B. ON COGNIZANCE AND FAITH

B. 意識和信仰

I. On cognizance

I. 關於意識

1. Cognizance of things

1. 對事物的意識

The theories on supposed “natural revelation” maintain that man has an inbuilt cognizance (knowledge) of God, which man then further cultivates. In other words, man is born having knowledge of God. Other theories say that there is no “natural revelation”, only a direct revelation on God’s part. This is a dilemma that developed chiefly among Protestants and Roman Catholics. A leading upholder of the theory that “natural revelation” does not exist, was – and continues to be - in the West : he is Karl Barth. Like all other issues, this problem does not exist within our Orthodox tradition and mentality. Before we start to talk specifically about the patristic views – the views of Orthodox tradition on the subject of knowing God - I would like to first define the problem: what is cognizance. And we shall begin by approaching the subject entirely objectively – let’s say, not as theologians, but as ordinary thinking people, or as scientists, if you wish. What is cognizance (knowledge) ? 1. Cognizance of things When we say that I “know” something, for instance: the table, it means that I am behaving in the following way: I am pointing out this table in order to relate it to my person. Aristotle had introduced this basic principle, which became familiar as the “this here” of Aristotle. When you point towards something and you identify it, saying: this (thing) is ‘this one” and not something else, you are in fact saying that you know (recognize) it. In other words, knowing always has something to do with some kind of identification. From the moment that the object’s identity is lost, then the knowledge of it is also lost. If this table is not this table but another one, then I don’t know it. To be unable to identify it means “I cannot recognize it”. Consequently, the identity of an object or a being is a necessary prerequisite for cognizance (“knowledge”). Now, how do we identify various objects? (This has to do with the gnosiology of every science. We are not speaking as theologians here, but in general, as we already said). And so, in order to simplify matters, I pose the following question: “In what way do I identify this table, and consequently say that I “know” it?” A. This includes a negative action to begin with; in other words, I identify this table and I say that it is a table, thus ruling out that it is something else; I am saying that “A” is “A” and that it is not “B”. Therefore, in defining “A”, I try to define what is not “A”, i.e., by excluding another being. When I say it is this, it means it is not that. B. The second basic action that is contained in the act of cognizance (knowing) is that I am obliged – precisely because I am excluding other objects – to somehow encompass the object of my cognizance; I have to define it. (Pay attention, how the use of words is very important). What is the meaning of the word “define”? The word “define” contains the inference of boundaries, or limits, or terms, which I place around the object. I am indicating it by excluding other objects, but: I am also placing limits around it. C. The third action that I perform, which is a consequence of the second action, is that I am describing it. (here we have another term of gnosiology, which, however, signifies precisely the relating of an object by the method of isolating it) To describe an object means that I inscribe (write) things around that object and thus create a frame around it. I say that “A” is “A” and not “B”, and in this way, I identify it. Now, how do I go about describing it? In order to describe, I utilize certain properties that the object has; for instance, in order to say that I am describing this table, and that I am identifying it by describing it, I need to give it a form. If it loses its form ( as conceded to me by space and time ), I will say that this table is another one and not that one. I identify it as being another. Imagine, if space and time were non-existent, and likewise the ability to isolate and to describe on the basis of the table’s form, thus rendering this table united to the other table to an absolute degree, then, I would no longer be able to know (discern) the specific table. Identity is lost and there will be a confusion of objects. Cognizance (knowledge) will disappear. Consequently, ‘description’ ( usage of the limits that space and time place between two objects ) is a necessary element and is accomplished on the basis of the object’s attributes (for example its form); this is advanced even further (Aristotle analyzed all of this), with the attributes of objects, which originate from a judgment expressed by the object of cognizance. In other words, I say that this table is square in shape; as cognizance of the table progresses, I can now define its form and say it is square. But where did I obtain the concept of “square”? It is a concept. Plato would have said it is an idea that we draw from the permanent cosmos of ideas and then apply to tangible objects. Aristotle says that it is not an idea, but merely attributes that the object itself possesses. In other words, the attribute of squareness already resides within the table. At any rate, for me to say that something is square, I must use a logical shape, which can apply everywhere, and not only to a table. It must also be applicable to other objects. It is not the table only that has a square shape. If we supposed that in all the world, only the table is square in shape, then I could not call it square. I have borrowed the concept of ‘square’ from my experience of another object. We shall examine this eventually; (and you will see how opportune it is, when we apply it to God, which is a very serious issue.) In any case, we are now at a point where we describe the object by using its different attributes, which, apart from its shape, include thousands of other things. The more attributes that I add, the more I “know” the object. For example, it is square; then I go to the colour. It has that colour. Then I go to various other attributes. And, based on all of these, I end up ( and this is our next element ) with the ability to utilize the object. And I can now define the object on the basis of its usefulness. I say that it is a table, because I use it for writing on. Thus, we always have a latent utilitarian aspect to this cognizance, which originates from the identification of an object’s attributes, because these attributes are automatically available for usage. This usage may be aesthetic (i.e. it is beautiful), or the object may be altogether exploitable from a realistic aspect, in which case, I use it for a specific purpose. So, to summarize: For the cognizance (knowledge) of an object, so that we may “know” it, relate it, we must have an exclusion of another object and a description based on the attributes that the object possesses, with the help of time and space. This is because we do not only relate objects that we perceive with our eyes, but also objects that we don’t see. I can relate my father; I know him. He is no longer alive. However, time has made it possible for him to be isolated from me, otherwise, there would have been confusion between my father and myself. If things were totally indistinct, I would never have known my father. I know him, thanks to the distance that time and space have allotted, as in the case of the table. Therefore, this description that I am making with the aid of time and space, is what helps me distinguish that “A” is “A” and not “B”. I can therefore “know” things, on the basis of this procedure of description, which leads me to the detection of attributes. And because of this detection of attributes, I am led – as I said – to their evaluation and their utilization. I can say that this table is larger than the other one; it is better than the other one, etc., etc.. This ability to compare, also offers the possibility to utilize it later; to say: “I want a larger table now; this one is not suitable”. All this procedure of “knowing” resides inside that which we call “scientific knowledge”, which is very much dependent on the cultural level and the cultural era in which one lives, so that one can see which of those attributes comprise useful attributes. For instance, in ancient Greek times, when beauty was important, the attribute of form, of beauty, was the basic attribute by which one could get to “know” something. In our age, and especially in the West, (where we can see how much theoretical sciences suffer), knowledge is accompanied by usage. If you don’t provide something along with knowledge that will be useful and will produce results, you are not providing anything. It is as though you know nothing. This knowledge is of no interest. Why should we speak of God, or of art? What can it “give” us? What are the results? And nowadays, in England, theoretical Schools are in danger of being closed down, because the prevailing philosophy is “how is the industry benefiting from these Schools?…… Give the money to Schools that produce results.” But how is a result produced? From that very procedure of knowledge, which defines and describes and consequently provides the possibility of usage and the benefit through that usage. Well, that is basically the method one uses in science. Although we must stress here that after Einstein and chiefly after the recent quantum theory, we definitely have a change in the perception that the researcher – the one who “knows” – distances himself from the object of his knowledge. Because, as you are aware, natural sciences today believe that the researcher is somehow entangled in the procedure of ‘knowing’ his object and affects that knowledge. In other words, to know that this table is square is not simply a matter of detecting the table’s attribute of squareness; it is as though the experimenter is affecting the result of the experiment. Therefore, the experiment is not simply “the object” that has certain attributes. We too allot certain attributes. And knowledge is an interaction of our involvement within this procedure, to the point that knowledge is entirely changed. We can’t expand on this right now of course. This is just a parenthesis. I would like to say however, that the basic perception, the classical perception prior to Einstein, in short, the common perception of knowledge (cognizance), has those elements that I just described.

這種「自然啟示」的理論聲稱， 對上帝的意識（知識）是建立在人的天生本性之中，一個人在此之後则進一步地將其培化。換句話說，人是在出生之時，就擁有對上帝的知識的。而其他的理論则說， 並沒有「自然啟示」這種東西，僅僅只有上帝對人的直接的自我啟示。這個迷題主要是在新教徒和天主教徒之間所發展出的。 在西方世界中曾經，並且繼續， 贊成「自然啟示」並不存在的理論之人，则是 Carl Barth。 就像所有其他的問題一樣，這個問題不存在於我們正教的傳統和精神之中。 在我們開始特別地談論教父們的見解之前 -- 也就是正教傳統對於認識上帝這個主題的見解 -- 我首先想给我們的問題作出一個定義：到底意識 (cognizance) 是個甚麼東西。在開始時， 我們將以完全客觀的方式來接近我們的主題： 比如說，不是以神學家的身份，而是以普通思考之人的身份，例如， 科學家。 那麼， 意識（知識）是甚麼呢？ 1. 對事物的意識 當我們說我「知道」這個或那個東西的時候 （例如：桌子），這意味著， 我的舉止是以以下的方式來表現出的：我指出這張桌子， 以便將其與我的人格 (person) 相聯繫到。阿裡斯多德 (Aristotle) 曾提出過這個基本的原則，而這個原則變成後來我們所熟悉的阿裡斯多德的「這個，這裡」。當你指向一件事物並將其識別的時候，說：這是 「這個」而不是其他的某些東西，你實際上是說， 你已知道（認識）它了。換句話說，知識總是與確認和鑒定 (identification) 有某些關系的。一但當我們失去了對某事物的認同之時，我們也就失去了對它的知識了。如果這張桌子不是這張桌子而是另外一張桌子，那我們就不算是知道它了。不能認出某件事物意味著， 「我不能認識它」。所以，對一件事物或一個物體的認同就是對它的意識（「知識」）的一個必要的先決條件。 那麼， 我們是如何識別和認同各種事物的呢？（這個問題關系到所有科學的知識學 [gnosiology]。我們在此不是以神學家的身份來談論這點的，而是以一般人的身份； 這點我們已經說過了的）。為了簡化我們所在談論的事情，我只提出以下的這個問題：「我是以甚麼方式來認同和識別這張桌子的，以至能說，我知道它」？" A. 首先， 這包括着一種否定性的行動；換句話說，我認同和識別這張桌子， 並且說它是一張桌子，因而排除了它是其他的某些東西的可能性；我說， 「A 是 A」， 而它不是「B」。所以，在對於 A 作出定義之時，我也是在嘗試着定義出「不是A 的」，也就是說，我排除了它是其他物體的可能性。當我說它是這個的時候，這意味着，它不是那個。 B.在意識（知識）的行動裡所包含的第二個基本的行動则是， 我被强迫 -- 因為我必須排除其他物體 -- 以某種方式含圍住我所意識到的物體；我必須對其作出定義。（注意，文詞的選用在此是非常重要的）。「定義」 (define) 這個詞是甚麼意思呢？「定義」包含着邊界，限制，或極限等等的意思，這些我皆用以圍繞住我所意識着的物體。我以排除其他物體的方式來指示出這個物體，但是：同時我也在它的周圍建立了邊界。 C. 那麼我的第個三行動呢 （這是第二個行動的結果），则是描寫它。（在這裡我們有知識學的另一 個詞；它準確地表明着那種由隔離的方法所作出的聯繫一個物體的方式。）描述一個物體意味著， 我在那個物體的周圍刻入了一些東西（寫）， 以至為它建立了一個框架。我說，「A 是 A 而不是 B」，並且以這個方式，我識別了它。現在，我將如何描寫它呢？為了能描寫它，我將利用這個物體所有的某些性質；例如，為了能說我在描寫這張桌子，並且經過描寫它而認同和識別它，我將需要給與它一個形式 (form)。如果它失去了它的（由空間和時間所給與的）形式，我將說， 這張桌子是另外一張桌子而不是那一張。我將其識別為另一張桌子。想像一下，如果空間和時間是不存在的話，並且以在桌子的形式的基礎上來隔離和描述它的能力也不存在的話，以致這張桌子將與其它的桌子絕對性地交和起來，那麼，我將會不能知道（辨別）這一張桌子。事物的自我身分將會被失去，所有的物體皆會成為混亂的一堆。意識（知識）將會消失。所以， 描寫 （也就是使用空間和時間在兩個物體之間所擺放的界限）是一個必要的要素， 並且它是在一個物體的性質（比如說，它的形式）的基礎上所完成的；再來，這可以以物體的性質更被推進（阿裡斯多德分析過全部這些），這些性質是發源於由對物體的意識所表達出的評判裁決 (judgment) 的。換句話說，我說這張桌子在形狀上是方的；當我對桌子的意識更為進展之時，我能夠定義其形式並說它是方的。 可是, 我是從哪裡獲得到「正方形」這個概念的呢？「正方形」是一個概念。柏拉圖會說我們是從那個永恆的概念的世界裡將其取出來的， 然後再將其用於切實的物體上。阿裡斯多德则說它不是一個概念，而只是一個物體本身所擁有的性質。換句話說，正方形這個性質已經存在於桌子以內。 無論如何，假如我想說某某東西是平方形的話，我必須使用一種到處皆可應用的邏輯性的形狀；這個形狀不能是僅僅可用於桌子的。他一定得適用於其他的物體。世上不是只有桌子是正方形的。如果我們假設在整個世界中，僅僅桌子是正方形的，那麼我們就不能夠稱桌子為正方形的了。我是從我對另一個物體的體驗中借用了「正方形」這個概念的。我們即將調查這點。（不久你將會明白，當我們把這點應用於上帝這個非常重要的問題時，這會是多麼地合時宜的。) 無論如何，我們現在是以各種不同的性質來描寫一個物體的； 除了形狀之外，這還包括了成千的其他的東西。我們越是加上更多的性質，我們也就越是「知道」這個物體。例如，這個東西是方形的；然後呢，我再講它的顏色。他是那種顏色的。然後我再講它各種其他的性質。然後，在所有這些的基礎上，我终於（這是我們要講的下一個要素）有能力利用這個物體。現在， 我可以在其有用性的基礎上再更加定義這個物體。我說， 它是一張桌子，因為我可以在其面上寫作。所以，對事物的意識之中總是隱藏着一種功利性質，而這個功利性質则是發源於一個物體的性質之鑒定，因為這些性質是自動地為我們所使用的。這個使用可能只是屬於審美觀的（即， 這個事物看來是美麗的），或者，這個物體是非常實用的； 在這種情況下，我是為了一個專門的目的而使用它的。 總結：為了能對一個物體有意識（知識），為了能够「知道」它，並與它建立起一種聯繫，我們一定得有對另一個物體的排除， 以及一個基於這個物體所有的性質， 再由時間和空間所建立的對其的描寫。 這是因為我們不是只聯繫到我們所關察到的物體，這也並且包括着我們所看不到的東西。我可以聯繫於我的父親；我認識他。他已去世了。可是，時間能使他與我隔離，不然，我的父親和我自己可能被搞混。如果事物皆是完全模糊的，我则絕不可能認識我的父親。我認識他， 是由於時間和空間所建立的距離之故，就跟桌子的情況一樣。所以，這個我以時間和空間為助手而所做出的描寫，即是幫助我區別「A 是 A 和 A 不是 B」的。 我因此能夠「知道」事物，依照這個引我發現物體的性質的描寫的過程。而且，因為這個物體性質的發現，我能够評估它和使用它。我能夠說， 這張桌子是比那一張更大的；或者，這張比那一張更較好， 等等。 這個比較東西的能力，同時也给與我們以後能利用它的可能性；以後我可以說：「我現在想要一張更大的桌子；這一張不是合適的」。全部這些「知識」的程序皆存在於我們所謂的「科學知識」之中，而這「科學知識」在很大的程度上是依賴着我們所生於的文化水平和文化時代的，以便我們能明白哪些性質是屬於有用的性質等等。例如，在古代希臘的時代，美麗是最重要的， 因此，美麗這個形式的性質，就是我們能够用以認識某件東西的最基本的性質。在我們的時代中，尤其是在西方的世界裡（在此我們可以看到， 理論性的科學到底受了多少損害），知識是被運用所陪同的。如果你不提供以後將會有實用性的，並產生某種效果的知識，那你就不是在提供任何東西。這好像是，你根本甚麼也不知道。没有人對這種知識有任何的興趣。我們為甚麼要講上帝或者藝術呢？它能夠「給」我們一些甚麼東西？它能够有些甚麼結果？如今，在英國的理論性的學校皆面對着被關閉的危險，因為當日盛行的哲學是， 「我們的工業是如何能獲益於這些學校的呢？.....把錢給與那些以後會有作用的學校。」可是， 作用是如何產生的？它是產生於那個给與事物定義， 描述， 並且為其提供使用的可能性和好處的知識的程序。 那在基本上就是在科學中所使用的方法。雖然， 我們在此必須強調， 在愛因斯坦和最近的量子論 (quantum physics) 之後，我們肯定地在對於研究人員的理解中 （「知者」必須與他所知的東西相隔離）感到了一個變化。 因為 -- 你當然已知道這點-- 自然科學家當今相信， 研究人員在某種程度上是被糾纏於他認識物體的過程中的，而他的研究工作也影響到他的知識结果。換句話說，當我們知道這張桌子是方形的時候，我們不只是單單地發現了桌子的平方形的性質的這回事；這好像是實驗者在影響着他的實驗的結果。所以，實驗並不只是一個擁有某種性質的「物體」。我們自己也加上了些性質。知識是我們自己介入在這個程序之中的相互作用，甚至使得知識的本身徹底地被改變。我們在此没有時間來擴展研究這個問題。我們只是在補充式地說一說。我想說的只是，在愛因斯坦之前的基本的關於知識 （意識）的理解，簡而言之，就是擁有以上我已講過的這些要素。