B. ON COGNIZANCE AND FAITH

B. 意識和信仰

II. Faith

II. 信仰

In the previous lesson we completed our examination of cognizance. And of course with respect to the cognizance of God, we shall repeat the basic points, because they are related to the things we shall be discussing today. I would like to remind you that cognizance (knowledge) has an ontological content, which means that it includes the identity of beings; that is, I acknowledge the existence of a being. This kind of identification, of recognition of a being’s existence: that this being exists and not another; that this is this, and not another; that this here is this table, and not the other table. “Identifying” does not simply imply that this being is a being, but that it is this being and not any other being. We furthermore said that knowledge, as a means of identification of beings, is two kinds: a) It is the knowledge of things, i.e., of beings which appear as objects before us, which are given, which we identify because we are compelled to identify them; we identify them, we recognize them, by the method of isolating them from other objects; by describing their characteristic attributes based on the broader experience which we have. We place them inside a lattice of relationships, along with other objects that we recognize, so that, from “things”, we make them “utilities”, which we can utilize. This kind of knowledge cannot apply to God, for the obvious reasons that were explained. b) We now look at the other kind of knowledge, which we described as the knowledge pertaining to personae, that is, the identifying of a being in a state of freedom and love. “In a state of freedom” means that this being does not compel us to acknowledge its presence; that although it has certain characteristics and attributes which we may recognize, it willingly reveals its presence to us, and we likewise willingly identify it and acknowledge its existence. Knowledge is not forced on us in this case; we acquire this knowledge in a state of independence. “In a state of love” means that we acquire this identification of the other, within a loving relationship. The other being is absolutely essential to our own existence; it is an existential inter-dependence. Thus, we come to know someone – God in this case – not in the form of an impersonal power that imposes His presence on us because of His attributes – His powers, let’s say – but, we come to know Him as a persona Who comprises part of a loving relationship that is an integral and necessary part of our very existence. And we subsequently recognize Him because He willingly reveals Himself and not because we are led there by our knowledge of the world (as in Platonism), or because of a logical observation or persuasion. It is not about a knowledge derived from a logical persuasion. We also said that this knowledge of God is offered to us within a loving relationship in which God is identified eternally, He is known eternally, despite us and despite the world; and this loving relationship is the relationship between the Father and the Son. We therefore identify God in Christ, in the Son alone, by becoming a part of this existing relationship ourselves. Only the Son knows the Father. Whether in essence or by nature, we cannot know God, nor should we seek to thus know Him, because that would imply knowing Him compulsorily, i.e., based on His attributes. This is what is implied, when we say that God is known by Christ only. But because this method of knowing God also involves the factor of love, of a loving relationship, God is consequently known within the framework of a community that is created by the Holy Spirit, and that is why we cannot get to know God without Christ and without the Holy Spirit, Who shapes this lattice of loving relationships into a community. On the basis of these observations, we shall proceed to examine the meaning of faith; starting from today, we shall examine the main elements of Dogmatics, as presented in the Symbol of Faith (the Creed). This structure of Dogmatics is the only correct structure. If we stray from this structure, we systematize the dogmas on the basis of logical categories, e.g., when we have dogmatic concepts such as “salvation” etc., and we process all these meanings and make them part of a system, Dogmatics becomes a system of logic. However, if we examine the Creed, which, as we said, is not a logical structure, but is a structure based on existential relations that are introduced from the moment of baptism, and especially during the divine Eucharist, then we can consider ourselves on safe ground. Well, the Creed – the Symbol of Faith - commences with “I believe…..”. What is the meaning behind “I believe”? The problem with the relationship between knowledge and faith as you probably know, is one of the basic problems; but, the overall problematics behind it have their roots in certain prerequisites that developed in the West, which do not apply to us. The matter of knowledge and faith is for many a dilemma. You either know, or you believe. Whoever believes, forsakes knowledge : this is the dilemma of “believe, and do not inquire” that is often quoted. There is a perception that knowledge precedes faith, or the reverse; that faith precedes knowledge and that at any rate it seeks the logic therein, as Augustine had said. This same theme, is a variation on the problem which, in a way, we have already touched on, i.e., if love precedes knowledge or knowledge love. In other words, can we love something that we do not know? The point had already been raised by Augustine. An answer was also given, and it had become prevalent in the West, to be later developed by Thomas Aquinatus in person, as well as by other, major Western thinkers. Their stance was that if you don’t know, you cannot love; that we cannot love something that we know nothing about. Therefore, philosophically this would mean that the relationship that we create with a being, must have the prerequisite of objective recognition of that being. All of this, rests on the premise that knowledge is a matter of mental conception, while love is something emotional. But, we saw in the previous lessons that things are not like that for us; that in other words, you cannot know unless you love, as we saw in the Apostle Paul, in John’s 1st Epistle, etc. However, we must elucidate this somehow, because it isn’t proper to distinguish between knowledge preceding love, or love preceding knowledge. This is equally wrong; we do not love, in order to attain knowledge. The correct thing to say – as has become evident from what we have said up to now – is that these two are identical, i.e., that knowledge is love and love is knowledge. Because, when love is comprehended as a relationship between personae, and not as an emotion or a natural attribute, it is then that this relationship is created, in which the other’s identity is revealed. And that is the meaning of “knowledge”: the revealing, the recognition of a being’s identity. Hence, knowledge becomes actual, through a relationship of this kind, either through love, or with love, or within love. It follows that knowledge and love do not oppose one another; neither does one precede the other, however, they do relate to one another. One could say the same about faith. Faith and knowledge are basically related. They are the same thing. Let us examine this more detail. I would like us to firstly bear in mind the historical prerequisites of that which we call “Symbol of Faith”. We have to refer back to the first lessons once again, basically to the liturgical experience of the Church. What does “I believe” signify, within the framework of the Symbol of Faith?   As you may perhaps know, during the ancient Church’s baptismal rite that was delivered to us in the 2nd century by Justinian (and later by Cyril of Jerusalem in more detail), in order for someone to be baptized, they must first be submitted to certain exorcisms; these exorcisms were accompanied by an invitation to the person being baptized to turn away from the West, and to face the East. This is a very important liturgical rite, because it denotes an act of reversal, of changing one’s position, from West to East. Further along, we shall see what meaning this about-face towards the East carries. However, the reversal itself signifies that in order for a person to declare “I believe”, he must firstly change his stance towards beings. Consequently, Faith is basically a stance that a person takes towards existence, and this stance is most assuredly the opposite of the stance that he takes with his biological existence. When man is born, he takes a stance towards life, towards beings, towards God. Well, this must be overturned, and afterwards, the about-face towards the East will take place (we shall see what this means). You most certainly cannot say “I believe”, if you remain fixed in the same direction that you have taken from the moment of your biological birth. Before analyzing this matter of “towards the East”, let’s take a look at the other basic aspect of this liturgical rite, which is, that the words “I believe” are in actual fact a response to a question. They can never be something that originates on its own, from whichever stance or whichever thought or placement that man may personally have. One must reply, to a question that is posed by others. The others, who pose the question, are the community of the church. Consequently, it is not possible for a person to state “I believe”, outside the framework of the community of the church. A person cannot develop faith by remaining locked up, alone in his room; it is only possible within the community that poses this question. Thus, the words “I believe” are a reply to a question, and they cannot be presumed to be without a question. The second basic element is the one that involves the “about-face towards the East”, which we shall see is of immense importance. As you know, liturgically the East is the direction towards which the prayers of the early Christians were offered, because it is from that direction that Christ’s coming was expected. It was therefore the ultimate - eschatological let’s say – point of reference within the church’s liturgical rites. The turn towards the East therefore signified that we turn towards that point from which we anticipate the End of Time to enter and to materialize. From this aspect, Faith could therefore be viewed as an about-face turn towards the End of Time. Now note carefully how, on the basis of these observations, the definition of the term “faith” becomes more comprehensible, as seen in the Epistle to Hebrews. You know that the only systematic definition of “faith” that we have, is the one found in the Epistle to Hebrews, chapter 11 verse (a) : “…faith is the substance/hypostasis of things hoped for, and the grasping of things not visible..”. What do we see in this verse, in this definition of faith? Well, exactly those elements that I have tried to describe and shall analyze again. The first element is that faith is knowledge. It is an existential identification. Notice how the author uses the word substance - ‘Hypostasis’: “…faith is the substance…” . The Hypostasis is an existential expression. We can translate it, with exactly that which I named existential identification; that something actually does exist; that it is precisely this, and not something else. It was because of this interpretation of Hypostasis, that the term was officially included in the 4th century Dogmatics. Therefore, when we say that faith is hypostatical, we mean that with faith we can acquire recognition, or identification, of a being. And naturally, “…of things” – or, similarly, of points in the same direction, ontologically. But the second element is that this knowledge, this identification, this hypostasis, is eschatological. It is the “ substance of things hoped for…”, of things that are to come, things that we do not have before us at this moment. Therefore, it is with faith that one turns towards the future, towards the End of Time, and one acknowledges as substantial (notice the term substance) those things that from a physical aspect are without substance. Hence the second part of the expression, which clarifies the first part : “….. the grasping of things not visible..” , things, which we cannot see – and here, the term “visible” has a certain Platonic background. The Epistle to Hebrews cannot be interpreted in any other way. When he says “ things not visible”, he is placing his finger on the Greeks’ focal point of knowledge, which was vision. Vision, therefore, generally means knowledge. The things that can be observed are those that convince us of their existence. Things “not seen” are those that are not subject to scrutiny by the senses in general. Hence, it is not a matter of vision alone, but any kind of scrutiny by the senses. Now, where is the importance here? The importance lies in that which I mentioned in an earlier lesson; that, while we cannot claim faith in those things that we can see, i.e., things that can be subjected to scrutiny by our senses (and this is where we must broaden the scope and not limit ourselves to the senses, but must also include logic, i.e., whatever convinces us logically, whatever convinces us through our senses, whatever convinces us objectively), on the contrary, we can claim faith when something convinces us, but not objectively, on account of our being obliged to recognize its existence. Thus, the notion of freedom once again presents itself, in faith. We do not believe because we must believe; or because we are obliged to believe. Whatever I said about knowledge previously, the same things apply, to faith. My presence here is perceived by your senses, by your vision; it is important for you, from the aspect of knowledge. You cannot say that you do not recognize me, or do not identify me ontologically, because it is imposed on you by your senses; it is a compulsory knowledge for you. This is due to the fact that knowledge can be grasped; my substance/hypostasis is grasped by your senses, or by the senses of your mind - by your reasoning. Whichever the case, whether by reasoning or by the senses, that which is important, is that you cannot avoid acknowledging the hypostasis of a being, therefore, based on the definition in Hebrews, this cannot be called “Faith”. Faith, therefore, is not something that the nature of things imposes on us as compulsory knowledge, nor is it something that is imposed on us by experience or by history; instead, it is that which comes to us as a hypostasis from the hereafter; it does not come from within history, or experience, or from the “not visible”. Which means that faith is not derived from things governed by nature and the senses. In other words, faith calls upon us to take a leap beyond compulsory knowledge. We cannot combine these two things. And this compulsory knowledge is a very sensitive thing, because it can also have a psychological inference in which case, faith can be interpreted as trust between two persons. A child trusts its mother. Would we call this faith? This is not what the term implies here, because this trust springs from a natural and empirical cause. The child has become convinced that its mother naturally loves it. From as early as gestation, the maternal filter has convinced it that its mother cares for it, and it is thus convinced empirically when it sees the dawn of life, where again the mother is there to take care of it. This is why a child cannot be fooled as to who loves it and who doesn’t. It has tremendous intuition that comes from a grasping of “things not visible”, but very well “perceived”. Obviously, this kind of trust cannot comprise the definition of faith; it is just plain trust, which is the way many people often perceive faith. I would say it is something much more dramatic. The dramatic thing about faith is that you are actually executing a giant leap, or a turn. What happens then? Your basis, your hypostasis, no longer reside in those things that nature offers you as secure and governable things. Hence, your faith is not supported on the prior experience of these already confirmed things; it comes from that turnabout, towards things that cannot be grasped by the senses. Faith, therefore, involves a non-support of our security, of our substance, by anything that can be grasped logically by our senses or our experience, because that would comprise a form of compulsion. From a positive viewpoint, it means placing our security in whatever cannot be grasped by our senses and cannot be confirmed by our experience. And when I say experience, I am referring to historical experience, as well as psychological experience, which may be pursuant to faith, but is not a presupposition and a basis for faith. This lifestyle was the one pursued by the first Christians, in a way that is difficult for us to comprehend today. All these definitions of faith, which we also see in Hebrews and are a taken for granted during the baptismal experience, had the following prerequisites: Upon being baptized, and subsequently embracing faith, the first Christians were asked to thoroughly change the basis of their hypostasis. The source of their identity could no longer be found in the things that other people resorted to. This meant chiefly two things, two kinds of relations, which placed them under crisis. And that is why faith was called “crisis”: because they went through this important crisis, this significant turnabout, this turn from the West to the East. One kind was biological relations. And this is a basic kind, because it is the first thing that gives us a sense of security. I mentioned the child earlier on. Its security was founded in its physical relations with its parents, with its family. If, therefore, it is removed from inside these relations, and you then ask it to identify itself, to relate itself, or be identified by us, in other words, to be recognized independently of these relations, then you are asking it to be uprooted, to make a change in its hypostasis. The second kind, which was also determinative for one’s sense of security, for one’s identity, is that of social relations; specifically, the kind that existed between the first Christians, as it still does today, i.e., the political element, or civilian. In other words, imagine a person travelling without a passport; a person who is not acknowledged by any public authorities. He would be the most non-existent person; essentially the most ignored and unrecognized. He cannot even identify himself; neither can he have a sense of security. Because security stems from the fact that I belong to a certain community, to a certain country, which can vouch not only for my integrity, but for my very existence – that I indeed exist. Quite often, one wonders why birth certificates are required. There can be no more obvious thing, than the fact we were born; nevertheless, someone has to certify that we were born, otherwise, without this social factor’s certification of our birth, it would seem that we were never born. Therefore, if we are not recognized by the state, that we belong to it, we have no social basis for security. Just as if we had no family, no parents, we would have no biological basis. These two bases are the ones that define our identity, and these are also the governable bases, of things “visible”. Here is the premise, on which the definition of faith relies, and the first Christians’ experience was of this kind. They were asked to do two things, with their faith and their baptism. Firstly, they had to forsake even their family. To the extent where we read in the Gospel that “if you do not forsake your kindred, you cannot follow me”, as Christ said. Luke also stresses this point, with these harsh words: “if you do not hate your kindred, you cannot follow me”; in other words, a complete uprooting. You cannot attain faith unless you uproot yourself from the security provided by your biological hypostasis. The second thing – which again applied to the first Christians but does not apply to us – is that they had no civilian recognition. It was necessary for Constantine the Great to come along, and bestow legal recognition to Christians. They were – in a way – outcasts, and they lived as outcasts. And that is why Paul says in his Epistle to Hebrews that “we have no permanent city here, but we yearn for the one that is to come”. This is a paraphrasing of the definition of faith. “City” here implies the constitution. “Our constitution exists in the heavens”. “We have no city” in this context means that we do not have any civilian hypostasis, we have no identification, we have no passport as Christians.

在之前的課堂中我們已完成了關於意識的檢討。當然， 在關於對上帝的意識這方面上，我們將得重複一些基本的要點，因為它們與我們今天所要討論的東西是有關聯的。我想提醒你， 意識（知識）是有一個存在性的內容的，這表示著它是包括著事物的自我身分 (identity) 的；也就是，我承認著一件事物的存有。 這種對事物的鑒定 (identification)，這種對事物之存有的認知：這件事物是存在的，而另外那件是不存在的；這是這個，而不是那個；在這裡的這個是這張桌子，而不是另外那張桌子。「確定」(identification) 並不只是表示著， 這件東西是一件東西，但是它也表示著，這是這件東西而不是任何其他的一件東西。此外，我們也說過， 身為為鑒定事物所用的工具的知識是屬於兩種的： a)  它是關於事物東西的知識， 也就是，關於那些出現在我們面前的物體的知識，那些就是那樣子给予我們的東西，那些因為我們被迫識別而識別的東西；我們以將它們與其他物體隔離開的方式，以在我們總共的經驗的基礎上描寫它們的特别性質的方式， 來識別它們和認識它們。我們將它們與我們所認識的其他物體一起放在各種事物以及人們的關係的格架之中，以便能將這些「物體」變為我們能夠利用的有用的東西。這種知識因為我們已解釋過的明顯的理由之故，是不能適用於上帝的。 b) 我們現在來看看另外那種我們已說過是關於人格的知識，也就是，在自由和愛中對某某的認定。 「在自由的狀態中」表示著， 這個存有者並不迫使我們承認其之存有；雖然他可能有我們所能認識到的某些特點和性質，他是自願地對我們顯露他之存有的，而我們也同樣地是自願地認識到他並承認他之存有的。知識在這種情形中不是被迫加在我們身上的；我們也是在完全獨立自主的狀態下獲得到這種知識的。「在愛的狀態中」表示著，我們是在一種親愛的關係以內獲得到對上帝的認定的。這另一者對於我們自己的存在性來說是絕對必要的；這是一種存在性的相互依賴性。所以，我們不是認識某人 -- 在此我們是說上帝 -- 為一種非個人性的能力， 而他又因為他的性質之故 （比如，他的能力）把他的存有強加在我們身上； 反之，我們把他認為是一個包含著在我們的存有中是一個必要部份的親愛的關係的人格。然後， 我們之認識到他是因為他自願地顯露出自己， 而不是因為我們被我們對世界的知識所引導到那兒（如同在柏拉圖學派主義中似的），也不是因為以邏輯所作的觀察或說服之故。這不是一種起源於邏輯性的說服的知識。 我們也說過， 這個關於上帝的知識是在一種親愛的關係之中所提供給我們的； 在這個親愛的關係之中， 上帝是永恒地被識別的， 永恒地被認識的，不管我們是怎樣的或是世界是怎樣的；並且， 這種親愛的關係是那種在父親和兒子之間所有的關係的。 所以，我們是在基督中，也就是只有在兒子中， 才可識得到上帝的，而這是以成為這個現有的關係之中的一部分的方式。只有兒子是認識父親的。不管是在本質上或是在天性上，我們皆不能認識到上帝，而我們也不該想去如此認識到他，因為那會意味著強迫性的認識，也就是以他的性質為基礎而認識的。 當我們說上帝只有是基督所認識的之時， 就是這個意思。但是， 因為這種認識上帝的方式也涉及到愛的這個要素，也就是親愛的關係這個要素，上帝是在由聖靈所制造的團體的結構中所被認識到的， 這就是為甚麼我們若是没有基督或是没有聖靈的話则是不能認識上帝的 -- 是聖靈將親愛的關係等等的格架塑造成一個團體的。 在這些觀察到的要點的基礎上，我們將看一看信仰的意思；從今天開始，我們將看一看在信仰的符號 (the Symbol of Faith)（教條：Creed）中所出現的教義學的主要的重點。教義學的結構是惟一正確的結構。如果我們偏離開這個結構，我們则就在邏輯類別的基礎上系統化了教義，例如，當我們有「救恩」等等的這些概念的時候，我們過濾所有的這些意義並將它們編輯成教義學系統中的一部分，這就使教義學成為了一個邏輯性的體系。但是，如我們已說過的，教條不是一個邏輯性的結構，而是一個建造在從洗禮的時刻開始即有的存在性的關係上的結構 （ 尤其是在聖餐的時候）； 所以，如果我們如此來看教條， 我們则可以認為是安全的。 教條 (Creed) -- 信仰的符號 -- 是以「我相信.....」為開頭的。「我相信」的意思是甚麼呢？知識和信仰之間的關係， 你大概已知道， 是一個最基本的問題之一；但是，在這個問題之中的先決條件是在西方世界中所發展出來的，所以並不是適用於我們的。知識和信仰之間的關係對很多人來說是一個難題。你或者是知道，不然你 就是相信。相信的人，则就是放棄了知識：這就是經常被引用的「只相信就好，不要去詢問」的這個難題。我們有知識是在信仰之前的一種看法，或反之，信仰是在知識之前的， 並在這後者之中尋找邏輯，如 Augustine 之說。這個主題在某種程度上是我們已經提到過的問題之中的一種變化，也就是，是愛在知識之前呢，還是知識在愛之前。換句話說，我們是不是可以愛一個我們不知道的東西？ Augustine 已經提到過了這一點。而他也给予了一個答案，而這個答案後來在西方世界裡變得很流行，並且由 Saint Thomas Aquinas 所親自發展出來（以及其他的西方世界中的主要思想家）。他們的看法是， 如果你不知道，你就不能愛；我們不能愛一個我們一無所知的東西。因此，以哲學性的說法來說， 這意味著， 我們與某某建立起的關係是依靠著對那某某的客觀性的認識的這個先決條件的。而這一切又是依賴著知識是理智所形成的概念、而愛是一種感情性的東西的這種假說。 但是，我們在之前的課堂中已看清， 這回事對我們來說不是如此的；換句話說，你若是不愛， 则就不能知道，就如我們在約翰以及保羅的書信中等等可見。但是，我們必須更加闡明這點，因為想要辨別愛是在知識之前，或是知識是在愛之前， 這是不妥當的。這二者是同樣錯誤的；我們不是為了獲得知識而愛。正確的說法则是 -- 從我們到目前為止已說過了的， 這應變得明顯的 -- 這二者是同樣的事，也就是，知識就是愛，以及愛就是知識。因為，當愛被理解為是在人格之間所有的一種關係、而不是一種情感或是一種自然的性質之時，這種關係就被成立了，而是在其中某某的自我身分才被顯露出。這即是「知識」的意思：某某的自我身份的顯露或是認識。因此，經過這類的關係， 經過愛，或是懷著愛，或是在愛之中，知識则變成一件實際的事。知識和愛， 不是哪個在哪個之前；反而，它們是彼此互相有關係的。 信仰也是同樣的事。信仰和知識是有關聯的。它們是同樣的一回事。讓我們更仔細地看一看這點。我希望大家首先牢記一下我們所謂的「信仰的符號」的歷史性的先決條件。我們必須再一次回到我們的第一節課，也就是教會的禮拜性的經驗等等。 在信仰的符號的結構之內，「我相信」到底表示著甚麼？   你可能已知道，在由 Justinian 在第二世紀時遞交給我們的教會的洗禮儀式中（後來 Cyril of Jerusalem 則更詳細地發展過這些儀式），某人若是想要接受洗禮，他必須首先接受驅魔的儀式 (exorcism)；在這種驅魔儀式中，要受洗者必須將臉從西方轉向東方。這是一個非常重要的禮拜儀式，因為它表示著一種從西方反轉到東方的行為，也就是自我立場的改變。以後，我們將看到這個面朝東方的行為到底有什麼意義。但是，這種反轉的行為表示著，為了能宣告「我相信」，一個人首先必須改變他對事物的立場和關系。所以，信仰在基本上就是一個人對存有所持有的態度，而這個態度正好就是與他對自然物質生物性的存有所持有的態度完全相反的。當一人出生之時，他即對生命， 事物，以及上帝持有了某種立場和態度。而這個態度和立場一定得被推翻，之後，面向東方的轉變才可發生（我們將看到這是什麼意思）。 你肯定地不能說「我相信」，如果你仍然保持著你在出生之時即開始持有的方向。 在分析「朝東方」這回事之前，讓我們先看一下這個禮拜儀式的另一個基本方面，那就是，「我相信」這句話實際上是對一個問題所作出的答覆。它是绝對不能夠自我出現的，無論是從哪一個某某人所能擁有的態度、思想、或是位置開始。一個人必須回答一個由他人所提出的問題。而提出問題的他人呢，就是教會的團體。所以，一個人在教會團體的結構之外， 是不可能聲明「我相信」的。一個人若是被單獨關在他的房間裡， 是不可能發展出信仰的；只有在提出這個問題的團體之內， 這才是可能的。因此，「我相信」這句話是對於一個問題的一種回答，而它是不能被假定是不與一個問題有關系的。 第二個基本的要素則涉及到「面向東方」的這回事； 我們將明白到，這是有龐大的重要性的。如你已知道的，在禮拜上來說， 東方是早期的基督徒們所禱告的方向， 因為他們預料基督的再來是會從那個方向的。因此， 東方可以說是在教會的禮拜儀式中所引用的最終的 -- 讓我們說， 末世的 -- 參閱點。 所以，朝東方的轉向表示著我們轉向於我們預待時間的終點將進入並具體化的那個方向。從這個方面看來，信仰就是朝時間的終點所作出的一個徹底的轉向。 現在仔細注意一下，在這些觀察到的要點的基礎上，「信仰」這辭的定義將變得更可理解的，就如在給予希伯來人的書信中可見。你知道， 我們所持有的「信仰」的惟一的系統性的定義就是在希伯來書中所見到的那個，第十一章第一句：「... 信仰就是所望之事的實底，是未見之事的確據 . ..」。 我們在這個信仰的定義中， 在這篇文章中， 到底看到了甚麼？正好就是那些我已嘗試描述過了的並且再將分析的要素等等。第一個要素則是， 信仰就是知識。這是一種存在性的鑒定。注意作者是如何使用「實底」(substance - hypostasis) 這個字的：「... 信仰是實底...」 實底（Hypostasis） 是一個存在性的說法。我們正好可以以我所謂的存在性的鑒定來翻譯它；也就是，某某東西確實是存在的；它就是這個，而不是另外的那個。就是因為這種對 Hypostasis 的解釋之故，這個辭才正式地在第四世紀之時被包括在教義學之中。所以，當我們說信仰是實底的（ hypostatical） 之時，我們即是意味著， 有著信仰，我們則能夠獲得對某物的認識或是鑒定。自然地，這是「... 對於事物」 -- 或者，類似地，在存在性的方面上，這是對於在同樣的方向中的點。 但是， 在此第二個要素則是， 這個知識，這個鑒定，這個 hypostasis，是末日性的。它是「所望之事的實底 ...」，也就是將要來到的事情，我們在此時此刻還没有的事物。所以，我們是以信仰而能朝向未來、朝向時間的終點的， 並且承認那些從物質性的方面看來並没有物質性或實質性的事物為實質性的（substantial: 注意物質或實質 -- substance -- 這個辭）。因而有這第二部分來解清這第一部分：「..... 是未見之事的確據 ...」，也就是我們所不能看見的事物 -- 在這裡，「可見」這個辭有某種柏拉圖學說的意思。希伯來書是不能以任何其他的方式而被解釋的。當他說「不可見之事」的時候，他是把他的手指直放在希臘人的知識的焦點上，也就是視力。視力，通常即是意味著知識。能夠被看見的事情則就是能使我們相信它們是存在的事情。「不被看見的」事情則是那些不能被感觸器官所仔細研究的東西。因此，這並不只是指視力這件東西，而是指任何感觸器官所能查覺到的東西。現在， 在這裡重要的東西是哪個？ 在此的重要性在於我在之前的課堂中已提及到了的；那就是，雖然我們不能對我們能夠看見的東西 （能够由我們的感觸器官所查覺到的東西）表示信仰（在此我們必須擴大一下範圍而不只限制我們自己於感觸器官而已，但也必須包括到邏輯，也就是，任何能够在邏輯上，或是經由感觸器官， 或是以任何甚麼其他的客觀的方式，使我們相信其之存在的東西），相反地，當某件東西使我們相信其之存有，但是不是以客觀的方式，也不是因為我們有義務認識其之存有之時， 我們則可表示信仰。因此，自由的這個概念再一次地出現，這回在信仰中。我們不是因為我們一定得相信而相信；也不是因為我們有義務去相信而相信。我在關於知識那方面上已說過了的，也必須同樣地用在信仰上。 我在此的存有被你的感觸器官所察覺到，被你的視力所見；在知識的這方面上， 這對你是重要的。你不能說你不認識我，或是在存在性的角度上不識別我，因為這是你的感觸器官所強加於你身上的；這對你來說， 是一種強制性的知識。這是由於知識是能夠被感觸到的原因之故；我的實底 （ substance/hypostasis ）被你的感觸器官所抓住，或是被你的頭腦所抓住 -- 也就是，被你的理智。無論是被你的感觸器官呢，還是被你的理智所抓住，重要之事則是，你是不能避免承認一件事物的實底 （ hypostasis）的，因此，以在希伯來人書中所見的定義為依據，這即不能被認為是「信仰」。 所以，信仰不是一種由事物自然的本性強加在我們身上的強制性的知識，它也不是一件由經驗或歷史強加給我們的東西；反之，它是從將來來到我們身上的實底；他不是來自歷史中，或是存在於經驗中，或是從「不可見的境界」而來的。這意味著， 信仰不是起源於由自然所治理的或是由感觸器官所查覺到的事物之中。 換句話說，信仰呼籲我們走出強制性的知識之外。我們不能够結合這兩件事。並且， 這種強制性的知識是一件非常敏感的事情，因為它也能夠有一種心理性的意思，而在其中，信仰則能夠被認為是在兩人之間所有的信任。一個小孩信任他的母親。我們會稱其為信仰嗎？這不是這個詞在這裡所意味著的東西，因為這個信任起源於一個自然的和經驗性的原因。這個小孩已經相信了他的母親是自然地愛著他的。自從孕育的時候開始，這位母親即使這個小孩相信他的母親是會照顧他的，因此， 當他看到黎明的時候，他就知道母親即會在那裡照顧他，他於是是如此地憑經驗而相信的。這就是為甚麼一個小孩， 在關於誰愛他和誰不愛他這回事的方面上， 是不能够被愚弄的。他從「不可見的」、但是很容易地「被察覺到的」事情的理解中取得了一個極大的直覺性。 很明顯地，這種信任不能是信仰的定義；它只不過是信任，而很多人却經常把它當成是信仰。 我想說， 它是更引人注目的一件東西。信仰是更引人注目的， 因為你在此是在執行一種躍進，一種轉向。然後又怎樣呢？你的基礎，你的實底，已經不再是在於那些由大自然所提供给你的既安全而又可控制的事物之中。因此，你的信仰不是由對這些已經被確認的事物所有的經驗所支持的；你的信仰是來自那個轉向，轉向於那些不能由感觸器官所查覺到的事物。 所以，信仰是一個不由我們的安全性，不由我們的實底， 不由任何我們的感觸器官或體驗在邏輯上所能感到的事物所支持的東西，因為那就會包含到一種強迫性的要素。從一個正片面的觀點來看，這意味著將我們的安全性放置在任何不能被我們的感觸器官所查覺到的或是被我們的經驗所確認的東西之中。當我說到經驗的時候，我是指歷史性的經驗，而不是只指心理性的經驗； 這或許能出現在信仰中，但它不是信仰的一個先决條件或是基礎。 這種生活方式是被第一代的基督徒所追求的，在某種程度上這在今天已是令我們難以理解了的。 所有這些信仰的定義，我們皆可在希伯來書中所見到， 並且在洗禮的體驗中只當作是理所當然的。但是這個定義有以下的先決條件： 在被洗禮以及接受信仰之後，這些第一代的基督徒被請求徹底地更換他們的實底的基礎。他們的自我身分的來源已不能再是位於其他人所為此使用的事物中。這意味著兩件事，兩種關係，將他們推入危機中。這就是為甚麼信仰被叫做「危機」：因為他們經歷了這個重要的危機，這個有特别意義的轉向，這個由西方向東方的轉向。 第一種是生理性的關係。這是基本的一種，因為它即是第一件給予我們安全感的事情。我在之前提及到那個小孩的例子。他的安全性是建造在他與他的父母的關係上，他與他的家庭的關係上。所以，如果他忽然被迫使離開這些關係，然後你再請他識別自己，聯繫自己，或是被我們識別，換句話說，在這些關係之外被認識，你就是在請他將自己連根拔起，在自己的實底中作出大大的改變。 這第二種對一人的安全感或是自我身份來說是有决定性的，則是社交關係；在此特別地是指在第一代基督徒們之間所有的、以及今日仍然存在的社交關係等等，例如，政治或平民性的。換句話說，想像一下一個沒有護照的人；一個不被任何公共當局所承認識别的人。他則會是一個最不存在的人， 最被忽略的以及最不可識別的人。他甚至不能識別自己；他也不能擁有任何安全感。因為安全性起源於我屬於某個社會團體、某個國家的這回事，這個團體或國家不僅僅能夠擔保我為人之正直，也能証實我的存有 -- 因此我是確實地存在的。人們經常想問， 為甚麼我們需要出生證。世上没有比我們已出生了的這回事更明顯的事了；然而，某某人必須證實我們已出生了的這回事，要不然，若是没有這種社會對我們之出生所作出的證明，我們就好像是根本沒有出生過了似的。所以，如果我們不被一個國家所認知，証實我們是屬於它的，我們就没有安全性所需的社交關係性的基礎。就好像如果我們沒有家庭，沒有父母，我們就會沒有生理性的基礎。 這兩種基礎就是定義我們的自我身分的東西，而這些也是「可見到的」事物的可治理的基礎。 這就是信仰的定義所依靠的提論， 而第一代的基督徒的經驗則就是屬於這一類。關於他們的信仰以及他們的洗禮這方面上，他們被邀請做兩件事情。首先，他們必須放棄他們的家庭。這是依照著我們在福音中所讀到的， 「如果你不放棄你的親人，你就不能跟著我」，基督如此地說。路加也強調過這點，以這句刺耳的話：「如果你不恨你的親人，你就不能跟著我」；換句話說，完成地將自己連根拔起。除非你將自己連根拔起， 不再去理由你的生理性的實底所提供的安全性，你就不能獲得到信仰。 這第二件事情 -- 這件事也是只適用於第一代的基督徒們而並不適用於我們的 -- 則是， 他們沒有平民性的認識。我們得等待康士坦丁 (Constantine the Great) 來給予基督徒們一個法律性的認同。他們 -- 在某種程度上 -- 是被社會所遺棄之者，他們就是如這種被遺棄之者而活著的。而這就是為什麼保羅在給希伯來人的書信中說道「我們在這裡没有固定的城市，但是我們渴望著將來的那個」。這是信仰的定義的一種意譯。「城市」在這裡意味著體格 (constitution)。「我們的體格是在天堂裡的」。「我們沒有固定的城市」在此則意味著， 我們沒有任何平民性的實底，我們沒有自我身份的鑒定，我們没有給基督徒們的專門護照。