只提到上帝而不同時去提及神聖的三位一體之性似的。 但是， 就如同奧古斯丁所聲言過的， 為了能夠主要地以及僅僅地提及到是為一者的上帝， 你必須把上帝與本質相聯繋上， 並且給與上帝一種優先權； 你必須說，本質是先有的， 然後才有人格。這個主題是非常重要的： 我們應該是將優先權給與本質呢，還是給與人格。西方神學則是將優先權給與了本質的 (而許多正教人士也是如此作的) 。 對我們東正教人士來説， "是為一者的上帝" 是父親而不是本質， 並且那就是為甚麽神聖的三位一體之性是我們在講上帝之時所說到的第一件事。我們在講上帝之時所說的第一件事是， "上帝是父親" 。既然這是我們所說的第一件事， 那我們就無法避免承認三位一體之性， 因為"父親"這詞 是一個必須介入到三位一體之性的意思的。 我們在這裡有一個非常重要的、在東方和西方之間的區別。一人是不是可以講上帝， 而不去理三位一體之性? 根據在西方的奧古斯丁的想法， 這是可能的。 並且在一神論中， 在現今所發生的所有對話中， 人們的確是如此作的。 你能夠看見， 在西方這的確是有被做出的。 他們說： "讓我們首先與那些相信上帝是一者的人們有所同意， 那些與我們是同樣的人， 並且排除無神論者。下一步則是將一神論者們與多神論者們隔離開。現今，當然啦， 我們已沒有多少多神論者剰下來； 幾乎是無。多神論已差不多消失了。所有其它的宗教都是一神論的... 。" 但是在這樣的對話中所發生的事情則是， 我們必須假定，我們基督徒們是可以講上帝 -- 是為一者的上帝 -- 而又不同時去說到神聖的三位一體之性的。這的確是我們被奧古斯丁很自然地帶領到的地方 -- 被本質所持有的、相對於人格的優先權。並且因為教義學不是一個學術主題 (即， 一件由理智所能了解到的東西)； 教義學不是只是學習神學的學生們為了獲取文憑而去管上的東西， 但它是有關於所有人的事情，所以呢，它必須對全世界皆有直接性的後果 -- 存在性的後果。 並且在此有一個很嚴重的後果， 那就是： 所有那些在祈禱的人， 他們是在對誰或是對甚麽東西祈禱的呢？ 也許你是可以對上帝的本身祈禱的； 但是， 你可是能夠對上帝的本質祈禱嗎？ 這是奧古斯丁和許多東正教人士們的看法； 他們未仔細地把事情考慮好， 並且把上帝與希臘教父們所謂的"神性" (或是在抽象意義中的"上帝"）相聯繋上。當我說： "我正在對上帝祈禱"， 我是在對哪個上帝祈禱著呢？ 我是可能對是為一者的上帝、是為一者的神性、祈禱著， 或者， 當我們說： "我正在對上帝祈禱"， 我們是不是可能在對三個人格當中的一個或是同時對所有的三個人格一起祈禱著? 你不能對上帝的本質祈禱， 你不能親自稱呼上帝的本質， 但是你能對是為一者的上帝祈禱。如此， 如果是為一者的上帝不是本質， 那麼你是在對誰祈禱著? 你當然是在對父親的人格祈禱著。 我們在東正教裡實際上是有著只對父親引用的禱告的， 把他當成是最真確的神。 很自然地，神聖的三位一體是無法被分割開的； 父親是在哪裏， 兒子和聖靈也就是在那裡。 在上帝中人格們是連結在一起的以及相互擁抱的， 但他們也在位格的方面上是互相不同的。 但是在與上帝對話中的我們呢， 則各自是我們所是的：個人。這允許我們對一個特定的人格祈禱： 我們甚至能對聖靈單獨祈禱， 好比在這個禱告中： "您在天堂中的王，提倡者 (Paraclete)...。" 這是說給聖靈聼的 。我們當然也有許多用於基督身上的禱告， 並且我們也有許多用於父親身上的禱告，而這些在基本上皆是在神聖的聖餐中所用的禱告 -- 它們是聖餐禱告， 謝恩禱告。神聖的聖餐是對於父親所作出的。並且如果你研究一下第一世紀時代的神聖的禮拜文式中的禱告，再看看它們是如何發展成它們在 Chrysostom 和 Basil 的禮拜文式中所有的形式 （而那就是我們現今所有的）， 你就能很明顯地看出，在神聖的禮拜文式中所有的懇求禱告原來是用在父親身上的。 這被保存在 Basil 的禮拜文式中。那個禱告是對父親所說的。很明顯的, 我們只是在對父親講話的， 但這並未排除兒子和聖靈。雖然如此， 我們仍是在與人格對話的， 正如兒子 (在他的肉體中) 是在對父親的人格祈禱和説話的， 即使他因他們之間的相互擁抱之故而繼續是"在於父親身中"的。所以， 他"是在父親身中" 的這件事實很清楚地並沒有阻止兒子與父親對話。這就是位格們的特徵。 但是在我們正在研究的例子中， 事情看來則有點模湖： "知識"在對"愛" 祈禱， 而"愛" 在對"記憶" 祈禱... 。這是無法被適用於任何存在性的經驗上的， 並且更不能被適用於教會的崇拜的經驗上。這就是為什麽，在西方，在禱告這事的方面上，三位一體之性被放在一邊了。 你可以看出，在西方， 你是對一位非常一般性的以及很模湖的上帝祈禱的； 或者呢，你是對上帝的本質、或者呢，你通常是對基督祈禱的。那就是西方人的虔誠和靈修所在之處。記住， 基督是一個人， 我們是可以感覺到他的； 我們是可以更位格性地感覺到他的， 也就是感覺他為一個人。奧古斯丁的神學不僅使得我們可以在三位一體之性之前講上帝， 他並且也使得我們可以對上帝祈禱， 而不是對一個具體的人格祈禱。 對我們來説， "是為一者的上帝" 無疑地就是父親， 至少從崇拜的方面上來說 (而正是這點定義出神學的)， 因為我們是對人格祈禱的。所以呢，"是為一者的上帝" 是父親， 因為神聖的三位一體中的人格們是從他之中發源出的。父親是最真確的上帝； 他不是本質， 他是父親的人格。 這就是區別出東正教之事；這與奧古斯丁是相反的。 將這些有關於神聖的三位一體之性的奧古斯丁的原則等等記在腦裡， 我們將試圖去審查一下出現在東方和西方之間的一個有關於三位一體的神學的非常棘手的問題。這個問題繼續著使我們傷腦筋， 那即是著名的"及聖子" （"Filioque"） 的問題。 及聖子這個問題有兩個方面。其中一個是教規性的，它是與促成及聖子的議論出現的歷史性的問題有關的。 而另一個方面是神學性的，而這被西方人用來辯護及聖子的想法，但卻被東方人用來拒絕及聖子的想法。 為了能了解這個神學性的方面，我們必須對以下兩件事非常熟悉： 奧古斯丁的神學， 以及卡帕多西亞教父們的神學。這是因為西方人是在奧古斯丁的神學的基礎上來講及聖子的神學， 而東正教是在卡帕多西亞教父們的神學的基礎上來講它的。 在來到對於及聖子的神學性的辯護或拒絕之前， 我們應該先提及幾件關於教摫方面的事情，也就是及聖子的這個問題的歷史性的方面。"Filioque" 是被插入於信條之中的一個拉丁語詞，它的意思是 "並且是從兒子來的" 。換句話說， 聖靈不僅是從父親而來的， 但"也是從兒子而來的" 。 這個概念， 這個從兒子出現之事， 在第四世紀期間已存在於西方。我們在Ambrose 中有見到它， 但是在那裏的形式還並未製造出任何神學性的問題，我們並且也在 Saint Maximus 的年代中有見到它， 在那時一種小小的騷動正開始出現。Maximus 一直與羅馬保持著聯繫， 而有一囘他被問到這點。Maximus 曾寫給Marinus 一封信， 在信中可以看出 Maximus 曾被如此問過： "在羅馬那裡是怎麼回事? 他們說 Filioque 有發生在那裡"； 而 Maximus 對此回答道： "是的。這確實是存在於西方的， 但是他們提出這事的方式完全是正統的和正確的。" 所以， 在Maximus 的時代裡，這還不是一個神學性的問題。我們現在是在第七世紀之內。 一直到那時爲止， 我們有一個在神學上是中立的情形。以一個很奇怪的方式， Filioque 忽然進入日常生活中， 並成為了爭議的中心， 而這完全是因政治原因之故。 西方人是最先在第六世紀之時，在西班牙， 在托理多的第三大公會議其間，將及聖子之信仰插入在信條 (信仰的符號)之中的。王 Requarerdos 才從阿理烏斯教中轉信出， 於是他 -- 就如每個新信仰者一樣 -- 狂熱地贊同和支持這新信念。他非常肯定地支持著反阿理烏斯教的立場 （也就是，兒子是上帝）， 而他就是在及聖子的想法中發現了如此作的方法 （因為在這時，及聖子雖然已存在於西方，但是還未被插入於信條中）。於是他就去說服大公會議的人士們將及聖子之事插入於信條内， 以便人們能夠成功地承認，兒子是與父親平等的。到此為止， 事情還是無害的。但那接著而來的事情呢， 則是開放出整個一個新年代的起因。 這是法蘭克人出現的時代， 以及與拜占庭相對的查理曼出現的時代。 (查理曼想建立一個真正的羅馬帝國， 以作為前羅馬帝國的後繼者， 但是拜佔庭的皇帝已認為自己是真正的後繼者，並且拜佔庭帝國是羅馬帝國的自然沿續。) 在準備與拜占庭作戰之時，查理曼於是激發了及聖子的説法， 因為在那時期， 你能僅僅因教條中的一個字而發動戰爭。(那可不同於今天： 今天沒有人會去管宗教中的一個字的定義。) 查理曼將他所有的兵士們召集在及聖子的理論之下， 聲稱拜占庭人是異論者， 因為他們沒有承認這個理論。這個與拜占庭帝國的爭論因而就成爲了信仰上的爭論。 但在這時， 教皇表示，他不同意於查里曼的作法。他認為查里曼威脅到他自己的權威； 因而， 教皇反而去支持拜占庭， 並反對將及聖子的理論介紹在信條之内。為了能成功地證明這點， 教皇利奧三世命令將信條題寫於兩塊匾上，其中卻不包括及聖子之事，然後他再把那兩個匾安置於聖彼得大教堂之内。事實上， 在最近在羅馬所進行的有關於第二大公會議的一個大會中，一位天主教的神學家曾提議出，若把那兩個現在在掩藏中的匾放回到它們原來的地方，那對天主教教會會是好的。 那就是利奧教皇三世將原來的信仰的符號題寫於其的、並不包括著及聖子之事的匾 。 直到那時爲止， 只有法蘭克人去辯護及聖子之事。羅馬並沒有同意於此。羅馬第一次正式地介紹出及聖子之時， 已是第十一世紀了。在1014 年， 在佛德里克四世 (Frederick IV) 的堅持之下 （他是德裔的一個法蘭克人的皇帝）， 教皇同意在羅馬舉行他的加冕儀式，如果及聖子被包括在信條之中的話。 只因權宜之故， 羅馬同意於此事 (羅馬經常為權宜行事) 。這事的時間已來到了：在那時並且也有與Photios 的爭執，因為羅馬堅持在保加利亞實行它的政策， 而及聖子的問題很快地就進入了爭執之中。 在羅馬和君士坦丁堡之間的對立因此就出現了，而有關於及聖子的爭議在其中也有著某種重要性。問題於是就在第十一世紀時代成熟了； 及聖子則正式地被插入於羅馬的信條之内， 而自那時起，羅馬也跟法蘭克人一起辯護著及聖子的想法； 在1054 年之時(羅馬和君士坦丁堡分裂的那年)， 教皇的禁制 (anathema) -- 而 Umberto 已把此放置在Hagia Sophia 教堂之内 -- 甚至包括了指責東方人將及聖子之事從信條中消除掉的控告!! 這可是非常有趣的一件事， 因為西方人在後來的世紀中一直相信是東方人消除掉了及聖子的信念， 而不是西方人加上了它!! 自此之後， 在兩邊皆出現了一大堆神學理論。為了辯解或是為了拒絕及聖子的理論的爭議於是開始了：西方人主要是運用著奧古斯丁的論據， 並用托馬斯-阿奎納 (Thomas Aquinas) 的經院神學來進一步將此開發。我們甚至發現 "誰不相信及聖子的想法，誰就是異論者" 的口號。 而在另一方面， 反及聖子的神學也出現了，並聲稱， 誰接受了及聖子的想法，誰就是異論者。這些爭論持續了好幾個世紀。而到了現代， 這個神學問題更激動地復出了， 主要是因為俄國的斯拉夫主義者 （Slavophiles） 在早前的世紀期間又將此用上了。他們是那些最終領導著 Émigrés 的神學之人士們 (Émigrés 是在共產主義革命之後逃於歐洲的學者們)， 在他們其中有一者再度把及聖子之問題介紹於在東方和西方之間的神學爭議中， 並且實際上是以異論邪說的 (或更糟糕的） 的形式的； 他就是 Lossky 。 如此， Lossky 並不只是把及聖子的問題再度帶進到我們的議論中； 它是以比在中世紀期間還要惡化的形式被再次介紹出的。當然， 現今的人們心理情勢不再允許這種議論上的惡化， 但是如果你去問西方人或是正教人士，什麼是在基本上區別我們的東西， 他們就會回答說，是及聖子的問題。並且這給與了及聖子的神學爭議一個新的模樣。 但是， 那個教規的方面仍然是一樣的。它仍然是個問題， 而這個問題是有以下的形式的： 一個"教會" （譬如西方的教會） 是不是有權利來獨自地把一種新的説法插入於信仰的符號中呢? 就是在此處事情是教規性的：一邊性的對信條的改變， 那是不是允許的， 尤其是當這個信仰的符號是由大公會議所決定出的東西? 一個團體在沒有得到其他團體的同意之下，如何可以隨便地改變它? OODE 的觀察： 我們需要在此指出，在有關於這個事件的方面上，曾有一些非常重要的大公會議： 譬如第八次大公會議，包括 Photios the Great 在内(879-880)； 以及 1341、1347、和 1451 年的 Hesychast 大公會議 (第九大公會議)； 再來，最近所舉行過的君士坦丁堡的會議 (1722 年, 1727 年, 1838 年和其他的)； 以及那些被聖靈所啓發的聖徒們， 譬如 Mark of Ephesus, Athanasios of Paros, Nicodemus of the Holy Mountain, Nektarios of Pentapolis，等等。這些人以他們的福音性的、教父性的、和大公會議型的神學理論， 公開地譴責拉丁人或讚同拉丁人人士們為異論者。其實， 一般來說， 所有的大公會議和 Patriarchal Circulars 等等， 因為他們有義務保護人民不受到法蘭克人的異論宣傳所影響到， 皆曾使用過非常銳利的語言 -- 即使這些並不是不真實的或完全惡意的 -- 來描述這些議論者。這並且在包括在大齋期 (Triodion) 中的、於修道院中所念的"東正教會議結合" (Synodical of Orthodoxy）中也可見到。在這個東正教會議結合和教父規範的基礎上， 神父Hierotheos of Nafpaktos 在他的一篇文章中強調過， 在天主教中並沒有使徒連續 (來傳送恩典和真理)； 也沒有聖事， 亦沒有任字面意義上的"教會"的概念 。否則， 如果任何簡單的"歷史上的連續" 即能保證構成一個真正的使徒連續性 (正教使徒傳統) 的話， 那我們就必須承認所有的其它異論者和異論邪說領導者們的連續性，而那是不可能的。例如，Saint Mark of Ephesus 説道： «Την μεν αιτίαν του σχίσματος εκείνοι δεδώκασι, την προσθήκην εξενεγκόντες αναφανδόν, ήν υπ’ οδόντα πρότερον έλεγον· ημείς δε αυτοίς εσχίσθημεν πρότεροι, μάλλον δε εσχίσαμεν αυτούς και απεκόψαμεν του κοινού της Εκκλησίας σώματος. Διότι ειπέ μοι: Πότερον, ως ορθήν έχοντας δόξαν ή ορθώς την προσθήκην εξενεγκόντας; Και τις αν τούτο είποι, μη σφόδρα τον εγκέφαλον διασεσεισμένος; αλλά ως άτοπα και δυσσεβή φρονούντας και παραλόγως την προσθήκην ποθήσαντας. Ουκούν ως αιρετικούς αυτούς απεστράφημεν και δια τούτο αυτοίς εχωρίσθημεν... αιρετικοί εισιν άρα και ως αιρετικούς αυτούς απεκόψαμεν». "他們才是提供分裂的起因的人，因為他們公開地表達出要加上 (Filioque)，而 (這分裂) 他們早先就經由他們的牙齒傳達過(口頭上)， 說道，我們(正教人士) 才是首先分離之者， 當我們將他們切離掉， 並從共同的教會的身體中去除了他們。因為， 告訴我， 哪一個才是對的：現有的信仰是正確的， 或者，加上的東西是正確的？ 並且，如果想說這個， 誰又能不承認加上的東西是十分不合適的、無關的、和荒謬的，除非他們已是嚴重地腦子不清的? 因此這不是我們把他們當成異論者並且因此離去他們； 反而是因為他們實際上就是異論者， 並且，因他們是異論者， 我們則切除了他們。"